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The past decade has been a golden age for innovation in corpo-
rate and international finance. Fueled by advances in computer tech-
nology and financial theory and attracted by opportunities created by
extreme volatility in financial markets, financial institutions have
been introducing capital market instruments and techniques at an
unprecedented rate.' Whether bearing a name which is reassuringly
simple or dauntingly hermetic, whether negotiated between a finan-
cial institution and its client one-on-one or traded anonymously on
I See, e.g., Miller, Financial Innovation: The Last Twenty Years and the Next, 21 J. FIN.
& QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 459, 460 (1986) ("Can any twenty-year period in recorded
history have witnessed even a tenth as much new development?"); Van Home, Of
Financial Innovations and Excesses, 40 J. FIN. 621, 621 (1985) ("The last six years have
witnessed the greatest number of financial innovations in our nation's history ... ").
Factors other than those identified in the text have also contributed to the
proliferation of new financial products. See infra note 3.
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an exchange, and whether offered domestically or abroad, these new
products punctuate and define the modem financial landscape.
Both a byproduct of and contributor to the integration of world
capital markets, these products also can generate risks with vexatious
international dimensions. Banking, commodities, and securities reg-
ulators have each viewed these risks with increasing concern. Acting
within the framework of a plan to ensure the capital adequacy of
international banks agreed to in July 1988 by twelve industrialized
countries (the "BIS Accord"),2 banking regulators seized the initia-
tive. These regulators have not only reined in the trillion dollar mar-
ket for the "swap" - the quintessential new financial product - but
they have done so in a manner which is remarkable for its level of
international cooperation and analytical sophistication. The BIS
Accord, when considered with the domestic regulations which imple-
mented it in each of the respective jurisdictions, constitutes the para-
digmatic international regulatory effort to deal with the new
generation of financial products.
Ironically, this state-of-the-art regulatory system is largely indif-
ferent to the underlying process of financial innovation by which new
financial products continue to arise and evolve. This Article argues
that such indifference undermines the integrity of this regulatory sys-
tem. The 1980s have spawned a plethora of new financial products
as well as a distinctive new process of financial innovation rooted in
the institutionalization of change and the application of advanced
financial theory. Examination of the law and economics of the swap
and of the financial innovation process reveals that this process
presents serious - but as yet barely recognized - challenges to the BIS
Accord's regulatory system. In addition, the complexities involved
in evaluating even an incremental modification to the regulatory sys-
tem is revealed by way of an example. Such complexities suggest the
pressing need to analyze systematically the full range of possible
changes which would render the international regulatory system
more accommodating of the financial innovation process.
INTRODUCTION: NEw FINANCIAL PRODUCTS AND THE MODERN
FINANCIAL INNOVATION PROCESS
The size and diversity of the market for new financial products
2 See COMMITTEE ON BANKING REGULATIONS AND SUPERVISORY PRACTICES,
INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS
(1988) [hereinafter BIS ACCORD), rprinted in 51 Banking Rep. (BNA) 143 (1988).
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are mind-numbing.3 The volume figures associated with the "swap,"
the most important and one of the most complex of this new wave of
financial products,4 are indicative. The volume of outstanding
"interest rate swaps," a mechanism for dealing with interest rate vol-
3 In 1988 alone, dealers issued $172 billion of hedging products known as
"caps," "collars" and "floors." Forde, LBOs Spur Rise in Rate Protection Deals, AM.
BANKER, Mar. 13, 1989, at 2; see also infra notes 187-89 and accompanying text
(describing growth of these hedging products). One of the studies which followed in
the wake of the stock market crash of 1987 noted that the value of stocks represented
by the volume of equity-related futures contracts traded on the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange daily is about twice the value of stocks traded on the New York Stock
Exchange. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS 5
(Jan. 1988) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE].
For discussions of the factors which contributed to the flourishing of new
financial products, see STUDY GROUP ESTABLISHED BY THE CENTRAL BANKS OF THE
GROUP OF TEN COUNTRIES, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETrLEMENTS, RECENT
INNOVATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BANKING 169-87 (1986) [hereinafter CROSS REPORT];
Finnerty, Financial Engineering in Corporate Finance: An Overview, FIN. MGMT., Winter
1988, at 14; Germany & Morton, Financial Innovation and Deregulation in Foreign
Industrial Countries, FED. RESERVE BULL., Oct. 1985, at 743; Kane, Interaction of
Financial and Regulatory Innovation, 78 AM. EcoN. REV. 328, 330-31 (1988); Lee, What's
with the Casino Society?, FORBES, Sept. 22, 1986, at 150; Morgan Guaranty Trust
Company, Global Financial Change, WORLD FIN. MARKETS, Dec. 1986, at 1; Ross,
Institutional Markets, Financial Marketing, and Financial Innovation, 44 J. FIN. 541, 542
(1989); infra notes 8-23, 79-87 & 191 and accompanying text.
4 See, e.g., Ardalan, Foreword to INSIDE THE SWAP MARKET 7 (3d ed. 1988)
(describing swaps as "potentially the single most important financing development
that has taken place in recent years"); Ebert, The Globalization of Financial Markets:
Opportunitiesfor Corporations and Financial Institutions, WORLD BANKING, Jan. 1987, at 23
(describing swaps as "the most visible innovation"); Forsyth, The $150 Billion Baby:
Interest Rate Swaps Are Growing by Leaps and Bounds, BARRON'S, Aug. 19, 1985, at 15
(describing swaps as "arguably the capital markets' most important development of
the decade"); Layard-Liesching, Swap Fever, EUROMONEY, Jan. 1986 (supplement), at
108 ("Swaps are at the centre of the global financial revolution."); Selling Fridges to
Eskimos, EUROMONEY, Apr. 1989 (supplement), at 55-56 (quoting one swaps officer as
saying that "[s]waps [computer] systems are the most complex systems being
developed in the financial world"); Vittas, The New Market Menagerie, BANKER, June
1986, at 16, 17 (describing swaps as "the most far-reaching innovation in recent
years").
One enthusiastic commentator noted:
The swap market has turned the world's capital markets into a global
Olympic Games. Every day, barriers are broken and records set as rival
banks and corporations try new techniques to arbitrage between ever-
changing market conditions. Every now and then the swap market will be
stunned by a fresh breakthrough, then overrun as the pack learns to
imitate. Never before have transactions depended on such a fine
combination of mental gymnastics, client relations and aggressive
marketing. Swaps are the greatest challenge yet to the agile banking
mind, and like the study of the universe itself, there is no horizon.
Shirreff, The Way to Any Market, EUROMONEY, Nov. 1983, at 60.
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atility, increased two hundred fold in five years.5 Combined with
"currency swaps," a corresponding mechanism for dealing with cur-
rency exchange rate volatility, the total volume of swaps outstanding
as of the end of 1988 was over $1.3 trillion.6
The diversity of modern financial products, exemplified by
unsecured debt instruments offered by corporations and by banks in
recent years, is extraordinary.7 Interest may be linked in esoteric
ways to various benchmark interest rates, the general price level, the
prices of specified commodities, or to various stock market indices.
It also may be set through auction procedures or be fixed at zero.
The principal amount may be denominated in a currency different
from that in which interest is paid or be denominated in a basket of
currencies. The instruments may mature on the date specified, some
prior date, some later date, or no date at all. The permutations seem
endless.
More important than the characteristics of any particular finan-
cial product is the epochal change in the process by which new finan-
cial products are invented, commercially introduced, and then
diffused in the marketplace. A change in the process of financial inno-
vation has begun to emerge.8 At its most impressive, this process of
financial innovation now has many of the features associated with the
5 See Rogers, Interest Rate and Currency Swaps, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES
MARKETS 397 (1988); see also infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
6 See International Swap Dealers Association, Press Release (July 26, 1989)
[hereinafter ISDA Press Release]. More precisely, the $1.317 trillion swaps market
consists of interest rate swaps with a total "notional amount" of $1 trillion and
currency swaps with a total "notional amount" of $317 billion. See id For a
description of "notional amount," see infra text following note 39.
7 See COOPERS & LYBRAND, A GUIDE TO FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 9-38 & 65-75
(1987); FRANKLIN SAVINGS ASSOCIATION, OFFERING CIRCULAR FOR COLLATERALIZED
REAL YIELD SECURITIES DUE 2008 (Jan. 20, 1988); A. SARWAL, KPMG INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND TRANSACTIONS 103-33 (1989); J.
WALMSLEY, THE NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS: AN INVESTOR'S GUIDE 185-226 & 271-
316 (1988); Brenner, Fleet Sells CD With Rate Tied to Bull or Bear, AM. BANKER, Sept. 8,
1987, at 1; Gerstell, Developments in Off-Exchange Financial Products, 21 REV. SEC. &
COMMODITY REG. 1, 1 (1988).
8 This Article will use the term "financial product" to refer to capital market
instruments or techniques intended to provide a return as specified in the governing
agreement. The term "innovation process" will be used to refer to the manner in
which a financial product is developed, introduced commercially, and diffused in the
marketplace. Cf P. STONEMAN, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
8 (1987) (describing the Schumpeterian tradition of breaking the process of
technological change down to invention, innovation, and diffusion); Freeman,
Innovation, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE - A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 858 (1987) (same).
Although "financial innovation" often is used to refer to any change in the
capital markets, this Article has as its focus a narrower range of phenomena. Thus, it
will largely avoid discussing incremental improvements in long-standing financial
1989]
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process of technological innovation seen in recent decades in bio-
technology, computer, and other science-based enterprises. The
features which epitomize science-based enterprises are becoming
applicable to major financial institutions.
Like technological innovation before it, financial innovation is
moving from the hands of imaginative craftsmen to those comforta-
ble with theory.9 The heavy reliance on computers, the complexity
of some of the products developed, the patenting of financial prod-
ucts and, sometimes, the generation of financial theory long before
its application, all suggest the increasingly conceptual nature of the
innovation process.10 Bankers with liberal arts backgrounds who,
through pluck and native ingenuity, develop useful new products
through hands-on tinkering are giving way. The spotlight is moving
instruments and techniques as well as changes in the means by which funds are
transferred and in the means by which corporate ownership shifts occur.
9 For discussions of the role of science in current technological innovation, see
C. FREEMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION 15-18 (2d ed. 1982); Dosi,
Sources, Procedures, and Microeconomic Effects of Innovation, 26 J. EcON. LIT. 1120, 1136
(1988). Cf Kline & Rosenberg, An Overview of Innovation, in THE POSITIVE SUM
STRATEGY: HARNESSING TECHNOLOGY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH 275 (R. Landau & N.
Rosenberg eds. 1986) (discussing the overall process by which modern technological
innovation occurs).
For discussions of the importance of theory in modem financial innovation, see
Chew, Preface to THE REVOLUTION IN CORPORATE FINANCE ix (J. Stern & D. Chew eds.
1986); Faulhaber & Baumol, Economists as Innovators: Practical Products of Theoretical
Research, 26 J. ECON. LIT. 577, 588-91 (1988); Lee, supra note 3, at 156; Slutsker,
Physicsfor Investors, FORBES, June 27, 1988, at 192; Van Home, supra note 1, at 624.
This new emphasis on theory has resulted in a heavy demand on Wall Street for the
services of prominent academics. See Laderman, Fischer Black is Practicing What He
Teaches, Bus. WE., Aug. 6, 1984, at 75; Uchitelle, A Bidding War for Professors Who Know
Wall Street Ways, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
10 For discussions of the utilization of computers, see French, The Comeback of the
Number-Crunchers, EUROMONEY, Oct. 1988, at 69, 71 (noting how one kind of
quantitative analysis is advancing particularly quickly because of increases in
computational power); Landis, Will Supercomputers Be Super for Banks?, BANKERS
MONTHLY, Sept. 1988, at 39, 40 (describing a German bank which uses ten
supercomputers to analyze foreign exchange opportunities); Schmerken, What's Next
on Wall Street's Automation Agenda: Trading Technology, WALL STREET COMPUTER REV.,
Apr. 1989, at 44 (discussing commercial and investment banks engaged in
developing better computer systems in connection with their capital market
operations); Verity, Street Smarts: The Supercomputer Becomes a Stock Strategist, Bus. WE.,
June 1, 1987, at 84 ("Suddenly supercomputers are in on Wall Street.").
For an introduction to some of the intellectual property issues, see Petruzzi, Del
Valle & Judlowe, Patent and Copyright Protection for Innovations in Finance, FIN. MGMT.,
Winter 1988, at 66-71. Intellectual property disputes have already occurred in the
financial innovations area. See, e.g., Cox, CenTrust Denies Patent Violation, AM. BANKER,
Apr. 26, 1989, at 2.
For an instance of how theory was ahead of application, see A Bank Has to Know
Its Way Around the Globe, EUROMONEY, Apr. 1989 (supplement), at 5.
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toward Ph.D.'s with quantitative or physical science backgrounds l
relying on the nuances of such matters as "option pricing theory"' 2
and hypotheses pertaining to the detection of enemy submarines and
the prediction of weather.'l Whether called "quants," "lightbulb
heads," "rocket scientists" or "rocketo kagakushas,"' 4 they compete
on a global level 5 to take advantage of subtle differences among and
inefficiencies in today's volatile capital markets.' 6
11 The top quant at Salomon Brothers, Martin Leibowitz, has a master's in
physics from the University of Chicago (obtained at the age of 19) and a master's and
doctorate in mathematics. See Rosenberg, Salomon's Idea Machine, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR, Nov. 1988, at 80, 81. Until September 1989, the head of the analytical
proprietary trading unit at Morgan Stanley was a former astrophysicist (and Jesuit
seminarian). See Hansell, Inside Morgan Stanley's Black Box, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR,
May 1989, at 204, 205; Power, Hard Times in High-Tech Trading Spark Shake-up at
Morgan Stanley, Wall St.J., Sept. 25, 1989, at C1, col. 4; cf Bang That Drum, BANKER,
Mar. 1989, at 19 (discussing academic backgrounds of Salomon Brothers' London
trading group); Pitman, Swooping on Swaps, EUROMONEY, Jan. 1988, at 80 ("Whether
swaps teams include physicists, mathematics PhDs, technicians or magicians,
undisputed agreement is reached on the importance of state-of-the-art technical
backup systems.").
12 One observer notes that "the revolution in finance is at bottom a change in
the theory of valuation," and a challenge to the "accounting-oriented intuition that
continues to pass for the collective wisdom of the business community." Chew, supra
note 9, at ix.
13 See Slutsker, supra note 9, at 193; Verity, supra note 10, at 84.
14 See Day of the Quants, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept. 1987, at 83; French, supra
note 10, at 69; Powell, Thomas & McKillop, A War of the Generations, NEWSWEEK, Nov.
30, 1987, at 48.
15 The global nature of modem finance and financial innovation is described in
Changes in Our Financial System: Globalization of Capital Markets and Securitization of Credit:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1988); CROSS REPORT, supra note 3, at 149-68; SHEARSON LEHMAN BROTHERS
HOLDINGS, INC., 1987 ANNUAL REPORT 10-24 (1988); M. WATSON, INTERNATIONAL
CAPITAL MARKETS: DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS 35-50 (1988); Slonaker &
Wiltshire, Innovative Debt Securities, 20 REV. SECS. & COMMODITY REG. 89, 93-94
(1987); see also infra notes 24-26, 81 & 101.
16 Exchange rate and interest rate volatilities appear to have increased during
the past decade. See STANDARD & POOR'S STATISTICAL SERVICE, BASIC STATISTICS:
BANKING AND FINANCE 15 (1985) (showing volatility of interest rates over the last
twenty years); The Chase Manhattan Bank, Guide to Financial Engineering, EUROMONEY,
Sept. 1988, at 189, 190-91. The trend is less clear as to the volatility of the U.S. stock
market. See Financial Market Regulatory Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Communications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 131 (1988); PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 11-5.
Volatility can increase the demand for hedges and result in capital market
anomalies exploitable by the nimble. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 311 (3d ed. 1988); M. MAYER, MARKETS 241-42 (1988); A risky
business, ECONOMIST, May 28, 1988, at 81; Day of the Quants, supra note 14, at 90;
Friedland, The expert-systems revolution, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July 1988, at 77;
Hansell, supra note 11, at 205; Price, The Development of the Swap Market, in SWAP
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The innovation process is also becoming institutionalized.
17
With the formation of new product development teams composed of
rocket scientists, traditional bankers, lawyers, operations experts,
and others, as well as the appointment of officers responsible for new
product development and the market testing of new financial prod-
ucts, a systematization of change is taking root. l8
Innovation has become central to the competition among finan-
cial institutions and their lawyers. 9 One institution boasts of being
named the "Financial Engineer of the Year" and "showing the way
toward a brave new world of corporate finance." 20 Another trum-
pets its willingness to invent new financial tools for its customers
"from scratch. '" 21 Lawyers play a critical role in this new process:
FINANCING TECHNIQUES 29-30 (B. Anti ed. 1983); Why the need for financial risk
management?, EUROMONEY, Apr. 1989 (supplement), at 12.
17 Cf C. FREEMAN, supra note 9, at 5-15 (discussing the institutionalization of
innovation in science and technology); Mansfield, The Microeconomics of Technological
Change, in THE POSITIVE SUM STRATEGY: HARNESSING TECHNOLOGY FOR ECONOMIC
GROWTH 308-09 (R. Landau & N. Rosenberg eds. 1986) (discussing the importance
of scientific research and development to individual firms).
18 See CROSS REPORT, supra note 3, at 185-86; Bates, From Evolution to Revolution,
FIN. WORLD, Sept. 16, 1986, at 119; Lee, Offwith Their Legs, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1988,
at 186; Nathans, US Innovators Still Ahead, BANKER, Mar. 1987, at 47.
In a July 1988 interview in London, a bank officer who requested anonymity
noted the importance of devoting entire teams to new product development because
of the range of matters involved. These matters include tax issues and questions as
to where the transactions ought to be booked, how to settle, which accounts to use,
how to hedge, and what capital to allocate. That same month, the author interviewed
in London officers with heavy swap responsibilities at over a dozen financial
institutions as well as outside attorneys and accountants actively involved in financial
innovation.
19 See BANKERS TRUST NEW YORK CORP., 1988 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1989); R.
REIDENBACH & M. GRUBBS, DEVELOPING NEW PRODUCTS: A MANAGER'S GUIDE 14
(1987); Lomax, The Importance of New Financial Instrumentsfor Activities of Banks, in NEW
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS: DISCLOSURE AND ACCOUNTING 61 (Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development ed. 1988).
20 See Bankers Trust Company, What more can we do in '88? (advertisement),
EUROMONEY, June 1988, at 10.
Commercial and investment banks are not the only entities which compete in the
introduction of new financial products. See Angrist, New York Comex Picks Philadelphia's
Staloff New-Products Whiz, to be Chief Wall St. J., July 13, 1989, at C9, col. I (reporting
a new products specialist from one exchange moving to presidency of another);
McMurray, Pit Bulls: Big Futures Exchanges in Chicago are VyingforJapanese Business, Wall
St. J., Dec. 9, 1988, at 1, col. 6 (discussing competition between the two largest
American futures markets in the introduction of investment products). For a model
of financial innovation which focuses on the competition among exchanges, see
Anderson & Harris, A Model of Innovation with Application to New Financial Products, 38
OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 203 (1986).
21 See Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Company (advertisement),
N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1988, pt. 2 (Magazine), at 19; see also CHEMICAL NEW YORK
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one of the "four ways to make partner at Sullivan & Cromwell" is to
"[i]nvent a new securities instrument.- 22 Relative national competi-
tiveness in financial innovation, like competitiveness in technological
innovation, has even become a source of pride or concern.
23
There is a social price to be paid for all this financial innovation.
Among other things, these new financial products and the underly-
ing process through which they arise and evolve can generate enor-
mous risks of virtually unfathomable complexity for the increasingly
interdependent world capital markets.24 The brouhaha over com-
puter-driven trading techniques which followed in the wake of the
stock market crash of 1987 notwithstanding, 25 the most ambitious
CORP., FORM 10-K at 10 (1987) (pertaining to the fiscal year ended December 31,
1986).
22 N. LISAGOR & F. Lipsius, A LAW UNTo ITSELF: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE LAW
FIRM OF SULLIVAN & CROMWELL 277-78 (1988).
A lawyer involved in financial innovations must go far beyond structuring
transactions in light of the applicable instrument- and institution-level regulatory
environments. Lawyers also must be sensitive to less obviously relevant bodies of law
which can materially affect the economics of new financial products. For illustrative
examples, see, e.g., supra note 10 (intellectual property issues in financial innovation);
infra note 40 (concerns over effect on swaps of prohibitions on gambling); infra note
82 (standardization of swap documentation); infra notes 87-88 (various banking,
commodities, and securities law concerns); infra note 154 (ultra vires defense to
enforcement of certain swaps); infra notes 163 & 229 (effects on swaps of bankruptcy
laws); infra note 221 (tax-driven swaps); infra note 237 (litigation over departing
employees); infra note 307 (litigation over regulatory approval); see also Carr &
Morton, The Deals That Kept the Lawyers Busy in 1988, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Jan. 1989, at
7-9 (discussing the success of Slaughter & May, a leading English law firm, in creating
a new financial instrument in the Euromarket); Henderson, Swap Credit Risk: A Multi-
Perspective Analysis, 44 Bus. LAw. 365, 377-81 (1989) (discussing bankruptcy and
contract law concerns giving rise to uncertainty as to extent of credit risk); Orey,
Capitalizing on Structured Finance, AM. LAw., Apr. 1987, at 12 (discussing legal
involvement in mortgage-backed and asset-backed securities); Roberts, Breeding
Hybrids on Wall Street, AM. LAw., Oct. 1987, at 16 (stating that colleagues described a
Sullivan & Cromwell attorney's work on currency exchange warrants as "a coup").
23 See, e.g., Nathans, supra note 18, at 47.
24 See CRoss REPORT, supra note 3; Fingleton, Will the System Tumble?,
EUROMONEY, Sept. 1986, at I11; Wayne, The Realities of 'Friday the 13th, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 22, 1989, § 3, at 1, col. 2; supra note 15; infra note 101; cf Ruder Calls for Capital
Markets Unit, CORP. FIN. WEEK, Apr. 24, 1989, at 7 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Current
file) (then chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission stating that new
trading strategies involving a combination of securities, futures, currencies, and
interest rate swaps contribute to increasing risks for investors and brokers).
25 There is a remarkable diversity of views on the role played by new financial
products in the 1987 crash. See, e.g., Div. OF MKT. REGULATION, U.S. SEC. & EXCt.
COMM'N, THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK (1988), reprinted in Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) No. 322 (Extra Edition) (Feb. 11, 1988); Div. OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS & DIV.
OF TRADING & MKTS., U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N, (1988), reprinted in
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 321 (Extra Edition) (Feb. 5, 1988); PRESIDENTIAL
TASK FORCE, supra note 3; Bernstein & Bernstein, Where the Postcrash Studies Went
1989]
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effort to deal with these complex risks relates not to world stock mar-
kets but instead to the international market for swaps and closely
related hedging products.
Most of the risks associated with the swap market were borne by
the international banks operating in New York and London serving
as the linchpins of the western financial system. 26 The failure of any
of these banks might have immediate consequences on world liquid-
ity and financial stability. Bank regulators believed in the need for
quick action.
27
The bank regulators were acting within the context of an inter-
national movement to enhance the ability of banks to deal with their
"credit risks," the risks posed by bank customers defaulting on their
loan, swap, and other obligations. This movement was premised on
the notion that banks must have the amounts and types of capital
deemed adequate in light of their respective credit risks. Ideally, this
capital cushion would help banks stave off insolvency in the event of
customer default. Unfortunately, unilateral action on the part of any
Wrong, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Apr. 1988, at 173; Malkiel, The Brady Commission
Report: A Critique, J. PORTFOLIO MGMrr., Summer 1988, at 9; SEC Staff Study Blames
Market Crash on House Tax Bill's Antitakeover Items, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No.
658 (May 5, 1989).
On October 13, 1989, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 190 points,
prompting more calls for the curbing of computerized trading techniques as well as
an unprecedented degree of governmental intervention. See, e.g., Eichenwald, Outcry
on Computerized Trades is Forcing Changes by Wall Street, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1989, at 1,
col. 3 ("The outcry on Wall Street and Main Street over computerized stock trading
.. has become so great that new market rules are being adopted and others appear
imminent."); Uchitelle, Government Spreading Net to Break Market Free Falls, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 30, 1989, at 23, col. 1 (stating that the emerging governmental intervention
process includes a "handful of safety measures adopted since the 1987 crash" and
quoting an economist as saying that following the 190-point plunge, "the Goverment
held the market's hand and the investor's hand in a way that we have never seen
before").
26 For example, approximately 70% of global swap exposure is concentrated in
ten United States banks. See Ireland, Counting on your Counterparty, CORP. FIN., Mar.
1989, at 31. As of the end of 1988, the three largest commercial bank swap dealers
accounted for more than $300 billion of interest rate swaps. See Quint, Eliminating
Risk of Rising Rates, N.Y. Times, July 31, 1989, at DI, col. 2.
The world's swap market is centered in London, New York, and Tokyo. Of these
markets, the London market is the most highly developed. See Beckstrom, The Use
of Computers and Technology in Swap Finance, reprinted in THE 1987 LONDON SWAPS
SEMINAR 79 (1987) (transcript of address). For an up-to-date description of current
market conditions, see Barclays Swaps, Barclays de Zoete Wedd, Ltd., 20 Questions
and Answers - Interest Rate and Currency Swaps 25 (1988).
27 See infra note 91 and accompanying text; Cf. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS,
ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 146-47 (1984) (describing relationship of bank
failures to financial panics); Shirreff, The Fearsome Growth of Swaps, EUROMONEY, Oct.
1985, at 247, 247 (discussing effect of swaps on international financial stability).
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one country to impose stringent "capital adequacy" requirements on
its own banks was impractical; by inflicting the costs of such require-
ments on its own banks, the banks of other countries would be at a
competitive advantage in the global marketplace. Regulators real-
ized that coordinated action was necessary and engaged in an intense
effort to develop a framework which would promote common stan-
dards of capital adequacy. Not surprisingly, the most complex and
controversial aspects of the framework involved swaps and related
products.
Promulgated in July 1988 under the aegis of the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements,2 the BIS Accord established minimum stan-
dards of capital adequacy for internationally active commercial
banks. The central banking authorities of the Group of Ten western
industrialized countries29 and Luxembourg agreed to implement
these standards in their respective countries. The BIS Accord is
widely considered paradigmatic in the sophistication of its regulation
of complicated financial products and in its degree of international
regulatory cooperation.30 In the United States, this new, enlight-
28 The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) is headquartered in Basel,
Switzerland and promotes cooperation among central banks of member nations.
Virtually all countries are members and the BIS manages a significant share of the
world's official reserves. The BIS is commonly thought of as the "central bankers'
central bank." See Bank for International Settlements: Flexible Mystique, ECONOMIST, June
17, 1989, at 94 [hereinafter Flexible Mystique]; Bederman, The Bank for International
Settlements and the Debt Crisis: A New Role for the Central Bankers' Bank?, 6 INT'L TAX &
Bus. LAw. 92, 92-93 (1988).
29 The Group of Ten is composed of Belgium, Canada, France, West Germany,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. See BIS ACCORD, supra note 2, at 1 n. 1.
30 See Capital Adequacy: Playing by the Same Rules, BANKING WORLD, Jan. 1988, at
12; Cooke, The Co-ordination of Regulation, BANK ENGLAND Q. BULL., Aug. 1988, at 364;
Kapstein, Resolving the Regulator's Dilemma: International Coordination of Banking
Regulations, 43 INT'L ORG. 323, 323 & 344 (1989); Moody's Investor Services, Common
Bank Capital Standards: A Step Toward Global Financial Integration, MOODY'S SPECIAL
COMMENT, May 9, 1988, at I & 4; Spero, Guiding Global Finance, FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter
1988-89, at 114; Note, The Proposed Risk-Based Capital Framework: A Model of
International Banking Cooperation?, 11 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 777, 801 (1988) (stating that
the BIS proposal was an "exemplary model of international banking cooperation");
Nash, Agreement on Banks' Capital Set, N.Y. Times,July 12, 1988, at Dl, col. 5; Melloan,
Global Bank Regulation Fans New Debate, Wall St.J., Mar. 15, 1988, at 35, col. 3.
Securities regulators have lagged behind banking regulators in the coordination
of policies on an international basis. For descriptions of current efforts to harmonize
capital adequacy standards pertaining to securities firms, see, e.g., Hang loose, Mr.
Regulator, ECONOMIST, Sept. 30, 1989, at 15 (discussing efforts of world securities
regulators to harmonize regulations); International Securities Regulation: Under Water
Already, ECONOMIST, Sept. 23, 1989, at 96; Capital Adequacy Standards for Securities
Firms: Report of the Technical Committee of the International Organization of
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ened era began on March 15, 1989, when Federal Reserve Board
rules implementing the BIS Accord became effective.3'
In Parts I and II this Article explains what "swaps" are and dis-
cusses those aspects of the BIS Accord and implementing regula-
tions pertaining to swaps and related hedging products. Part III
then demonstrates that the BIS Accord is subverted by the process of
financial innovation in three related ways. First, the institutionaliza-
tion of the innovation process causes a serious "mapping" problem
with respect to the classification-based rules at the heart of the BIS
Accord. The compelling need for administrative simplicity in classi-
fications conflicts with the increasing heterogeneity of swaps and
related hedging products. As a result, an increasingly diverse group
of financial products will be subsumed within each classification.
The consequence is that the capital adequacy requirement associated
with a given classification will over time reflect increasingly badly the
true risks of the products within that classification.
3 2
Second, no formal mechanism is prescribed by the BIS Accord
for changing the rules on a timely basis. The institutionalization of
the innovation process and the dynamism of the financial markets
will render the classifications and amounts of associated capital
required under the BIS Accord increasingly obsolete. Because of the
absence of such a mechanism for changing the BIS Accord stan-
Securities Commissions (Aug. 10, 1989) [hereinafter IOSC Technical Report]; infra
note 149.
31 See Final Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 54 Fed. Reg. 4,186 (1989)
[hereinafter FRB Capital Guidelines] (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 208 & 225)
(Federal Reserve Board rules pertaining to state-chartered banks that are members
of the Federal Reserve System, and to bank holding companies); cf. Risk-Based
Capital Guidelines, 54 Fed. Reg. 4,168 (1989) [hereinafter OCC Capital Guidelines]
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 3) (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency rules
pertaining to national banks; effective December 31, 1990); Capital Maintenance:
Final Statement of Policy on Risk-Based Capital, 54 Fed. Reg. 11,500 (1989)
[hereinafter FDIC Capital Guidelines] (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 325) (Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation rules pertaining to Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation-insured, state-chartered banks that are not members of the Federal
Reserve System; effective April 20, 1989); see also infra note 120 (supplemental capital
adequacy system). The distinct regulatory aspects of bank holding companies is
beyond the scope of this Article. Cf FRB Capital Guidelines, supra, at 4194-96
(discussing applicability of BIS Accord to bank holding companies).
For information on the division of jurisdiction over banks and bank holding
companies in the United States among regulators, see TASK GROUP ON REGULATION
OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 18-19 (1984); J. Norton & S.
Whitley, Banking Law Manual §§ 1.03[2] & 1.04[3] (1988); Scott, The Dual Banking
System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1, 7 (1977).
32 See infra notes 173-93 and accompanying text.
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dards, this obsolescence problem will be difficult to overcome on an
internationally coordinated basis.33
Third, partly because there is no pre-clearance procedure for
the introduction of new types of swaps and related products, capital
requirements will, in effect, often be assigned to instruments without
the benefit of information on the credit risk characteristics of those
instruments. Regulators would inherently be playing a game of
catch-up, always having to determine, after a bank has already intro-
duced a new form of swap, whether the pre-existing classification
structure continues to makes sense. Whatever informational
problems regulators in a dynamic and secretive marketplace had to
begin with are exacerbated by allowing banks to make the first
move.
34
Part IV of this Article begins by identifying the circumstances
where the mapping, obsolescence, and informational problems are
especially troublesome. Because any changes to the BIS Accord will
need to be incremental in nature in the foreseeable future, one possi-
ble approach to ameliorating these problems is to supplement the
capital adequacy system established by the BIS Accord with a mecha-
nism which would operate only in those circumstances; ideally, the
mechanism itself would involve incremental departures from existing
practices. This Article briefly examines one way in which this might
occur: a capital adequacy system supplemented by the escape valve
of "surrogate regulation"3 5 provided by a system of private insurers.
Under this approach, the capital adequacy system would be applica-
ble only as to those hedging products which regulators specifically
designate; the regulators would in turn designate only those hedging
products for which they believed the capital adequacy system works
reasonably well. All other hedging products - most notably, new
types of hedging products which arise subsequent to such designa-
tion - would be subject to an alternative regime. As to such non-
designated products, the swap dealer would be required to obtain
insurance against losses on default of its customer from highly
creditworthy financial guaranty insurers.
As this Article shows, the financial innovation process under-
mines the BIS Accord in a number of fundamental ways. The BIS
Accord's capital adequacy approach will eventually need to be sup-
33 See infra notes 194-215 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 216-258 and accompanying text.
35 Cf Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 942, 954-55 (1988) (discussing how the incentives created by environmental
liability insurers result in what Abraham refers to as "surrogate regulation").
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plemented by an alternative regime in circumstances where the
approach is clearly wanting or else totally replaced by a different sys-
tem. This Article briefly analyzes the supplemental insurance
scheme not because it favors adoption of such a scheme but as a way
of illustrating some of the considerations and difficulties involved in
devising a practical solution. That even a mechanism as incremental
in scope and technique as this is so resistant to evaluation suggests
the need for bank regulators to begin now to examine carefully the
full range of possible solutions.
I. THE SWAP AND THE SWAP DEALER: BASIC CONCEPTS
3 6
Swaps are a potent tool for, among other things, coping with
interest rate and currency rate fluctuations. By using swaps, a com-
pany can, in effect, change the interest rate and currency characteris-
tics of its liabilities and assets at any time in ways previously
inconceivable37 . On the liabilities side, for instance, companies fre-
quently issue debt on which they must pay rates of interest that float
with some index of market interest rates. Despite having issued this
floating rate debt, a company can fully insulate itself from the effects
of rising interest rates through an "interest rate swap." Using such a
swap, a company can, in effect, convert the interest on its debt from a
36 Materials submitted to the Federal Reserve Board and other federal banking
agencies in connection with the development of capital adequacy rules constitute the
most comprehensive publicly available analyses of the economics of swaps. This
Article has relied, in part, on the data in these letters, copies of which were obtained
through the Freedom of Information Act. See, e.g., infra note 57.
For more readily available introductions to interest rate and currency swaps, see
EUROMONEY SWAP FINANCE SERVICE UPDATE I (B. Antl ed. 1987); S. HENDERSON &J.
PRICE, CURRENCY AND INTEREST RATE SWAPS (2d ed. 1988); R. KOPPRASCH, J.
MACFARLANE, D. Ross & J. SHOWERS, THE INTEREST RATE SWAP MARKET: YIELD
MATHEMATICS, TERMINOLOGY AND CONVENTIONS 1-5 (1985); PRICE WATERHOUSE,
HEDGING: FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND INTEREST RATE RISK MANAGEMENT-
IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE 15-20 (1986); SwAP FINANCE (B. Antd ed. 1986); J.
WALMSLEY, supra note 7, at 125-47; Arak, Estrella, Goodman & Silver, Interest Rate
Swaps: An Alternative Explanation, FIN. MGMT., Summer 1988, at 12; Arnold, How to Do
Interest Rate Swaps, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1984, at 96; Bicksler & Chen, An
Economic Analysis of Interest Rate Swaps, 41 J. FIN. 645 (1986); Hammond, Recent
Developments in the Swap Market, BANK OF ENGLAND Q. BULL., Feb. 1987, at 66;
Henderson & Klein, Glossmy of Terms Used in Connection with Rate Swap, Currency Swap,
Cap and Collar Agreements, BUTTERWORTH'S J. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L., June 1987
(Supp.); Smith, Smithson & Wakeman, The Market for Interest Rate Swaps, FIN. MGmT.,
Winter 1988, at 34.
37 See Ardalan, supra note 4, at 7. Companies can not only use swaps in
connection with their liabilities (as discussed in the text) but also in connection with
their assets. For discussion of how this might be done, see the references in infra
notes 44 and 85.
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floating rate to a fixed rate. Interest rate swaps also can allow com-
panies to convert fixed rate debt to floating rate debt or convert an
interest rate floating with one index of market interest rates to a rate
floating with another index of market interest rates. By using cur-
rency swaps, a company can move beyond mere interest rate con-
cems and alter the currency characteristics of its assets and liabilities
in order to protect itself from the fluctuations in currency exchange
rates.
As might be expected, a company in the market for such com-
plex financial instruments generally looks to swap dealers, usually
large financial institutions or their affiliates. These financial institu-
tions assume certain risks. In the simplest case,38 the primary risk is
the "credit risk," the risk that the bank's customer will default on its
obligations under the swap. This is the risk with which the BIS
Accord is primarily concerned.
A. The Swap as an Exchange of Cash Flows
1. The Interest Rate Swap
In its most basic form, an interest rate swap involves: (1) one
party (typically called the "fixed rate payor") agreeing to make peri-
odic payments to the other party which are fixed in amount in return
for (b) the other party (typically called the "floating rate payor" or
the "variable rate payor") agreeing to make periodic payments to the
first party that vary with the "prime rate," "LIBOR," or some other
benchmark of market interest rates. 39 The payments exchanged by
the parties are analogous to interest payments on a purely hypotheti-
cal principal amount (typically called "notional principal amount" or
"notional amount"). No payments analogous to principal payments
are made.
This "plain vanilla" interest rate swap can be analogized to a
bet.40 A party concerned primarily with interest rates rising should
38 This is the case in which a bank has interposed itself between perfectly
matched parties, illustrated in Figure 4 and discussed infra text preceding note 57.
39 Broadly speaking, the "prime rate" is the rate of interest charged by a bank
for loans made to its most creditworthy customers and "LIBOR" or London
Interbank Offered Rate is the rate that major international banks charge each other
for large loans of dollars outside the United States. See INTERNATIONAL SWAP DEALERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., 1987 INTEREST RATE AND CURRENCY EXCHANGE DEFINITIONS 22-23
(1987) (offering various technical definitions of the prime rate and LIBOR).
40 The term "plain vanilla," when used broadly, refers to any simple or common
swap; when used more narrowly, the term refers to particular examples of such kinds
of swaps. See CRoss REPORT, supra note 3, at 265; A. SARWAL, supra note 7, at 313;
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assume the role of the fixed rate payor. A party concerned primarily
with interest rates falling should assume the role of the floating rate
payor. Interest rates will either rise or fall subsequent to commence-
ment of the swap:
(1) If interest rates were to rise, the floating rate payor's payments
to the fixed rate payor (the "floating rate payments") would be
larger than the fixed rate payor's payments to the floating rate
payor (the "fixed rate payments").4 ' On a net basis, the fixed
rate payor would receive money on the swap. 42 Thus, the fixed
rate payor would be "in the money" on this swap, helping the
fixed rate payor weather an environment of higher interest
rates.
(2) If interest rates were to fall, the fixed rate payor's payments to
the floating rate payor would be larger than the floating rate
payor's payments to the fixed rate payor. On a net basis, the
floating rate payer would receive money on the swap. The
floating rate payor would now be "in the money" on this swap,
helping protect the floating rate payor from a lower interest
rate environment.
What might this bet between these "counterparties" look like in
the real world? Assume that a savings and loan association has
obtained its deposits by way of money market accounts paying
depositors rates of interest that vary with market interest rates, and
has in turn loaned the entire amount to home buyers in the form of
fixed rate mortgages. If interest rates rise, the savings and loan will
Olander & Spell, Interest Rate Swaps: Status under Federal Tax and Securities Laws, 45 MD.
L. REV. 21, 23 n.7 (1986).
The gambling flavor of swaps has caused some discomfort over the possibility
that swaps violate gaming laws. See 2 G. PENN, A. SHEA & A. ARORA, THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING 247-50 (1987); Puleo, Recent Developments in
Merchant Banking Activities of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, in 2 BANKING LAW AND
REGULATION 1988 at 14 (F. Puelo & B. Smith eds. 1988); cf FIN. MGMT., Spring 1987,
at 21 (advertising the Third Annual Symposium on Cash, Treasury and Working
Capital Management, held in Las Vegas).
41 This assumes a "par" interest rate swap, a swap in which the fixed interest
rate on the swap is equal to the then current market swap rate. See Ferron &
Handjinicolaou, Understanding Swap Credit Risk: The Simulation Approach, J. INT'L. SEC.
MARKETS, Winter 1987, at 135, 142.
42 For purposes of simplicity, the text assumes that the floating rate payor
makes the floating rate payments to the fixed rate payor and the fixed rate payor
makes the fixed rate payments to the floating rate payor. In practice, these payments
are typically "netted" so that the party owing the greater amount simply pays the
excess to the other party. See INTERNATIONAL SWAP DEALERS ASSOCIATION, INTEREST
RATE AND CURRENCY EXCHANGE AGREEMENT § 2(c) (1987) (setting forth a typical
"netting" clause). For discussions of swap documentation, see Henderson, supra
note 22, at 385-87; infra note 82.
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not be long for this world. This is so because an increase in interest
rates will raise its cost of obtaining money while its income from the
mortgages would remain fixed.43
Luckily for the savings and loan, there happens to be a con-
sumer finance company that has an asset-liability mismatch which is
reverse to that of the savings and loan. The finance company has
obtained its funds by issuing bonds bearing a fixed rate and has lent
to its customers on a floating rate basis. This finance company might
want to avoid this asset-liability mismatch because of its concern over
the possibility that interest rates might drop.
The needs of the finance company and the savings and loan are
complementary. Figure 1 shows how an interest rate swap in which
the savings and loan is the fixed rate payor and the finance company
is the floating rate payor would benefit both parties. Pursuant to the
swap (represented in the diagram by arrows linking the two entities),
the savings and loan makes fixed rate payments to the finance com-
pany in return for floating rate payments.
If interest rates were to rise, the savings and loan would have to
pay more to its depositors. However, a corresponding increase in
the size of the floating rate payments that the savings and loan would
receive pursuant to the swap could be used to pay the higher interest
rates to depositors. Similarly if interest rates were to drop, the
finance company would receive less from its customers. However,
the finance company could continue to meet its obligations on its
fixed-rate debt by using the fixed amounts it would receive pursuant
to the swap to pay its bondholders. The ability to apply payments
the parties receive under the swap to their respective liabilities has,
in effect, insulated both parties from interest rate risk.
43 For discussions of asset-liability management policies and techniques, see R.
HARRINGTON, ASSET AND LIABILITY MANAGEMENT BY BANKS (1987); R. PLAfT,
CONTROLLING INTEREST RATE RISK: NEW TECHNIQUES AND APPLICATIONS FOR MONEY
MANAGEMENT (1986).
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While this example shows how interest rate swaps are useful as
hedges against interest rate fluctuations, interest rate swaps can be
used in other ways as well. For instance, swaps can allow corpora-
tions to "arbitrage" subtle economic, tax or regulatory differences in
capital markets.4 4
44 Although this Article illustrates only the arbitrage use of swaps in connection
with company liabilities, swaps are sometimes used as well in connection with
company assets in order to create "synthetic securities." See A. SARWAL, supra note 7,
at 324-29; Henderson, Economics of Swaps, in INTEREST RATE AND CURRENCY SWAPS
1987 at 18-23; Swapping Mad, ECONOMIsT, Nov. 4, 1989, at 99; infra notes 53-55, 83 &
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The classic example for illustrating this arbitrage use to swaps
focuses on differences between the capital market for fixed rate bor-
rowings and the capital market for floating rate borrowings. 45 At
bottom, the example involves an extension of the classical theory of
comparative advantage from trade in goods to "trade" in money.
In the goods context, each party should produce goods in which
it has a comparative advantage and then exchange those goods in the
international market in order to reach its desired mix of goods. By
obtaining the desired mix of goods through trade rather than pro-
ducing the desired goods itself, each party reaches a higher level of
welfare.
4 6
Thus, assume that a borrower would prefer borrowing on a
fixed interest rate basis to borrowing on a floating rate of interest
basis. However, this borrower appears to have relatively better
access to the capital market for floating interest rate borrowings than
it has to the capital market for fixed interest rate borrowings. Since
the borrower has a comparative advantage in floating rate money, it
should borrow on a floating rate basis and then somehow "trade"
the floating rate money for fixed rate money. The swap allows this
kind of "trade" to occur: if the trade works as intended, the borrower
can obtain fixed rate money more cheaply through the use of the
swap than if it tried obtaining such money directly.
In Figure 2, a savings and loan has $100 million dollars in
deposits on which it pays a floating rate of interest equal to the sum
of a specified prime rate ("Prime") and 3/4%. The savings and loan
is a typical savings and loan, living from day to day at the very edge.
Since the capital market for fixed rate borrowings tends to be quite
sensitive to credit quality,47 the savings and loan would have to pay a
high rate of interest for fixed rate borrowing (say, 13% a year). On
the other hand a finance company, because it is somewhat more
85, cf infra notes 53-55, 83 and accompnaying text (discussing arbitrage
opportunities).
45 Although most participants in the swap market subscribe to the kind of
arbitrage analysis illustrated in the text, this analysis is not completely satisfying. For
critiques of the standard swap arbitrage analysis, see Arak, Estrella, Goodman &
Silver, supra note 36, at 12; Smith, Smithson, & Wakeman, supra note 36, at 41-42;
Turnbull, Swaps: A Zero Sum Game?, FIN. MGMT., Spring 1987, at 15.
46 See, e.g., H. GRUBEL, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 11-23 (1981) (explaining
world gains from trade and specialization).
47 See C. BEIDLEMAN, FINANCIAL SWAPs: NEW STRATEGIES IN CURRENCY AND
COUPON RISK MANAGEMENT 214-18 (1985); Tomlinson, Principles and Applications of
Interest Rate Swaps, in THE 1987 LONDON SWAPS SEMINAR, supra note 26, at 165
(transcript of address). But see Smith, Smithson & Wakeman, supra note 36, at 41-42;
Turnbull, supra note 45, at 20.
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creditworthy than the savings and loan, can issue bonds in the princi-
pal amount of $ 100,000,000 bearing interest of 11%, a rate fully two
percentage points lower than the savings and loan's cost of fixed rate
borrowing. Of course, the finance company could have borrowed on
a floating rate basis, as did the savings and loan. However, as an
empirical matter, the finance company will only be able to do slightly
better than the savings and loan when borrowing on a floating rate
basis. The finance company can borrow at the sum of Prime plus 1/
8%, only 5/8 of a percentage point lower than the rate obtained by
the savings and loan. The possible alternatives for borrowing are
shown in Table 1.
s floating rate fixed rate
savings and loan Prime + 3/4% 13%
finance company Prime + 1/8% 11%
differential: 5/8% 2%
Table 1
savings and loan] 11.50 o-e e" company~~~Prime-fnnecopn
Prime +3/4% 11%I I
depositors with purchasers of
$100,000,000 in $100,000,000 of
saving and loan fixed rate bonds
money market issued by finance
accounts company
Figure 2.
Because the finance company is more creditworthy, it has an
absolute advantage in borrowing money on either interest rate basis.
However, the savings and loan has a comparative advantage in bor-
rowing at a floating rate. As a result, the savings and loan should
borrow at a floating rate, the finance company should borrow at a
fixed rate, and the two entities should then "trade" through use of a
swap. Such a swap might call for the savings and loan to make pay-
ments of $11.5 million each year to the finance company in return
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for the finance company making annual payments equal to Prime on
the hypothetical principal amount of $100,000,000. The savings and
loan would be effectively paying 11.5% "interest" on a "notional
principal amount" or "notional amount" of $100,000,000 and
receiving "interest" equal to Prime applied to the same notional
amount of $100,000,000.
By entering into the swap, the savings and loan can effectively
reduce its fixed rate of interest from 13% per year to 12.25% [e.g.,
(Prime + 3/4%) + (11.50%) - (Prime)]. At the same time the
finance company can effectively reduce its floating rate of interest
from Prime + 1/8% to Prime - 1/2% [e.g., (11%) + (Prime) -
11.50%].
2. The Currency Swap
With interest rate swaps, the parties never make any payments of
principal. The only payments made can be characterized as de facto
interest payments on a purely hypothetical principal amount. With
the currency swap, however, there are exchanges of both interest
and principal. By carefully structuring these exchanges, parties can
hedge against both currency and interest rate fluctuations. The cur-
rency swap also may offer arbitrage possibilities.48 If a company has
a comparative advantage in the fixed interest rate Deutsche mark
capital market but prefers floating rate United States dollars, it could
reduce its borrowing costs through a currency swap. The company
can borrow in the fixed rate Deutsche mark capital market and then,
through a currency swap, transform the fixed rate Deutsche marks to
floating rate United States dollars. Obtaining such funds indirectly
can be cheaper than doing so directly. A simple illustration is set
forth in the footnote.49
48 See Ardalan, supra note 4, at 9; Hammond, supra note 36, at 71. But see supra
note 45.
49 Assume that an American company wants $50 million at a floating rate of
interest, say a specified prime rate ("Prime"). Unfortunately, this American company
has relatively poor access to floating rate United States dollars; it would have to pay
Prime + 1/8% for the money.
Assume further that, for historical and other reasons, this American company
has relatively better access to the German capital market than the American capital
market. The American company can borrow in the German capital market because of
its comparative advantage in that market, and then "trade." Assume that there is a
German company which wants DM100,000,000 at 4% fixed interest rate.
Unfortunately, though, this German company happens to have relatively poor access
to fixed rate Deutsche marks; it would have to pay 4 1/8% for the money. The
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B. The Swap Dealer
1. Role
The example about the savings and loan and the consumer
finance company assumed that two parties with precisely comple-
mentary needs existed, that they would meet, that they would enter
into a swap, and that they would live happily ever after. In the real
world, needs may not be precisely complementary. One party's
desires concerning the notional amount, the swap payments, and the
German company believes that it has relatively better access to the American capital
market than the German capital market.
The two companies were meant for each other, as described below and shown in
Figure 3. The German company can obtain floating rate United States dollars and
the American company can obtain fixed rate Deutsche marks and then the two
companies can "trade." Assuming that at the inception of the swap the exchange
rate was two Deutsche marks to one United States dollar, the companies can trade in
the following manner:
(a) At the inception of the swap (concurrent with the United States
company's issuance of DM100,000,000 of bonds bearing interest at
4% in the German market and the German company's issuance of
$50,000,000 at Prime in the United States market), the United States
company gives the DMI00,000,000 in offering proceeds to the German
company in return for $50,000,000 in offering proceeds from the
German company. At time zero, the U.S. company thus has
$50,000,000 in its coffers and the German company has
DM100,000,000 in its coffers.
(b) During the term of the swap (coinciding precisely with the terms of
the two bond issues), the United States company pays an amount
equal to interest at Prime on $50,000,000 to the German company in
exchange for DM4,000,000 (e.g., four percent of DM100,000,000)
each year from the German company. Each company takes the swap
payment it receives and gives to its bondholders. In effect, during the
term of the swap, the United States company is paying "interest"
equal to Prime (in United States dollars) and the German company is
paying "interest" equal to 4% (in Deutsche marks).
(c) On the termination date of the swap (coinciding with the maturity
dates of the bonds), the U.S. company pays the German company
$50,000,000 and receives DM100,000,000 from the German company.
The German company takes the $50,000,000 it receives in order to
pay off its bondholders and the American company takes the
DM100,000,000 it receives in order to pay off its bondholders.
As a result of this swap, the United States company effectively received
$50,000,000 from issuance of the bonds in Germany, paid interest at Prime during
the term of the bond, and at maturity paid $50,000,000. The German company effec-
tively received DM100,000,000 from the issuance of the bonds in the United States,
paid interest at four percent during the term of the bonds, and at maturity, paid
DM100,000,000. This process occurs regardless of changes in the United States dol-
lar/Deutsche mark currency exchange rate. The United States company has achieved
its goal.
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beginning and end dates may be different from the desires of the
other party. Even if two perfectly suited parties exist, there is no
reason to suspect that they will find each other. Even if they find
each other, there is no reason why these two parties may actually be
willing to deal with each other. Furthermore, if they were to enter
into a swap, there is a possibility that the party "losing" the bet
would seek to repudiate the agreement.
Additionally, with respect to the putative arbitrage possibilities
inherent in a swap, parties must be able to monitor world capital
markets continuously, recognize subtle differences in those markets,
determine how to take advantage of those differences, and actually
take advantage of those differences. In the real world, few institu-
tions, financial or otherwise, would find it worthwhile to engage in
such an undertaking.
50
In essence, the simple examples above assume away the need for
a swap dealer, a combination of matchmaker, guarantor and wise
man.5" Typically a major commercial or investment bank or an affili-
ate, the swap dealer is a party to the vast majority of swap
agreements.
52
The role of wise man is the swap dealer's most difficult. The
at inception during the term at termination
U.S. company] [U.S. company U.S. company
DMI00 mm. $I50 mm. Prime[ IDM4 mm. DM100 mm.I 1$50 mm.
German y compGerman company
(initial exchange of (periodic exchange of (final exchange of
principal) interest) principal)
Figure 3
50 See Beckstrom, supra note 26, at 79; Stilit, Money for nothing arbitrage by Daiwa,
CORP. FIN., May 1987, at 24-25; Monroe, Firms Return in Force to Credit Markets With
Debt Linked to Interest Rate Swaps, Wall St.J., Nov. 20, 1987, at 40, col. 3. But cf Keller,
The Rocket Men are Still at Work, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1989, at 148 (concerning
increasing sophistication of corporate customers as to swaps and related products).
51 These functions are separable. Some financial institutions participating in
the swaps market, for instance, do not serve in a guarantor capacity. See BANK OF
ENGLAND, THE REGULATION OF THE WHOLESALE MARKETS IN STERLING, FOREIGN
EXCHANGE AND BULLION 38-39 (1988) [hereinafter WHOLESALE MARKETS]; Crabbe,
Clearing House for Swaps, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1986, at 345, 347; Kolman, The Sultans of
Swap, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Oct. 1985, at 258, 264.
52 One leading swaps dealer is affiliated with an insurer. See AIG Financial Hires
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constant monitoring of subtle differences in capital markets leads to
strategies which can arguably offer opportunities to borrow at lower
cost or obtain higher risk-adjusted returns.13 The opportunities can
be highly transitory. Pepsico reportedly took advantage of one
opportunity which existed for only three hours.5 4 Opportunities can
also be difficult to detect and exploit. One $100 million aircraft
financing involved the use of 240 swaps.
55
As a matchmaker, a bank may be able to find a party with needs
complementary to its client's, a capacity derived from its world-wide
information network. However, such knowledge may not be enough
because the party with complementary needs might be unfamiliar to
the client and might be of dubious credit standing. Consequently,
the bank will typically have to serve as a guarantor, interposing itself
between the two parties in such a way that it substitutes its credit
standing for those of the parties.
An example will help illustrate the matchmaker and guarantor
functions. In its matchmaker role, the bank may have determined
that the savings and loan and the finance company in our example
were perfect for each other. But the finance company's concern with
the creditworthiness of the savings and loan may preclude it from
entering into a swap directly with the savings and loan. The bank
could break this impasse by simultaneously entering into two sepa-
rate swaps, one with the finance company and one with the savings
and loan. In its swap with the finance company the bank would make
fixed rate payments and receive floating rate payments. In the
"matching" or "mirror" swap with the savings and loan, the bank
would receive fixed rate payments and make floating rate payments.
Eight; Plans to Expand Swap Effort this Year, SEC. WEEK, Mar. 7, 1988, at 9; AIGlobal to
Service Multinational Firms, Bus. INS., Apr. 17, 1989, at 64.
Corporations appear to be increasingly able to bypass banks in even complicated
financial transactions. See Roden, Forex Funding Free of Banks, EUROMONEY, May 1989,
at 102-103.
53 See Lee, supra note 18; Wilson, Designing a Swap Package, in INSIDE THE SWAP
MARKET 33-36 (3d ed. 1988); supra note 44; infra note 85 and accompanying text.
54 Fleet-footed Pepsico Exploits T-Bill Swap Window, CORP. FINANCING WEEK, May 8,
1989, at 4.
55 See A Deal with 240 Swaps, EUROMONEY, July 1, 1988, at 80; cf Kolman, supra
note 51, at 259 ("A single swap can blossom into a 'daisy chain' of as many as a half-
dozen interrelated components that change constantly with the smallest interest rate
fluctuations."); Wall St.J., Nov. 20, 1987, at 40, col. 3 ("The more legs you have on
[a] transaction... the more chances you have of some sort of [market] imperfection
along the line.").
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The "mirror swaps" into which the bank would enter are described
in the footnote 56 and illustrated in Figure 4.
savings and loan - .0' bank -114%*finance o
--i Prim,. <-Prim e-LI
Prime + 3/4% 11%
1 1
depositors with purchasers of
$100,000,000 in saving $100,000,000 of fixed
and loan money rate bonds issued by
market accounts finance company
Figure 4.
With such perfectly matched mirror swaps, the bank is perfectly
hedged, and need not worry about interest rates going up or down.
If interest rates were to rise, the bank would pay more to the savings
and loan than it received; at the same time, it would receive more
than it paid on the "mirror swap" with the finance company. Simi-
larly, if interest rates were to drop, the bank would pay more to the
finance company than it received; at the same time, it would receive
more than it paid on the "mirror swap" with the savings and loan.
As long as neither the savings and loan nor the finance company
defaults on its swap obligations, the bank will make money each time
swap payments are made. In the example in Figure 4, the dealer has
a profit margin of about .10% a year.
56 Under the bank's agreement with the finance company, the bank would pay
$11.4 million a year to the finance company and the finance company would pay to
the bank each year an amount equal to Prime applied to $100 million. Under its
separate and independent agreement with the savings and loan, the bank would
receive $11.5 million each year and would pay an amount equal to Prime applied to
$100 million. The bank, in effect, passes along the payment it receives from the
savings and loan to the finance company (less the bank's $100,000 slice), and passes
along the payment it receives from the finance company to the savings and loan.
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2. Risks for the Swap Dealer
57
In the real world, the swap dealer's life is not quite that easy.
For instance, in the previous example, the bank was lucky enough to
have found a party (the consumer finance company) whose needs
were complementary to the savings and loan's in every respect. In
the real world, the bank might not find such a perfect match.58
Indeed, instead of undertaking the matchmaking process, the bank
may attempt to hedge its swap with the savings and loan "syntheti-
cally"59 with mathematical strategies involving publicly traded finan-
cial instruments.6" In the world of finance a perfect hedge is elusive:
"[t]he only perfect hedge is in a Japanese garden."
6 1
Apart from the interest rate or exchange rate risks, the swap
dealer faces the risk that its customer will fail to perform according
to the terms of the swap. The swap dealer is thus exposed to "credit
57 The risk analysis has been simplified considerably. In the analysis of credit
risk, for instance, this Article will not refer to the replacement costs of "matched
pairs" of swaps or the bankruptcy and contract law complications which can affect the
quantification of credit risk. See supra note 40 (effect of prohibitions on gambling);
infra note 63 (portfolio issues); infra note 154 (ultra vires defense to enforcement of
certain swaps); infra note 163 & 229 (effects on swaps of bankruptcy laws); infra note
221 (tax-driven swaps). The most detailed publicly available analyses as to the credit,
interest rate, exchange rate, and other risks assumed by swaps dealers are found in
the comment letters referred to in supra note 36. More readily available materials
include Ardalan & Seigel, Swap Exposure and Regulatory Concerns, EUROMONEY CORP.
FIN., Nov. 1985, at 82; Balman, Risk Assessment and Control, in THE 1986 ANNUAL
LONDON SWAPS SEMINAR 70 (1986); Ferron & Handjinicolaou, supra note 41; d'Souza,
Managing Risks in Swaps, in THE 1987 LONDON SWAPS SEMINAR, supra note 26, at 121;
Potential Credit Exposure on Interest Rate and Foreign Exchange Related Instruments
[hereinafter FRB/BOE Credit Exposure Memorandum], reprinted in INTEREST RATE AND
CURRENCY SWAPS 1987, at 325; Whittaker, Interest Rate Swaps: Risk and Regulation,
ECON. REV., Mar. 1987, at 8-10 (published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City).
58 The bank may find, for example, that the savings and loan wants a notional
amount of $100 million while the finance company desires a notional amount of only
$20 million. The bank may need to find parties in addition to the finance company
who are willing to make floating rate payments on a swap. Moreover, the savings and
loan may want a swap period which differs from the swap period desired by the other
parties. To the extent that the swaps entered into by the bank are not perfectly
complementary, the bank is taking some interest rate or currency risks in addition to
the credit risk.
59 See International Swaps: Has the Swap Market Moved Full Circle, Irr'L FIN. REV.,
Apr. 27, 1985, at 927; Lawton & Metcalfe, Portfolio Approach to Swapping Swaps, in
EUROMONEY SWAP FINANCE SERVICE - UPDATE I, at 13 (B. Anti ed. 1987).
60 See Gelber, Elementary Hedging Techniques for Swaps, in THE 1986 ANNUAL
LONDON SWAPS SEMINAR, supra note 57, at 107 (transcript of address); Smith,
Smithson & Wakeman, supra note 36, at 259.
61 Surviving the Meltdown: Rotberg on Risk, INT'L FIN. REV., Nov. 28, 1987, at 727.
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risk."62 This risk is present even in the simple world of the perfectly
complementary savings and loan and consumer finance company
swaps. Credit risk is inherent in being a swap dealer. No matter how
lucky it is in finding parties whose needs are complementary or how
clever it is in its hedging, the swap dealer is always exposed to the
possibility that its customer will default. It is this kind of risk with
which the BIS Accord was primarily intended to deal and to which we
now turn.
63
The credit risk faced by a bank on a given swap is most easily
analyzed by examining two related concepts, "current exposure"
and "potential exposure." The "current exposure" of the bank on a
swap as of any date refers to the extent to which the bank would
suffer if its customer were to default on the swap on that date. If, for
instance, interest rates were to rise and the finance company (the
floating rate payor) breached, the bank would lose its source for the
floating rate payments which it needs to make payments to the sav-
ings and loan pursuant to the mirror swap. Indeed, since the bank
will pay more on the mirror swap than it receives from the savings
and loan the bank will lose money acting as swap dealer. The bank
has lost the benefit of the bargain with the finance company at a time
when the finance company was losing its bet with the bank.
A rough approximation of the bank's loss would be the cost for
the bank of replacing the defaulted swap with its economic
equivalent. That is, the bank's damages are the cost of making
62 See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, PROPOSED STATEMENT OF
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS: DISCLOSURES OF INFORMATION ABOUT FINANCIAL
INSTRUMENTS wrrH OFF-BALANCE-SHEET RISK AND FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS WITH
CONCENTRATIONS OF CREDIT RISK 3 (July 21, 1989).
63 Cf supra note 51 (describing how some financial institutions avoid this
"guarantor" role and hence credit risk).
This Article does not discuss the effect on bank risk of diversification within swap
portfolios or diversification of bank activities generally. See, e.g., FIRST INTERSTATE
BANCORP, TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT [hereinafter FIRST INTERSTATE TECHNICAL
SUPPLEMENT] (attachment to Letter from James F. Burns, Jr., Executive Vice
President, First Interstate Bancorp to William W. Wiles, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (May 7, 1987)) (illustrating effects of failure to capture
interest and exchange rate diversification effects within a swaps portfolio on estimate
of credit exposure); Technical Paper: Average Potential Exposure vs. Near-Maximum
Potential Exposure for Interest Rate Swap Portfolios (attachment to Letter from Michael P.
Esposito, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Chase
Manhattan Corporation, to William W. Wiles, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (June 1, 1987)) (illustrating how portfolio effects can complicate
measurement of potential credit exposure of swaps); Litan, Evaluating and Controlling
the Risks of Financial Product Deregulation, 3 YALEJ. ON REG. 1, 10-19 (1985) (discussing
how financial institutions can reduce risk through diversified portfolios of various
banking and non-banking activities).
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arrangements to pay $11.4 million a year in return for Prime on a
$100 million notional amount for the remaining life of the original
swap. If the original swap is a fairly common one - a plain vanilla
swap - the bank could simply buy a swap from another swap dealer
with the precise economic characteristics as the original swap with
the finance company. 64 In contract terms, the bank can simply enter
into a cover transaction and ask the finance company to pay the cost
of cover. 65 This lump sum amount - typically called the "mark-to-
market" value - would be the measure of damages suffered by the
bank on default by the finance company.
The current exposure of the bank to the finance company is thus
approximately equal to the mark-to-market value of the swap at that
time. As one would expect, the more interest rates increase from
commencement of the swap, the more "credit" the bank is effectively
extending to that party and the more the "mark-to-market" amount
will be.
Of course, if interest rates were to remain stable, or if they were
to drop, a default by the finance company-would expose the bank to
little or no credit risk. Indeed, if interest rates were to drop, the
bank would not have to pay a swap dealer anything to enter into the
replacement swap. Instead, a swap dealer would be willing to pay
the bank to enter into a swap on what would be extremely favorable
terms. Thus, if interest rates drop, the finance company is effectively
extending "credit" to the bank rather than the other way around; the
"mark-to-market" value would be a negative number.
The "potential exposure" of the bank on a swap as of any date
does not refer to the credit risk to which the bank is actually subject
on that date. Instead, the term refers to the extent to which the bank
would be exposed to its customer if interest rates or exchange rates
were to move in the wrong direction. Broadly speaking, the current
exposure on a given day can be analogized to the temperature on
64 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL SWAP DEALERS ASSOCIATION, USER'S GUIDE TO THE
STANDARD FORM AGREEMENTS 8-11 (1987) (discussing how loss calculated in standard
documentation when one party to a swap defaults); see also S. HENDERSON &J. PRICE,
supra note 36, at 101-121; Gooch & Klein, Damages Provisions in Swap Agreements, INT'L
FIN. L. REV., Oct. 1984, at 36; Henderson, Termination Provisions of Swap Agreements,
INT'L FIN. L. REV., Sept. 1983, at 22.
65 For example, assume that Prime has risen to 20% at the time of default by the
finance company. No swap dealer would be willing to enter into a swap paying Prime
on $100 million in return for a payment of $11.4 million, the payment terms of the
original swap between the bank and the finance company. The bank would have to
sweeten the deal with a lump sum payment, and then attempt to recover this payment
from the finance company.
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that day. The potential exposure on that day would reflect just how
hot it might reasonably get in the future.
Clearly, it is much easier to state what the temperature is now
than to predict tomorrow's high temperature or even to express that
prediction in a simple way. The meteorologist can determine with
absolute certainty what the temperature is at the moment. On the
other hand, in order to predict what the high may be the following
day, she must develop a model of weather systems. However sophis-
ticated her modelling, she cannot state what the precise high will be,
but will, at best, only be able to give a range of statistical
probabilities.66
Similarly, current exposure as to a plain vanilla swap is easy to
quantify. Phoning a swap dealer to see what it would charge is analo-
gous to looking at a thermometer.6 7 Potential exposure, however, is
not as easy to determine or express.
The modeling is not only technically difficult but is susceptible
to personal judgments. Such models depend on a wide variety of
assumptions, ranging from assumptions about how interest rates and
exchange rates fluctuate to assumptions about how these fluctuations
relate to the risk of default on the part of bank customers. 68 Quanti-
66 See Note, Social Science Statistics in the Courtroom: The Debate Resurfaces in
McCleskey v. Kemp, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 688, 695 (1987) (describing the
measures of central tendency and the measures of dispersion).
67 The only major problems likely to emerge from measuring current exposures
pertain to "exotic" swaps, for which only a limited number of swap dealers may be
willing to give quotations. Thus, in the early days of the swap market, when quotes
were less available, there was reluctance to use a mark-to-market concept in case of
counterparty default. Even now, there are provisions for alternative damage
remedies in case a sufficient number of reliable quotations is unavailable. See
INTERNATIONAL SWAP DEALERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 42, at 12; cf infra notes 232-
33 and accompanying text (concerning possible mispricing of certain hedging
products by major money center bank).
68 See, e.g., BRITISH BANKER'S ASSOCIATION, CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL ADEQUACY
IN THE UK AND US: MEMORANDUM ON THE CONSULTATIVE PAPERS ISSUED BY THE BANK
OF ENGLAND AND THE U.S. FEDERAL AUTHORITIES 8-9 (May 1987)[hereinafter 1987
BBA MEMORANDUM] (criticizing as overly conservative the proposed uses of
"stringent" confidence limits and data on volatilities observed during the early
1980s); FIRST INTERSTATE TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 63, at 5 (describing
how small changes in United States dollar interest rate volatility drastically affect
swap exposure); Ardalan & Seigel, supra note 57, at 82-83 (asserting a vast distinction
between the use of statistical data from the 1973 to 1980 period and the use of such
data from the 1978 to 1985 period).
The methodology ultimately used by regulators to assess risk is not clearly set
forth in the BIS Accord. Inferences can be drawn from a preliminary model released
by the Federal Reserve Board and the Bank of England in March 1987, the comment
letters filed in response thereto, and the regulations eventually implementing the BIS
Accord. See FRB/BOE Credit Exposure Memorandum, supra note 57.
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fication of these assumptions involves answering questions that do
not lend themselves to scientific resolution.
69
Whatever the models and assumptions used, the potential expo-
sure is more difficult to express than the current exposure. The cur-
rent exposure of a bank on a swap is captured quite well by a single
number, the mark-to-market value of the swap. The potential expo-
sure on the same swap is intended to give some sense as to how high
the exposure might reach; if the potential exposure on a swap is
characterized by a single number, implicit in that number is some
judgment as to the acceptable level of statistical improbability.
70
As this discussion illustrates, the credit risks assumed by a bank
entering into a swap are quite different from those assumed when
making a traditional variable rate term loan. 71 With such a loan, the
maximum amount the bank could lose at any moment is identifiable
and constant in magnitude: even in the worst case scenario, the most
the bank can lose if the borrower defaults is the principal amount.
72
69 For good discussions of the subtleties of potential exposure, see FIRST
INTERSTATE TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 63; Garbade, An Appreciation of the
Analysis of Credit Exposure on Single-Currency (U.S. Dollar) Fixed-floating Interest Rate Swaps
in TREATMENT OF INTEREST RATE AND EXCHANGE RATE CONTRACTS IN THE RISK AssEr
RATIO AND POTENTIAL CREDIT EXPOSURE ON INTEREST RATE AND EXCHANGE RATE
RELATED INSTRUMENTS (Mar. 1987) (attachment to Letter from George J. Vojta,
Executive Vice President, Bankers Trust Company, to William W. Wiles, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (May 12, 1987)); Letter from Donald S.
Howard, Executive Vice President, Citicorp, to William W. Wiles, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Appendix I (June 1, 1987); Comments on
Federal Reserve Board Proposed Rulemaking, Docket No. R-0567: Incorporation of Credit Risks
From Interest and Exchange Rate Contracts in Risk Based Capital Measure (attachment to
Letter from John F. Kooken, Vice Chairman & Chief Financial Officer, Security
Pacific Corporation, to William W. Wiles, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (May 29, 1987)).
Analogous problems can arise in the technological decisionmaking context. See,
e.g., McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science
Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729, 732 (1979)
("The proceedings are characterized by very few 'hard facts,' many assumptions and
inferences, large uncertainties, and the unavoidable exercise of policy judgment.").
70 Cf FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, PROPOSED STATEMENT OF
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS: DISCLOSURES ABOUr FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 17 (Nov. 30,
1987) (defining the concept of reasonably possible credit loss).
71 See Ferron & Handjinicolaou, supra note 41, at 135-36 (discussing credit risk
differences between swaps and traditional variable rate bank loans).
72 Strictly speaking, the bank also could lose accrued interest and unreimbursed
enforcement costs and, possibly, suffer from the impact of such a default on the
bank's overall mix of assets and liabilities. In addition, under certain narrow
circumstances, the bank may actually find itself having liability to the borrower or to
others from having entered into a lending transaction. See, e.g., 42 VAND. L. REV.
855-983 (1989) (articles on various aspects of lender liability); Quentel, The Liability
of Finanical Institutions for Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs Under CERCLA, 1988 WIs. L.
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Using swap terminology, the "current exposure" on a loan is fixed in
magnitude and is equal to the "potential exposure" on the loan.
In contrast, the current exposure of a swap can vary from hour
to hour as interest rates and exchange rates fluctuate. The potential
exposure is more difficult to assess and to express. The potential
exposure will depend on the forecasting model, the assumptions
underlying the model, and, if a single number is used to express the
potential exposure, the level of statistical improbability selected.
II. MODEL TWINS: THE SWAP AND THE BIS ACCORD
A. Swaps: Uses and Growth
Introduced in quite some secrecy in the late 1970s, swaps
became vital to corporate and international finance in the 1980s.
73
With disclosure in 1981 of some of the particulars of a currency swap
between IBM and the World Bank and the disclosure in 1982 of the
details of an interest rate swap involving Deutsche Bank Luxem-
bourg, the swap soon flourished. 4 In two years, the swap market
"shot from infancy to middle-age." 75 The figures as to interest rate
swaps are illustrative. As of the end of 1982, $3 billion of interest
REv. 139 (describing how lenders can face potential liability for their borrowers'
hazardous waste cleanup costs).
73 Some observers speculate that the first swap was a currency swap in August
1976 between clients of Continental Illinois Limited and Goldman Sachs. In an
effort to protect the proprietary nature of the product, the parties apparently
shunned publicity, See S. HENDERSON & J. PRICE, supra note 36, at 4; see also A Back
Door to Fixed Rate Loans, Bus. WK., Dec. 13, 1982, at 85 (discussing the closely
guarded nature of swaps); Hammond, supra note 36, at 66 ("[I]solated examples of
swap agreements date back to the mid-1970s.").
There is some dispute over when the first interest rate swap was entered into.
See, e.g., S. HENDERSON &J. PRICE, supra note 36, at 4 (stating that the first interest
rate swap occurred in 1981); R. KOPPRASCH,J. MACFARLANE, D. Ross, &J. SHOWERS,
supra note 36, at I (suggesting that the first interest rate swap occurred in the late
1970s). Moreover, it is not clear who invented or first introduced the interest rate
swap. See McGough, Scratch My Greenback, FORBES, July 18, 1983, at 129 ("Somebody
invented [the interest rate swap] ... and by three cocktail parties later everybody on
The Street had invented it." (quoting First Boston's Dexter Senft)); cf First Swap,
EUROMONEY: A SPECIAL 20TH ANNIVERSARY SUPPLEMENT, June 1989, at 246 ("Who
started swaps, and when? There are many claimants for that particular honour, and
the truth is certainly obscure.").
74 See S. HENDERSON &J. PRICE, supra note 36, at 4-5; Price, Keller, & Neilson,
Exchanges of Borrowings, in SWAP FINANCING TECHNIQUES 17 & 30-31 (B. Ant ed.
1983); see also Shirreff, supra note 4, at 60 (discussing the 'initial swaps). For a
discussion of the importance of the World Bank's decision to enter into a currency
swap, see Tait, It Takes Two to Tango, EUROMONEY, Feb. 1983, at 75, 77.
75 Shirreff, Swaps: Managing the Future, EUROMONEY, Oct. 1984, at 202 (quoting
Bank of America's Richard Davis).
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rate swaps were outstanding;76 two years later, this had grown to $90
billion.77 By the end of 1988, one trillion dollars of interest rate
swaps were outstanding.
78
While the phenomenal rate of growth is difficult to explain,
79
the popularity of the swap was not entirely surprising. The
extraordinary interest rate and exchange rate volatility of the past
decade increased the demand for hedging products. As a hedging
device, the swap was outstanding in a number of respects. Not only
did swaps have the technical virtue of providing hedging on a long
term basis,8 0 they also quickly became user-friendly and inexpensive.
Newly aggressive financial institutions looking for business would
not only show puzzled corporations how to protect themselves
against these risks by using swaps but would also tailor the amount,,
type, and term of the swap to the precise needs of the customer.
8'
The benefits of such guidance and custom-made hedging would
often trump such alternatives as publicly-traded options and futures
with their standardized terms and conditions. Such tailor-made
hedges became increasingly inexpensive to bank customers with
increasing standardization of legal documentation and price compe-
tition among swap dealers.82
The fact that the swap proved to be useful beyond its simple
76 See Rogers, supra note 5, at 397.
77 See id.
78 See ISDA Press Release, supra note 6. The figures as to currency swaps and
closely allied products like "caps" and "floors" are suggested by supra notes 3 & 6.
One major swaps dealer claims that "[flrom their origins in the early part of this
decade, the swap markets have grown at a faster annual rate than any other area of
the financial market both before and since." Westpac, Interest Rate and Currency
Swaps: A Presentation 1 (June 1988) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review).
79 See Smith, Smithson & Wakeman, supra note 36, at 34.
80 See When the Swap Meets the Option, EUROMONEY, Apr. 1989 (supplement), at 26
("If you want to hedge currencies long term, swaps are the only instruments liquid
out to 10 years.").
81 Cf For the Client, A Black Box or Something Transparent?, EUROMONEY, Apr. 1989
(supplement), at 23 (development of teams with time, skills and computer power to
analyze clients' problems). The deregulation of capital markets, the attendant
globalization of finance, and competition from the internal staff of their own
corporate clients all seemed to contribute to the growth of entrepreneurial spirit
within major financial institutions. See Germany & Morton, supra note 3, at 743;
Sillem, A Central Bank View of Innovations in the Financial Markets, WORLD BANKING,
Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 12 & 16; Stillit, What Are the Limits of Disintermediation CORP. FIN.,
Oct. 1986, at 67.
82 For a discussion of efforts to standardize swap legal documentation, and of
the increasing use of swap Tnaster agreements, see BRITISH BANKERS' ASSOCIATION,
INTEREST RATE SWAPS (Aug. 1985) (usually referred to as "BBAIRS" terms);
Cunningham, Swaps: Codes, Problems and Regulation, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Aug. 1986, at
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hedging uses also contributed to its popularity. As capital markets
worldwide were deregulated, arbitrage opportunities emerged
whereby the swap could be employed to take advantage of subtle
differences in capital markets. This technique became the key to
many debt issuances, saving the astute borrower significant interest
costs. 8 3 By the end of 1986, some 70% of all new international bond
issues were "swapped out."84 The swap has also proven to be very
useful in creating other financial instruments.s5
The exponential growth in the speed and sophistication of com-
puter hardware and software in the 1980s went hand in hand with
the growth of the swaps market. Advanced computers facilitated the
computations necessary to help banks develop complex new types of
swaps and manage their payment streams and their hedging
activities.
8 6
Finally, in the early years, participants believed that few regula-
tory requirements existed at either the product level or at the finan-
cial institution level.8 7 Any financial institution that decided it had
26; Henderson, supra note 22, at 385-87; Selby, Standardizing Caps and Collars,
INSTrruTONAL INVESTOR, Apr. 1989, at 28.
For a discussion of the decreasing profit margins of swap dealers, see Weiner,
Bankers Cite Edge over Rivals in Competitive Swaps Market, AM. BANKER, Apr. 6, 1988, at 1
(tracing decline of bid-offer spread on a five-year plain vanilla swap from 22 basis
points in 1983, to 12 basis points in 1984, and eventually to a mere 10 basis points in
the 1985-1988 period).
83 See supra notes 44, 53-55 and accompanying text. But see supra note 45.
84 See Ebert, supra note 4, at 23-24; see also A Little Local Difficulty, ECONOMIST,
Mar. 18, 1989, at 84 ("Few Eurobonds are launched without at least one swap behind
them to give the borrower cheaper or in some way more desirable funds.").
85 See Lee, Why Investors Are Missing Profits, EUROMONEY, Apr. 1989, at 56; Smith,
Smithson & Wakeman, supra note 36, at 43; see also supra note 44.
86 See, e.g., Backstrom, supra note 26, at 83 (suggesting that no matter how
complex the swap business of a particular bank, a need for computer technology
exists); A Bank Has to Know Its Way around the Globe, EUROMONEY, Apr. 1989
(supplement), at 5 (discussing the resources such as computer technology that a bank
must possess in order to act as a risk manager); Selling Fidges to Eskimos, supra note 4,
at 55 (discussing the types of computer hardware and software being used by the
banks in the swap industry); supra note 10.
87 See Regulators Expected to Require More Disclosure, Regulation of Swap Market,
Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 531 (Apr. 7, 1986) (quoting an officer of an
investment bank as saying that swaps are "one of the few major unregulated financial
instruments"); Raiding of the Rate Swappers, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1986, at D1, col. 3
("Clearly, one of the reasons why this [swap] market has grown so rapidly is because
it's unregulated." (quoting Charles M. Lucas of the Federal Reserve Bank of Newv
York)). For a discussion of regulation in the early years of the swap market, see infra
note 88.
In more recent years, regulators have been paying increasing attention to the
swap market. For instance, in 1987, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
took actions which suggested it might ultimately require many swaps to be traded on
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the contacts and the expertise could choose to be a swap dealer.
Neither capital adequacy requirements nor deposit insurance premi-
ums applied to bank swap activities. Nor did regulators prescribe the
terms and conditions of swap agreement. It was virtually a free mar-
ket. It was too good to last.
B. The BIS Accord and the New Generation of Financial Regulation
1. The Rationale for Regulation
Soon after the existence of swaps became public knowledge,
regulators began considering possible courses of action. In the
United States, commodities and securities regulators refrained from
intervening in the offer, sale or trading of the products.8 8 It was U.S.
federally designated exchanges and otherwise subject them to its jurisdiction. See
Young & Stein, Swap Transactions under the Commodity Exchange Act: Is Congressional Action
Needed?, 76 GEo. LJ. 1917, 1918-20 & 1943-45 (1988). To the delight of the swaps
industry, in July 1989 the Commodity Futures Trading Commission recognized a
broad non-exclusive safe harbor; if a transaction comes within the safe harbor, the
Commission will take no action to regulate it. The safe harbor can be met by the vast
majority of swap transactions. See Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed.
Reg. 30694 (1989) [hereinafter CFTC Swaps Policy Statement]; Dorff, The CFTC's Swaps
Policy Statement: A Safe Harborfor Off-Exchange Instruments, FIA REVIEW, Sept.-Oct. 1989,
at 14; see also infra notes 201 & 215 and accompanying text (discussing commodity
swaps).
For examples of other recent regulatory or quasi-regulatory actions in the
United States taken outside of the capital adequacy area, see FFIEC Interest Rate Swap
Proposal Opposed by Bankers and Accountants, 52 Banking Rep. (BNA) 320, 321 (Feb. 6,
1989); Saunders, "It's the Right Thing to Do," FORBES, Apr. 17, 1989, at 104; Weiner,
'89 Will Bring Closer Scrutiny of Swap Products: Regulators, Tax Authorities Concerned over
Implications for Banking Industry, AM. BANKER, Jan. 3, 1989, at 3; cf THE 1987 LONDON
SWAPS SEMINAR, supra note 26, at 90-92 (Bank of England official referring to three
United Kingdom regulators with swap responsibilities); WHOLESALE MARKETS, supra
note 51, at 38-44 (1988) (Bank of England establishing general standards for swap
market); Morton & Creamer, FSA: The Scheme for Derivative Instruments, Iwr'L FIN. REV.,
Oct. 1989, at 30, 30-31 (describing applicability of Britain's Financial Services Act
1986 to swaps and other financial products).
88 The most notable actions on the part of commodities regulators in this area
occurred in 1987, when the Commodity Futures Trading Commission took actions
which seemed to suggest that it might ultimately require many swaps to be traded on
federally designated exchanges, and in 1989, when it effectively elected not to
regulate the vast bulk of swap transactions. See supra note 87 and infra notes 201,
215-16 and accompanying text. The most notable action taken by securities
regulators in this area was an undated, unpublished, and unissued "no-action letter"
pertaining to the "net capital" of a broker dealer. See SEC Considering Interest Rate
Swap Guidelines Opposed by Industry, SEC. WEEK, Mar. 11, 1985, at 3; Taylor, Interest Rate
and Currency Swaps, 2 REV. FIN. SERVS. REG. 107, at 109 (1986); Taylor, Regulatory
Valuation of Swap Exposure, in INTEREST RATE AND CURRENCY SWAPS 1986, at 369 &
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commercial bank regulators, often in close coordination with their
foreign counterparts, who were to become the dominant actors.
Why should governments regulate the affairs of commercial
banks at all? Governments are not supposed to intervene in the suc-
cess and failure of private firms. Individual successes and failures are
part of the proper functioning of a free enterprise system in which
the race goes to the swift.8 9 Yet, in virtually all western industrial-
ized countries, the banking industry is more heavily regulated than
any other, and virtually all economists believe that the safety and
soundness of banks is sufficiently important to warrant such
intrusion.
90
Two arguments for governmental intervention are especially
prominent. The first relies on application of the basic "externalities"
argument for government intervention. Proponents believe that fail-
ure of a bank has social costs which far exceed the private costs of
such failure; the "externalities" from failure are higher than those
arising from the failure of a typical industrial enterprise. Based on
experience from the Depression, some argue that the failure of an
individual bank, especially a large bank, could lead to bank runs
throughout the economy and ultimately lead to a disastrous financial
panic.9 Other economists focus on the fact that widespread bank
453-55 (D. Cunningham chairman 1986) (reprinting the draft no-action letter); infra
note 149.
For background on the early history of swap market regulation and the possible
application of securities and commodities laws to swaps, see Dutt, Interest Rate Swaps
Face Scrutiny by Commodities Regulators, CORP. FINANCING WEEK, Sept. 16, 1985, at 1;
Gilb erg, Regulation of New Financial Instruments Under the Federal Securities and Commodities
Laws, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1599 (1986); Henderson, US Authorities Decide Not to Issue
Ruling, INT'L BANKING L. BULL., Feb. 1985, at 55; Klein, Interest Rate and Currency
Swaps: Are They Securities?, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Oct. 1986, at 35; McGough, supra note
73, at 129; Olander & Spell, supra note 40, at 21; Taylor, Interest Rate and Currency
Swaps, 2 REV. FIN. SERV. REG. 107 (1986).
89 See Macey & Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for Bank
Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1155 (1988) ("In a market economy, when an
enterprise fails, the resources previously devoted to a firm will find other, more
efficient uses.").
90 See R. DALE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING 53 (1986).
For discussion of the full range of reasons for governmental intervention as to
the soundness of banks, see, e.g., Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86
YALE LJ. 4, 10-26 (1976); Macey & Miller, supra note 89, at 1155-65.
91 See Corrigan, A Framework for Reform of the Financial System, FED. RESERVE BANK
NEW YORK QUART. REV., Summer 1987, at 1, 3; Garten, Banking on the Market: Relying
on Depositors to Control Bank Risks, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 129, 160-63 (1986); Wall,
Regulation of Banks'Equity Capital, EcON. REV., Nov. 1985, at 4-5. But see G. BENSTON &
G. KAUFMAN, RISK AND SOLVENCY REGULATION OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS: PAST
POLICIES AND CURRENT OPTIONS 18 (1988); Fischel, Rosenfield, & Stillman, The
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failures could cause the money supply to drop unexpectedly, thereby
causing unemployment to rise and output to fall.92
The second set of reasons favoring bank regulation, a variation
on the externalities argument, arises from the existence of the
explicit or implicit governmental safety net for banks. 93 Because of
the existence of governmental deposit insurance, the costs of a bank
failure would be borne by the healthy institutions paying premiums
or, if the insurance funds are depleted, taxpayers. Deposit insurance
premiums, being fixed at a flat rate rather than adjusted for the risks
being taken by the individual financial institution, give financial insti-
tutions incentives to take undue risk. Decisions that major money
center banks were simply too large to be allowed to fail may similarly
encourage shareholders and managers to engage in excessive risk-
taking because the costs of failure would be borne by third parties.
94
Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REV. 301, 310-11; Macey &
Miller, supra note 89, at 1157.
A version of the externalities argument helped motivate the $300 billion
congressional rescue of the savings and loan industry in August 1989. See Hershey,
Savings Bill Expected to Cut Premium Rates on Deposits, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1989, at 1, col.
2 ("Over 30 years, the plan will cost about $300 billion, with taxpayers picking up
$225 billion and the healthy portion of the industry paying the rest."); Nash, After
Savings and Loan Rescue, Lawmakers Go Home, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1989, at 14, col. 3
(quoting an observer who contended that "[i]f at any time along the way the
Congress had wavered at all on making good on the deposits, you would have seen
massive runs from banks and S. & L.'s").
92 See Fischel, Rosenfield, & Stillman, supra note 91, at 311.
93 See Macey & Miller, supra note 89, at 1162-63. For other discussions of the
moral hazard justification for bank regulation, see UNITED STATES GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEPOSIT INSURANCE: ANALYSIS OF REFORM PROPOSALS (1986);
G. BENSTON & G. KAUFMAN, supra note 91, at 23-26; Fischel, Rosenfield, & Stillman,
supra note 91, at 314-16; Goodman & Shaffer, The Economics of Deposit Insurance, 2 YALE
J. ON REG. 145 (1984); Litan, supra note 63, at 20-21; Lovett, Moral Hazard, Bank
Supervision and Risk-Based Capital Requirements, 49 OHIO ST. LJ. 1365 (1989); Macey &
Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors: A Summary of the Theoretical and Empirical
Arguments, 5 YALEJ. ON REG. 215 (1988); see also infra note 121.
94 The "moral hazard" argument implicitly suggests that bank management
engages in risk-taking that is excessive from the social standpoint despite the
existence of a number of factors militating in favor of very risk-averse behavior. Cf
Litan, supra note 63, at 21-22 (describing reasons why bank managers may wish to
avoid excessively risky undertakings); Tussing, The Case for Bank Failure, 10J.L. ECON.
129, 130-31 (1967) (referring to studies a generation ago which found that banking
firms were "dominated by submissive, nonaggressive, security-oriented
personalities").
Governmental deposit insurance has spawned an additional, related argument
for bank regulation. The argument is that the government, by providing deposit
insurance, is a stakeholder in the bank and, as such, has a right to protect its interests;
"[t]he federal deposit insurance system, by guaranteeing deposits, in essence takes
on the role of a bank liability holder and has an interest in bank capital similar to that
of private liability holders in an uninsured firm." Furlong & Keeley, Bank Capital
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This moral hazard problem contributed to Congress including an
express limitation on the ability of savings and loans to invest in
"junk bonds" in the August 1989 legislation bailing out the savings
and loan industry.9
Both of these arguments in favor of bank regulation generally
apply to the financial innovation activities of banks. Because of the
difference between social and private costs of failure and because of
the governmental safety net, banks acting in the best interests of
shareholders would have the incentive to knowingly incur more risk
as to financial innovations than society would want them to take.
This problem would be worse - and the need for governmental
intervention heightened - if banks were in fact taking on even higher
levels of risk. Regulators believed that this was occurring. First,
some regulators believed that the "off-balance sheet" nature of the
new financial instruments might encourage banks to assume more
risks than would be the case if the full nature and extent of the risks
were fully understood by and disclosed to the market.96 Second,
some regulators believed that financial institutions were involved in
complex and exotic instruments but did not understand the risks the
instruments posed to the financial institutions themselves. In 1985,
one official at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York highly active in
the financial innovations area stated that he was "convinced that no
one at the top levels" of the banks entering into swaps and other new
financial products had a "thorough understanding of the risk proper-
Regulation and Asset Risk, in FED. RESERVE BANK SAN FRANCISco ECON. REV., Spring
1987, at 20, 22; see also infra note 121.
95 See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 222, 103 Stat. 183, 269-73 (1989) [hereinafter FIRREA].
FIRREA has directed the Secretary of the Treasury to explore the feasibility of
establishing variable rate deposit insurance as part of a study of the federal deposit
insurance system. See FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73 at § 1001(a)-(b); cf. Litan, supra
note 63, at 21 & 39-40 (concerning difficulties of establishing variable rate deposit
insurance as a means of solving moral hazard created by current deposit insurance
system); Avery & Belton, A Comparison of Risk-Based Capital and Risk-Based Deposit
Insurance, EcON. REV., Winter 1987, at 20 (comparing risk-based capital scheme with
variable rate deposit insurance); infra note 266 (describing, among other things,
difficulties of governmental insurance schemes).
96 See, e.g., GROSS REPORT, supra note 3, at 231 ("The absence of widely accepted
and recognised accounting practices ... with respect to off-balance-sheet items ...
raises the issue of whether firms have been willing to assume more risks than if their
positions were disclosed and understood by the market."); see also Andrews & Sender,
Off Balance Sheet Risk: Where is it Leading the Banks?, INSTITuTIONAL INVESTOR,Jan. 1986,
at 75, 76 ("Has the attention paid to simple capital-asset ratios driven risks off
balance sheet - and is off balance sheet also out of mind?" (quoting Paul Volcker)).
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ties of these instruments."9 7 Other regulators focused on pricing at
levels which seemed to be below those justified by the risks assumed
and on the failure to adjust the swap prices for the creditworthiness
of bank customers.9 8 Sudden collapses in the markets for various
exotic securities and massive losses by the likes of Merrill Lynch in
trading exotic securities exacerbated these fears.
99
2. Constraints on Unilateral Intervention and the Emergence of
the BIS Accord
Bank regulators chose not to develop a regulatory system specif-
ically addressed to these products. Instead they took advantage of,
97 Hiltzik, Banks Enter New World of High Risk, L.A. Times, Oct. 27, 1985, pt. 5,
Al, col. 6; id. at D6, col. 1 (quoting Charles Lucas of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York); see also Sillem, supra note 81, at 16 (quoting another central banker who
said "[lt is doubtful whether top management is always fully aware of the risks
assumed by financial specialists. The situation becomes even more alarming if the
remuneration of these specialists is partly linked to the financial results achieved by
them"); cf. Cooke, supra note 30 ("I am sure I am not alone in expressing the hope
that senior management really is on top of the use made of these sophisticated'
techniques. Perhaps I may be excused from evidencing a little of the supervisors'
twitch on this subject. Senior management and supervisors have to work hard to keep
up with these developments.").
Stanley Ross, managing director of Deutsche Bank Capital Markets, recently
made the following entry for 7:15 a.m. in his daily journal:
Directors' meeting linked to head office. Swaps specialist propounds
complex multistage swap. Entire table nods wisely. Wonder if all as
confused as I. Again think, "This is a young man's game."
Ross, Bright Sun, Clear Seas, Blue Skies .. , EUROMONEY: A SPECIAL 20TH ANNIVERSARY
SUPPLEMENT, June 1989, at 263.
98 See CROSS REPORT, supra note 3, at 3; Ireland, RJR bids focus attention on swap
credit risk, CORP. FIN., Dec. 1988, at 13. But see Smith, Smithson, & Wakeman, supra
note 36, at 43 ("We see no convincing evidence that swaps are mispriced.").
99 See Crabbe, Perpetual Commotion, EUROMONEY, Jan. 1987, at 5; Spragins &
Farrell, The Big Loss at Merrill Lynch: Why It was Blindsided, Bus. WK., May 18, 1987, at
112 (stating that the investment bank's April 1987 trading loss of $250 million
resulted in part from the inability "to understand and manage the risks of the
complex business it is in"); A Third of a Billion Dollars Wiser at Merrill, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR, Aug. 1988, at 136; see also OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
THE DIRECTOR'S BOOK: THE ROLE OF A NATIONAL BANK DIRECTOR 31 (1987)
("Management should be fully conversant in [highly technical risk reduction
techniques, such as swaps, futures, and options] before it engages in them."); Shale,
The great risk-management systems failure, EUROMONEY, Feb. 1989, at 66, 67 (quoting a
former head of equity-block trading for a major investment bank as saying
"[mlanagement is simply not spending enough time on risk-management"); cf
KLYNVELD PEAT MARWICK GOERDELER, GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS 33 (1988) (stating
that sixty percent of large financial institutions surveyed were not satisfied as to the
adequacy of their risk management systems); THE 1987 LONDON SWAPS SEMINAR,
supra note 26, at 92 (comments of the Bank of England's Carol Sergeant on the
importance of "systems").
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and contributed to, the momentum that had been building since the
1970s for internationally-coordinated efforts at enhancing the safety
and soundness of major banks generally. This momentum consisted
of three related elements: (1) regulation on an international basis;
(2) the emergence of a massive movement in favor of capital ade-
quacy standards as a solution to perceived problems in the safety and
soundness of banks; and (3) incorporation of the regulation of swaps
and related hedging products into this movement. Each of these ele-
ments is examined in turn.
Regulation of bank activities on an international basis helps
resolve a fundamental problem of international public goods. A safe
and sound international financial system has elements of what econ-
omists would refer to as a "public good."' 00 Because it is impossible
to exclude those who do not pay for a pure public good from also
benefiting from that good, each party will have incentives not to pay
its fair share of the benefit. Deterrence against enemy aggression
offers a classic illustration of a public good: everyone benefits from
such deterrence, even an individual who refused to pay taxes.
Because each individual would be protected if everyone else contrib-
uted their share of national defense, there are likely to be "free rid-
ers." If each person acts rationally from his own point of view, far
too little will be spent on defense from the perspective of society as a
whole.
The maintenance of a healthy financial system for the western
industrialized countries has similar public goods elements. Particu-
larly in view of the explosive growth in interdependence among capi-
tal markets in the past decade or two,101 each country has an interest
in the maintenance of a healthy international financial system and is
100 For concise introductions to public goods issues, see R. MUSGRAVE & P.
MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 49-80 (2d ed. 1976); E. STOKEY
& R. ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 305-308 & 315-16 (1978);
Conybeare, International organization and the theory of propery rights, 34 INT'L ORG. 307,
327 (1980); Sandier & Cauley, On the Economic Theory of Alliances, 19J. CONFLICT RES.
330 (1975).
A body of literature implicitly applying these theories to the international
regulation of bank safety is emerging. See R. BRYANT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
INTERMEDIATION 128-50 (1987); B. COHEN, IN WHOSE INTEREST? INTERNATIONAL
BANKING AND AMERICAN FOREIGN 'POLICY 303 (1986); R. DALE, supra note 90, at 171-
72; Lichtenstein, Introductory Note, Bank for International Settlements: Committee on
Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices' Consultative Paper on Proposals for
International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, 27 INT'L LEGAL
MAT. 524 (1988).
101 See Spero, supra note 30, at 115 (referring to the "dramatic increase in
international market activity" during the 1980s); supra notes 15, 24-26 & 81.
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willing to contribute in some fashion to its maintenance. A country
may, for instance, be willing to impose controls on its own banking
institutions to further this international goal. However, since the
benefits of a healthy financial system will, to a certain extent, benefit
all industrialized countries whatever their individual contribution to
such a system, each country may be tempted to free-ride to a certain
extent on the efforts of other countries. To further complicate mat-
ters, while the regulators of all countries have an interest in interna-
tional stability, they also have an interest in minimizing the cost to
their own nation's banks. This latter tendency may result in a race




International coordination was needed to prevent this kind of
shirking by individually rational but internationally troublesome reg-
ulatory behavior. With the increasing globalization of the capital
markets, this became more of a problem. A sea change occurred
because of the 1974 failures of West Germany's Bankhaus Herstatt
and the Franklin National Bank of New York."°3 In December 1974,
the central bank governors of the Group of Ten countries and Swit-
zerland established a committee under the auspices of the Bank for
International Settlements to promote international cooperation in
the monitoring and supervisory coverage of international banking
activities. This, the Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervi-
102 See Risk-Based Capital Requirements for Banks and Bank Holding Companies:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on General Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1988) (statement of
William Taylor, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation, Federal Reserve
Board) ("[W]e simply cannot ignore the impact of differing regulatory standards on
U.S. banks' ability to compete worldwide. More consistent supervisory standards
among countries can contribute to greater competitive equality and, in the long run,
to a safer and more stable banking system."); R. BRYANT, supra note 100, at 141
("The supply of international regulatory cooperation is likely to fall short of what
would be mutually beneficial because each nation, acting rationally on an individual
basis, ignores the potential benefits of the greater cooperation for others."); B.
COHEN, supra note 100, at 303 (explaining that in the 1960's and 1970's governments
"became engaged in a kind of 'competition in laxity' in the hope of avoiding any
competitive disadvantages for their national banking systems"); Shirreff, The Fearsome
Growth of Swaps, EUROMONEY, Oct. 1985, at 247, 253 (quoting Charles Lucas of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York as stating that central banks must harmonize their
regulation of swaps, for "[o]therwise the busness will simply be driven to the least
regulated markets"); cf. Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8
CARDOZO L. REV. 709 (1987) (article discussing competitive behavior on the part of
the states with regard to incorporation laws).
103 See Kapstein, Resolving the Regulator's Dilemma: International Coordination of
Banking Regulations, 43 INT'L ORG. 323, 328-29 (1989).
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sory Practices, or the "Cooke Committee," has centerposted interna-
tional supervision of banks ever since.
10 4
The Cooke Committee, United States bank regulators, and the
Bank of England created, through a series of interdependent actions,
an irresistible momentum toward the international coordination of
bank safety and soundness through a capital adequacy approach. In
June 1982 the Cooke Committee presented a paper which argued
that "in the current and prospective environment further erosion of
capital ratios should, on prudential grounds, be resisted; and that, in
the absence of common standards of capital adequacy, supervisors
should not allow the capital resources of their major banks to deteri-
orate from their present levels, whatever those levels may be."'
' 0 5
The Cooke Committee continued its work on capital adequacy
amidst calls from regulators from around the world for strengthen-
ing the capital base of banks.'
0 6
104 Peter Cooke, an Associate Director of the Bank of England, was chairman of
this Committee from 1977 to 1988. See BANK OF ENGLAND, ANNUAL REPORT UNDER
THE BANKING ACT FOR 1988/89, at 20 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 BANK OF ENGLAND
ANNUAL REPORT]; see also R. BRYANT, supra note 100, at 145 (stating that the Cooke
Committee is "[t]he most important forum for catalysing consultations and
cooperation among banking supervisory authorities"); Norton, Capital Adequacy
Standards: A Legitimate Regulatory Concern for Prudential Supervision of Banking Activities?,
49 OHIo ST. L.J. 1299, 1339 (1989) (calling the Committee a "centrifugal force for
creating a worldwide network for the exchange of information and the discussion of
issues regarding bank prudential supervision").
The Cooke Committee represented a significant break with prior international
practice. See, e.g., R. BRYANT, supra note 100, at 145 (explaining that before the
formation of the Committee, "consultations among [national banking] authorities
were infrequent and primarily bilateral"); B. COHEN, supra note 100, at 303
(suggesting that the formation of the Cooke Committee marked a shift in
international attitudes towards bank regulation); Duffy, Regulators Assess Group of 10
from Humble Start to Global Plan, AM. BANKER, July 27, 1988, at I (reporting Peter
Cooke's belief that at the first meeting of the Committee, none of the banking
supervisors from the Group of Ten industrial countries had ever met each other).
For a description of the purposes of the Committee, see Cooke, The Basle
"Concordant" on the Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments, 39 AusSENwIRTSCHAFT
151, 151 (1984) (stating the main purpose "is to work towards cohesion of
arrangements for supervising the activities of banks operating in international
markets ....").
105 Norton, supra note 104 at 1339-40 (quoting COMMITrEE ON BANKING
REGULATIONS AND SUPERVISORY PRACTICES, REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKING SUPERVISION 1982, at 3 (1983)).
106 See, e.g., Lamfalussy, Is Change Our Ally?, BANKER, Sept. 1986, at 24 (quoting
the general manager of the Bank for International Settlements as referring to the
need to "radically strengthen ... the capital base of all financial intermediaries and of
banks in particular"); Norton, The Work of the Basle Supervisors Committee on Bank Capital
Adequacy and the July 1988 Report on "International Convergence of Capital Measurement and
Capital Standards," INT'L LAW., Spring 1989, at 245, 253-54.
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At around the same time, Congress and the federal banking
agencies had also become concerned with declining levels of capital
in relation to assets. The International Lending Supervision Act of
1983107 called on the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and
the Secretary of the Treasury to work with other countries to
strengthen the capital adequacy of banks involved in international
lending and required the federal banking regulators to establish min-
imum levels of capital domestically.' The federal banking regula-
tors responded with a series of capital adequacy rules.'0 9
Unfortunately, these capital rules were not very specific on how they
might be adjusted for the risk profile of individual banks." 0 Coun-
tries such as France, Britain, and West Germany had more sophisti-
cated capital adequacy approaches."' In 1986, federal regulators
proposed a revised system which explicitly took into account the risk-
iness of bank assets.
12
The international collective goods issue raised its head and
came to dominate the capital adequacy efforts. Many of the banks
which commented on theproposal argued that, without similarly
stringent risk-based capital standards in other countries, United
States banks would be at a competitive disadvantage. Coincidentally,
the Bank of England was also in the process of revising its capital
adequacy system, a system that was conceptually similar to the
United States proposal. The answer was at hand. In the fall of 1986,
United States authorities deferred action on their own proposal to
work with the Bank of England toward a common approach. On Jan-
107 12 U.S.C. § 3901 (Supp. V 1987).
108 See id. at § 3907. For d discussion of the pre-existing capital adequacy
guidelines, see Note, International Banking: United States - United Kingdom Capital
Adequacy Agreement, 28 HARV. INT'L LJ. 499, 501 n.2 (1987).
109 See 50 Fed. Reg. 16,057 (1985) (rules of the Federal Reserve Board); 50 Fed.
Reg. 11,128 (1985) (rules of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); 50 Fed.
Reg. 10,207 (1985) (rules of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency); see also
Norton, supra note 104, at 1327.
110 See Norton, supra note 104, at 1331 (noting that the capital adequacy rules
"explicitly indicate that the regulators.., should factor into their capital analysis an
assessment of institutional risks on a case-by-case basis").
II1 See Bardos, The Risk-based Capital Agreement: A Further Step Towards Policy
Convergence, FED. RESERVE BANK NEW YORK Q. REV., Winter 1987-88, at 26, 27. The
discussion in the text as to the historical background of the BIS Accord relies heavily
on Bardos, supra.
112 See Comptroller of the Currency, Minimum Capital Ratios; Risk-Based
Capital Standards for National Banks, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,602 (1986); Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, Capital Maintenance; Supplemental Adjusted Capital
Proposal, 51 Fed. Reg. 6,126 (1986); Federal Reserve System, Bank Holding
Companies and Change in Bank Control; Capital Maintenance; Supplemental
Adjusted Capital Measure, 51 Fed. Reg. 3,976 (1986).
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uary 8, 1987, United States bank regulatory authorities and the Bank
of England announced that they had agreed to request public com-
ment on a proposed risk-based capital framework for banks and bank
holding companies that had been jointly developed by federal bank
regulators and the Bank of England. i t ' Regulators in the United
States and the United Kingdom were aware that simply achieving a
"level playing field" between the two countries would not do. There
was concern that this effort to strengthen the regulatory framework
in the United States and the United Kingdom would undermine the
international competitiveness of banks from those countries.' 14 The
regulatory authorities in the other major financial countries were
forced to consider these concerns when United States and United
Kingdom regulators deferred action on the joint proposal in order to
seek the agreement of a larger number of countries."1 This joint
U.S.-U.K. proposal also added pressure to the Cooke Committee
113 See Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
and Federal Reserve Board, Joint News Release, reprinted in INTEREST RATE AND
CURRENCY SWAPS 1987, supra note 57, at 207. This agreement led to, among other
things, Federal Reserve Board revision of its 1986 proposal. See Federal Reserve
System, Capital Maintenance; Revision to Capital Adequacy Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg.
5,119 (1987); Norton, supra note 106, at 258; cf Comptroller of the Currency,
Minimum Capital Ratios; Issuance of Directives, 52 Fed. Reg. 23,045 (1987); Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, Capital Maintenance; Risk-Based Capital Proposal,
52 Fed. Reg. 11,476 (1987).
114 See 1987 BBA MEMORANDUM, supra note 68, at I ("There is ... a real danger
that a strengthening of the regulatory framework in the U.K. and U.S. may
undermine the competitive position of banks in those countries unless the
supervisory authorities in other major countries introduce comparable
arrangements."); Letter from Patrick de Saint-Aignan, Chairman, International Swap
Dealers Association, Inc., to Brian Quinn, Head of Banking Supervision, Bank of
England and William W. Wiles, Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, at 10 (May 28, 1987) [hereinafter 1987 ISDA Letter] ("Any
distortion of costs and pricing caused by an uneven regulatory playing field will have
an immediate effect on competition"), reprinted in THE 1987 LONDON SWAPS SEMINAR,
supra note 26; see also Matthews & Naylor, US Banks Seek Equal Treatment as Capital Talks
Move to Japan, AM. BANKER, Jan. 12, 1987, at 1 (stating that at the time of the
promulgation of the United States-United Kingdom proposal, the president of
Federal Reserve Bank of New York was "reportedly discussing capital adequacy
ratios with central banking officials in Japan, whose major banks have long operated
with lower capital levels than those of many of their international competitors");
Regulating Swaps: Capital Punishment, ECONOMIST, May 30, 1987, at 78-79 ("British and
American bankers fear that while they have to raise costly capital to meet the new
rules, French, West German and Japanese Banks may carry on under their old
rules.").
115 See Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
and Federal Reserve Board, Joint News Release (Dec. 10, 1987) [hereinafter
December 1987 Joint News Release].
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process."t 6 In April 1987, the Cooke Committee took the joint U.S.-
U.K. proposal under consideration and addressed the possibility of
expanding the agreement to include all the countries represented on
the Committee.' 7 In December 1987, the Cooke Committee set
forth the conclusions of its discussions in the form of a proposal
which broadly paralleled the U.S./U.K. proposal." 8 In March 1988,
the federal banking agencies issued for public comment a revised
capital adequacy scheme based on the Cooke Committee proposal.
In July 1988, following additional changes, the members of the
Cooke Committee set out an agreed framework for measuring capital
adequacy and a minimum capital standard which the members would
implement in their respective countries. This framework was subse-
quently endorsed by the central bank Governors of the Group of
Ten." 9 In the United States, implementing regulations in turn were
adopted by each of the primary federal banking regulators for their
respective commercial bank and bank holding company charges.'
20
116 See Norton, supra note 106, at 258.
117 See Bardos, supra note 111, at 28.
118 See COMMITrEE ON BANKING REGULATIONS AND SUPERVISORY PRACTICES, BANK
FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, PROPOSALS FOR INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF
CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (Dec. 1987); December 1987 Joint
News Release, supra note 115. The proposals, however, did incorporate certain
changes in the methodology dealing with swaps and related products. For instance,
the proposals provided that no capital was required to cover the potential credit
exposure on single currency floating/floating interest rate swaps; the credit exposure
on these contracts would be evaluated solely on the basis of their mark-to-market
value (that is, the current exposure). See id. annex 3, at 4.
119 See BANKING SUPERVISION DIVISION, BANK OF ENGLAND, IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE BASEL CONVERGENCE AGREEMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 1 (1988) [hereinafter
BOE CAPITAL GUIDELINES]; Norton, supra note 106, at 262.
120 See supra note 31. Federal bank regulators plan on supplementing the risk-
based capital adequacy system contemplated by the BIS Accord with modified
versions of the pre-existing non-risk-based capital adequacy rules. If a bank were
subject only to the risk-based capital adequacy requirements, the bank would be able
to operate with very low absolute levels of capital if its assets were subject to zero or
low capital requirements (such as government securities). A supplemental, non-risk-
based capital adequacy system based on minimum capital to total asset ratios could
prevent this from occurring. Matters pertaining to this supplemental capital
adequacy system have been highly controversial and, as of the beginning of
November 1989, not fully resolved. See FDIC Capital Guidelines, supra note 31, at
11,508; FRB Capital Guidelines, supra note 31, at 4,193; OCC Capital Guidelines,
supra note 31, at 4,171; Minimum Capital Ratio, 54 Fed. Reg. 46,394 (1989)
[hereinafter OCC Supplemental Capital Requirement Proposal] (notice of proposed
rulemaking as to existing Office of the Comptroller of the Currency capital-to-total-
asset ratios); OCC Proposes Minimum Leverage Ratio; Capital Standards Debated, 28
CONTROL BANKING § 6.4 (Sept. 15, 1989) (describing OCC proposal of a 37o
minimum capital-to-total assets ratio to supplement the current risk-based
guidelines); see also infra note 133 (concerning Office of the Comptroller of the
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This broadly based international regulatory movement sub-
sumed concerns about swaps and related hedging products. Swaps
proved particularly troublesome to the regulators because of the
complexity of evaluating their credit risk. One Bank of England reg-
ulator asserted that regulators "had a more thorough and longer
running debate with the swaps market on the sort of capital require-
ments to apply to them than [they] have had with almost any other
sector of the banking market." '21 Although it was clear that swaps
exposed banks to credit risk, by late 1985 United States bank regula-
tors had not yet developed a practical way of incorporating a mea-
sure of this risk in a risk-based capital framework.'22 Initial
international regulatory efforts were limited mostly to gathering
information on reporting mechanisms and on the extent to which
banks were involved in financial innovation activities. Banks were
also called upon to strengthen training programs and monitoring
with respect to the risks associated with these activities.1 23 More
sophisticated analyses followed. 124 In the course of the work prior to
Currency's interest rate risk argument for supplemental capital adequacy system); cf.
Regulatory Capital, 54 Fed. Reg. 46,845 (1989) (interim final rule adopted by the
Office of Thrift Supervision as to minimum regulatory capital regulations for savings
and loan associations).
The European Community has engaged in parallel efforts to harmonize
"solvency" ratios among the twelve member states. See 1989 BANK OF ENGLAND
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 104, at 21-23; Clearing up the Confusion (or muddying the
waters?), EUROMARKET REP., Apr. 24, 1989 (available on LEXIS); EC Ministers Agree on
Capital Adequacy Definition, In Move Toward Harmonization, 51 Banking Rep. (BNA) 1041
(1988); Second Banking Directive Agreed, Irr'L BANKING REP., July 1989 (available on
LEXIS) [hereinafter EC Efforts]; European Community Council, Common Position
Adopted by the Council on 24 VII 1989 with a View to the Adoption of the Directive on a
Solvency Ratio for Credit Institutions [hereinafter EC Council Common Position].
121 THE 1987 LONDON SWAPS SEMINAR, supra note 26, at 92 (remarks of Carol
Sergeant, Banking Supervision Division, Bank of England); see also Mayer, The
Currency Options Snafu, AM. BANKER, Aug. 4, 1988, at 1 ("The recent Basel agreement
of the central banks to set new capital requirements for their wards grows mostly
from the regulators' concern about the risks involved in these swaps and options."):
122 See Bardos, supra note 111, at 33.
123 See Cooke, Co-operation Between Regulatory Authorities, in NEW FINANCIAL
INSTRUMENTS: DISCLOSURE AND ACCOUNTING 205-206 (Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development ed. 1988); see also BANKING SUPERVISION DIVISION,
BANK OF ENGLAND, OFF BALANCE SHEET BUSINESS OF BANKS: CONSULTATIVE PAPER BY
THE BANK OF ENGLAND (Mar. 1986) [hereinafter 1986 CONSULTATIVE PAPERS] ("The
Bank is keenly aware that it does not currently receive statistics on many types of off-
balance sheet business except on an ad hoc basis."), reprinted in INTEREST RATE AND
CURRENCY SWAPS 1987, supra note 57, at 400.
124 See, e.g., 1986 CONSULTATIVE PAPER, supra note 123, at 385-86 (preliminary
report on off-balance sheet risk prepared by the Basel Supervisor's Committee);
CROSS REPORT, supra note 3, at 37-60 (report of study group established by the
central banks of the Group of Ten countries on new financial instruments).
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the January 1987 United States-United Kingdom announcement, a
special task force comprised of representatives of the Bank of Eng-
land, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency was established to develop a measure of credit risk
acceptable to both countries.' 25 -Even then, the task force could not
agree on an appropriate measure of swap risk by the time of the
United States-United Kingdom proposal.126 The American and Brit-
ish regulators did proclaim that it was their "firm intention" to
include the "credit equivalent exposure on interest rate and foreign
exchange rate related transactions in the risk asset ratio as soon as
possible."'
' 2 7
On March 7, 1987, the Federal Reserve Board and the Bank of
England published an agreed proposal on the measurement of credit
risk on swaps and other related instruments.' 28 Subsequently, regu-
lators from a much wider group of countries 129 joined in the swap
discussions; the center of discussion moved to the Cooke Commit-
tee."30 During multilateral discussions on this proposal, several
members of the Cooke Committee objected to the United States-
United Kingdom approach. There was a compromise: in both the
December 1987 Cooke Committee proposals and the BIS Accord,
two alternative ways of calculating swap credit risk were adopted,
one simple and one complex. The International Swap Dealers Asso-
ciation and individual banks were active throughout the process.13
These three factors - the international collective action problem,
the underlying movement to use capital adequacy to ensure the
safety and soundness of banks, and the specific capital adequacy
actions pertaining to swaps and related products - led to the defini-
tion of the swaps "problem" primarily in terms of credit risk. Under
the BIS Accord then, banks were to have capital sufficient to absorb
losses that might arise in connection with defaults by their customers
125 See Bardos, supra note 111, at 27.
126 See id. at 27-28.
127 AGREED PROPOSAL OF THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL BANKING SUPERVISORY
AUTHORITIES AND THE BANK OF ENGLAND ON PRIMARY CAPITAL AND CAPITAL ADEQUACY
ASSESSMENT, reprinted in INTEREST RATE AND CURRENCY SWAPS 1987, supra note 57, at
278 (citations omitted).
128 See FRB/BOE Credit Exposure Memorandum, supra note 57, at 325; see also Staff
Memorandum, Treatment of Interest Rate and Exchange Rate Contracts in the Risk
Asset Ratio (Mar. 3, 1987), reprinted in INTEREST RATE AND CURRENCY SWAPS 1987,
supra note 57, at 289 (describing the proposal).
129 See THE 1987 LONDON SWAPS SEMINAR, supra note 26, at 93 (statement of
Carol Sergeant, Bank of England).
130 See id.
131 See, e.g., supra note 36 (concerning comment letters).
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on their swaps and related products.' 3 2 Other kinds of risks, such as
the interest rate risk which might arise from not finding perfectly
matched counterparties, basically were left for another day.13 3
3. The BIS Accord: Theory and Operation
a. Conceptual Underpinnings of the Capital Adequacy Approach
Thus far, we have seen how the regulators embraced a risk-
based capital adequacy approach as a way of enhancing the sound-
ness of the international banking system. In order to evaluate the
capital adequacy system established by the BIS Accord, we need to
understand in greater detail how increasing the amount of capital is
supposed to increase bank safety. We must also examine why it is
important from society's point of view that the amount of capital
required be set at appropriate levels. We turn now to these two
issues.
Those who believe that capital adequacy requirements can
enhance bank safety13 4 typically rely on three related grounds.1
3 5
132 See BIS ACCORD, supra note 2, Annex 3, at 2.
133 See id. at 3; cf. OCC Supplemental Capital Requirement Proposal, supra note 120
(Office of the Comptroller of the Currency noting that one of the reasons for a capital
adequacy system supplemental to that contemplated by the BIS Accord is the need to
take interest rate risk into account); Regulatory Capital, 54 Fed. Reg. 46,845 (1989)
(the Office of Thrift Supervision stating in November 1989 that it anticipated
publishing in "the near future" a notice of proposed rule-making dealing with
interest-rate risk faced by savings and loan associations); Adequacy of Examination Levels
and Compensation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision,
Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 169 & 214-19 (1989) [hereinafter Banking Supervision Hearings]
(regulatory analysis of the interest rate risk of savings and loan associations); supra
note 43 (concerning asset-liability management policies); supra note 16 (describing
interest rate risk generally); supra note 59 (describing interest rate risk which can
arise in swap context from imperfectly matched swaps).
134 Although the world-wide movement to the capital adequacy approach would
suggest otherwise, the usefulness of the usual accounting-based capital adequacy
approach in assuring the safety and soundness of banks has been the subject of fierce
theoretical debate and is not settled. Analysis of the deficiencies of the capital
adequacy approach, other than as the approach relates directly to the financial
innovation process, is beyond the scope of this Article. For some illustrative critiques
of capital adequacy as a regulatory tool, see G. BENSTON & G. KAUFMAN, supra note
91, at 38-42 & 47-53; Clark, supra note 90, at 63-64 ("[T]he search for the optimal
capital measure continues, apparently in the belief that capital cushions must have
something to do with bank soundness."); Gilbert, Stone & Trebing, The New Bank
CapitalAdequacy Standards, REV. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK ST. Louis, May 1985, at 12 &
n.5 ("There is remarkably little evidence.., that links the level of capital or the ratio
of capital to assets with bank failure rates."); Koehn & Santomero, Regulation of Bank
Capital and Portfolio Risk, 35J. FIN. 1235, 1244 (1980) ("[A] case could be argued that
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The first ground is based on accounting notions. Under accounting
conventions, losses suffered by a bank are first deducted from the
bank's capital account. Thus, the argument goes, during lean times
capital can serve as a cushion to absorb losses and ward off insol-
vency.13 6 Increases in the size of the cushion would reduce the
chances of balance sheet insolvency. Moreover, to the extent that
people believe that the amount of bank capital is correlated with
bank safety, a high capital standard will help foster confidence in the
bank; a perception of stability has independent value.1
37
The second ground is based less on such balance sheet notions
and more on the ability of a bank with low levels of capital to meet its
debt and other obligations on a continuing basis. Generally speak-
ing, to the extent that a bank relies on outside funding to finance
bank operations, a bank can do so either by obtaining capital (such as
by issuing shares of common stock) or by incurring liabilities (such as
by issuing bonds or obtaining additional deposits). Shareholders are
not entitled to fixed payments from the bank while bondholders and
the opposite result can be expected to that which is desired when higher capital
requirements are imposed.").
135 According to the United States General Accounting Office:
Greater capital levels will help institutions absorb losses, since capital
provides a buffer to protect depositors and the funds from decreases in
the value of assets or earnings declines. If the increased capital is raised
in the public markets, it should provide more impetus for market
discipline as more outsiders have a financial stake in the performance of
depositary institutions. As a result of this discipline, riskier institutions
may find it harder to grow as rapidly. An additional advantage associated
with capital is that it is far less destabilizing to rely on investors,
shareholders, or other long-term creditors to bear risk and impose market
discipline on bank and thrift behavior than to rely on the more volatile
uninsured short-term depositors.
1 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEPOSIT INSURANCE: ANALYSIS OF REFORM PRO-
POSALS 102 (1986) (quoting January 1985 Cabinet Council Recommendations for
Change in the Federal Deposit Insurance System); see also Y. ORGLER & B. WOLKO-
WITZ, BANK CAPITAL 14-18 (1976); Wall, supra note 91, at 8-12 (noting that
"[i]ncreased capital can protect banks from insolvency by providing a cushion to
absorb losses"); cf Crouhy & Galai, An Economic Assessment of Capital Requirements in the
Banking Industry, 10 J. BANKING & FIN. 231 (1986) (describing four different roles
attributed to bank capital by those who believe in capital adequacy approach); Mingo,
Capital Ratios: The Reg Q Fiasco of the Future?, 4 Banking Expansion Rep. (CCH) 8, 9
(Jan. 21, 1985) (describing the three major purposes capital serves according to
regulators).
136 See G. BENSTON & G. KAUFMAN, supra note 91, at 38; Wall, supra note 91, at 4;
cf. Gilbert, Stone & Trebing, supra note 134, at 13 (noting difference between
"accounting" definition of capital and "economic" definition of capital).
137 Cf Wall, supra note 91, at 38 (noting that equity capital "protects against
illiquidity resulting from deposit runs" and is a factor in "helping to maintain
depositor confidence").
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depositors are entitled to their principal and interest regardless of
economic conditions. The familiar result is that, everything else held
equal, the larger the amount of funding by way of capital, the more
likely the bank will be able to meet its obligations to the liability
holders."' 8 While the government does not usually interfere with a
private firm's decision on how much capital it ought to have, there
are externalities and moral hazard problems which affect bank deci-
sions in this area. The failure to take into account the effects of its
failure on society and the reliance on the governmental safety net
cause bank management to elect to have too little capital from the
standpoint of society as a whole.'
3 9
The third ground is based on the notion of subjecting manage-
ment to the financial discipline of the market for equity capital. If a
bank wishes to grow it may first have to meet the market test of being
able to obtain new capital. Capital adequacy requirements may thus
have the effect of helping curb bank expansion.1
40
In order for capital adequacy requirements to operate as
intended, those requirements must be set at the right levels. If the
capital adequacy requirement of a particular activity is set too low, it
is unlikely to contribute to the safety and soundness of the financial
system. If, for instance, the mandated capital requirement were
equal to or lower than the amount of capital the bank itself would
have selected, a capital adequacy requirement would have no effect
at all. Indeed, there may be a perverse effect: to the extent that
financial institutions view the legally established capital requirements
as officially sanctioned estimates of riskiness, the underestimation of
risk for regulatory purposes will seep into commercial bank
decisions.
14 1
138 Cf. W. KLEIN &J. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 285-86 (3d ed. 1988) (explaining effects of leverage);
Furlong & Keeley, Bank Capital Regulation and Asset Risk, ECON. REV., Spring 1987, at
20, 22 (describing effect of greater amounts on capital on likelihood of bank meeting
obligations to its liability holders).
139 See Shome, Smith & Heggested, Do Banks Have Adequate Capital?, BANKERS
MAG., July-Aug. 1989, at 21; Wall, supra note 91, at 5-7; supra notes 91-99 and
accompanying text.
140 But see G. BENSTON, R. EISENBEIS, P. HoRvITz, E. KANE & G. KAUFMAN,
PERSPECTIVES ON SAFE & SOUND BANKING: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 175-76 (1986)
(arguing that evidence provides "only tenuous support for the view that stockholders
are a significant force for conservative operation"); Litan, supra note 63, at 35-36
(noting that shareholders are ineffective monitors of bank risk-taking because they
are likely to be willing to take more risks than federal insurance agencies).
141 See BIS ACCORD, supra note 2, at 10 ("[T]he weightings should not be
regarded as a substitute for commercial judgement for purposes of market pricing of
the different instruments."); THE 1987 LONDON SWAPS SEMINAR, supra note 26, at 99-
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There are also serious consequences for setting too high a capi-
tal standard, all of which substantially derive from the costs imposed
by such a standard. A bank, like any other enterprise, seeks to oper-
ate with a capital structure that is optimal from its own point of view,
a structure that maximizes its value. While the capital structure of a
firm will not affect its value in a world of highly restrictive economic
assumptions, 4 2 in the real world of taxes and other imperfections,
theorists postulate that an optimal capital structure does exist (even
if it is difficult to determine).t To the extent that regulation forces
a deviation from the optimal capital structure, opportunity costs are
imposed on the bank shareholders.44
From a public policy viewpoint, there can be two effects of an
overly restrictive capital adequacy requirement. First, to the extent
that capital requirements are too high as to a particular activity,
banks will not engage in a socially optimal amount of that activity.
The profit margins on swaps are extremely thin; even slight increases
in the capital requirements would unnecessarily increase prices or
100 (statement of David Gelber, Chemical Bank International); cf infra notes 145 and
264.
142 See Modigliani & Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of
Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REv. 261, 261-63 (1958). For additional discussions, see R.
BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 16, at 383-402; Black, Miller & Posner, An Approach to
the Regulation of Bank Holding Companies, 51 J. Bus. 379 (1978).
143 See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 16, at 437 (arguing that "[tihere is no
neat formula that you can plug in to find the optimal capital structure" but that one
should consider such factors as taxes and risk); Jensen & Warner, The Distribution of
Power Among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and Directors, 20J. FIN. ECoN. 3, 5 (1988);
Stillit, The Perfect Capital Structure: Does it Exist?, CORP. FIN., Nov. 1988, at 54.
144 See Stillit, supra note 143, at 54.
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decrease availability.145 Financial innovation would also be unneces-
sarily dampened.146
Second, there is a danger of misallocations in the economy aris-
ing from too much equity and not enough debt in the capital struc-
ture of banks.' 4 7 A capital adequacy standard that is too high from
the social point of view would unnecessarily increase the cost of
funds for the banking industry. The overall efficiency of the financial
system would be affected.'
48
145 The regulatory "price" with respect to amount of capital required can affect
the price actually charged by banks for their swaps. See, e.g., Capital Adequacy: Japanese
feel the pinch, INT'L FIN. REV., Apr. 23, 1988, at 1339 (discussing effect of capital
adequacy requirements on willingness of Japanese banks to enter into currency
swaps); Cooper, Still Plenty of Room to Grow, EUROMONEY, Oct. 1988, at 35, 36
(discussing in-house analysis by Shearson Lehman Hutton on effect of rules on the
spreads for currency swaps and interest rate swaps); Donaldson, The GIO capital
adequacy requirements, BANKING WORLD, Aug. 1988, at 42, 43 (Morgan Guaranty officer
asserting that new capital requirements constitute a cost which will be reflected in
price of swaps); Levis & Suchar, What Those Guidelines Mean, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1989,
at 215 (analyzing effect of the BIS Accord's capital requirements on the market for
currency swaps and interest rate swaps); What price capital adequacy?, CORP. FIN., Jan.
1989, at 13-14 (indicating in a table the impact of different capital adequacy
requirements on required "spread"); id. at 13 (noting that some banks have already
stopped making markets in currency swaps as a result of increased capital adequacy
requirements); Letter re: Interest Rate and Exchange Rate Contracts from Kenneth
N. LaVine, Jr., Chief Financial Officer, Chemical Bank to William W. Wiles, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, at app. (May 27, 1987) (attachment to
letter illustrating the pricing implications of capital adequacy requirements); cf Staff
Memorandum, supra note 128, at 10-11 (expressing concern over impact of capital
adequacy requirements on swap pricing). But see Cooper, supra, at 35 (stating that
most commercial banks would swallow a lower rate of return on swaps rather than
raising prices and losing business to the investment banks not subject to such capital
adequacy rules).
146 Evaluating the social benefits and costs of a new financial product is
extremely difficult. The literature on the evaluation of the social benefits and costs of
product innovations generally is only now emerging. See Trajtenberg, The Welfare
Analysis of Product Innovations, with an Application to Computer Tomography Scanners, 97 J.
POL. ECON. 444, 445 (1989) (stating that the "literature on product innovations is
very scanty"). The absence of a fully accepted explanation of why swaps even exist
would hinder a completely convincing analysis of the social benefits and costs of
swaps. For some illustrative analyses as to the social value of financial innovations,
see Impact of the Stock Market Drop and Related Economic Developments on Interest Rates,
Banking, Monetary Policy and Economic Stability: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1987) (statement of Professor
John Kenneth Galbraith); CROSs REPORT, supra note 3, at 187-254; Brown & Smith,
Recent Innovations in Interest Rate Risk Management and the Reintermediation of Commercial
Banking, FIN. MGMT., Winter 1988, at 45, 56-57; Keeley, Financial Innovation and Social
Benefit, in FINANCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY: THE AMEX BANK REVIEW PRIZE
ESSAYS 117-35 (J. Calverley & R. O'Brien eds. 1987).
147 See Stillit, supra note 143, at 54.
148 See Wall, supra note 91, at 12. Moreover, such a deterioration in the
competitive position of banks may mean that "banks will forgo some share of the
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b. The BIS Accord's Operative Provisions
The BIS Accord is designed to result in minimum levels of capi-
tal for internationally active banks. 149 These capital adequacy ratios
are being phased in, with interim figures and stringent final require-
ments which must be met by the end of 1992. National authorities
are permitted to set ratios which are higher than the minimums pre-
scribed in the BIS Accord, but may not set lower ratios.
The ratios are meant to ensure that each bank has a ratio of
"capital" to "aggregate credit risk" which is no less than that speci-
fied by the BIS Accord. Thus, if a bank makes more loans, its aggre-
gate credit risk (that is, the denominator) would increase. If the bank
had been operating with the minimum permissible amount of capital,
it would have to increase the amount of capital (that is, the numera-
tor) in order to remain in compliance. The amount of capital and the
market for various financial services" and thus "the government's ability to protect
the money supply could be undermined." Id. at 12-13. For a fuller exposition of the
costs imposed both on banks and on society as a whole by a forced overcapitalization
of banks, see Santomero & Watson, Determining an Optimal Capital Standard for the
Banking Industry, 32 J. FIN. 1267, 1272-77 (1977).
149 See BIS ACCORD, supra note 2, at 3. In the United States, federal bank
regulators elected to apply the BIS Accord system to all commercial banks instead of
restricting its application only to internationally active banks and decided to retain a
supplementary, non-risk based capital adequacy system. The regulations pertain as
well to bank holding companies. See supra notes 31 and 120.
The BIS Accord stated that its fundamental objectives were "firstly, that the new
framework should serve to strengthen the soundness and stability of the international
banking system; and secondly that the framework should be fair and have a high
degree of consistency in its application to banks in different countries with a view to
diminishing an existing source of competitive inequality among international banks."
BIS ACCORD, supra note 2, at 2.
The capital adequacy rules spawned by the BIS Accord do not apply to
investment banks in the United States. Indeed, the Securities and Exchange
Commission's efforts to ensure the capital adequacy of investment banks with respect
to swap exposure have been narrow in scope and have lagged behind those of the
commercial bank regulators. See Swaps Players on the Sidelines, Irr'L. FIN. REV., Mar. 14,
1987, at 913, 915; supra note 30. Nevertheless, the number and thoughtfulness of the
comment letters filed by investment banks in connection with the proposals which
ultimately led to the BIS Accord indicate that investment banks believe those
commercial bank rules will ultimately affect them in some way as well. Cf Swap Players
on the Sidelines, supra (describing how investment banks do not want to be seen as
inadequately capitalized by the Federal Reserve Board); cf. IOSC Technical Report,
supra note 30, at 3 n.3 (noting possibility of securities firms dealing in swaps through
unregulated affiliates). For current and proposed Securities and Exchange
Commission net capital rules, see Securities and Exchange Commission, Net Capital
Requirements for Brokers or Dealers, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1989); Net Capital
Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 27,249, 52 Fed. Reg. 38,322 (1989); see also
Haberman, Capital Requirements of Commercial and Investment Banks: Contrasts in
Regulation, FED. RESERVE BANK NEW YORK Q. REV., Autumn 1987, at 1.
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amount of credit risk a bank is considered to have must be calculated
in the manner prescribed by the BIS Accord.
In calculating what constitutes "capital" for the purposes of the
ratios, the BIS Accord emphasizes equity capital and disclosed pub-
lished reserves from post-tax retained earnings. This "Tier 1," or
core capital, is considered to be the only element common to all
countries' banking systems, wholly visible in the published accounts.
Other forms of capital - such as unpublished reserves, loan loss
reserves and certain subordinated debt - may count towards the capi-
tal requirement, but only to a limited extent.
The denominator is intended to reflect the credit exposure of
the bank. Roughly speaking, the most a bank can lose on a tradi-
tional loan is the principal amount. Consistent with this, under the
BIS Accord, for most bank loans the credit exposure figure associ-
ated with a traditional loan is simply the amount of the loan. How-
ever, because borrowers vary in creditworthiness, loans of equal
principal amounts in fact can differ in riskiness. The BIS Accord rec-
ognizes this in a broad brush way.
For a typical loan to a corporation, the full amount of the loan
will be used for the denominator; in other words the "risk weight" is
one hundred percent. With a loan in local currency to a central gov-
ernment of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (the "OECD"), on the other hand, there is presumed to be
no credit risk; in other words the "risk weight" is zero percent and
no capital need be held against these sorts of loans. There are also
intermediate points. For example, assets consisting of claims on
banks incorporated in the OECD are assigned a risk weight of 20%
while claims on banks incorporated outside the OECD with a
residual maturity of over one year are given a risk weight of one hun-
dred percent. Because of the disparity in weights, a $5 million loan
to an OECD bank will generally trigger a capital requirement equal
in amount to a $1 million long-term loan to a non-OECD bank.
Swaps and related products had to be treated differently from
loans. As discussed previously,' 50 the amount of credit exposure a
bank has on a swap, unlike the credit exposure the bank has on a
loan, constantly fluctuates in size with hour to hour movements in
interest rates and exchange rates. Moreover, the notional amount of
a swap is merely one of many factors to be taken into account in
calculating credit exposure; the principal amount of a loan, however,
is in and of itself a fairly good measure of the maximum possible loss
150 See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
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on customer default. Recognizing this, the BIS Accord adopts for
swaps and related products the notion of "credit equivalents."
Swaps and related products are put through a two-step procedure:
they are first converted into "credit equivalents" and then risk
weights are applied to these credit equivalents.
Unfortunately, the regulators of the Group of Ten Countries
could not agree on how to calculate credit equivalents.' They
adopted two alternative methods, both of which depend to some
extent on a classification-based approach to assigning a capital price
to individual swaps.
The "original exposure" method to determining credit
equivalents'- 2 is the simpler of the two. This method does not rely
at all on the mark-to-market values for current exposure or separate
measures to reflect potential exposure as discussed earlier.'
53
Instead, this method simply assumes that the credit exposure is
equal to the notional amount of the bank's swap multiplied by speci-
fied numbers (called "conversion factors"). Thus, a bank would
merely apply one of the two sets of conversion factors indicated in
Table 2 to the notional principal amounts of each instrument accord-
ing to the nature of the instrument and its maturity. Once the credit
equivalent is calculated, it is multiplied by the applicable risk weight.
A swap dealer's swap with an OECD bank, for instance, would have
its credit equivalent multiplied by twenty percent. However, because
most regulators believed that customers of swap dealers were
creditworthy, a maximum of weight of fifty percent is applied with
respect to customers who would otherwise attract a one hundred
percent weight.'
5 4
151 See Bardos, supra note 111, at 34; cf EC Council Common Position, supra note
120, at Annex II (discussing the "marking to market" approach and the "original
exposure" approach).
152 See International Regulation, in INSIDE THE SWAP MARKET 95, 99 (3d ed. 1988).
153 See supra text accompanying notes 65 & 66.
154 The International Swap Dealers Association specifically lobbied for 50%
weighting for this reason. See Letter from Mark C. Brickell, Chairman, International
Swap Dealers Association, Inc., to William W. Wiles, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, at 5 (May 13, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 ISDA Letter]; 1987
ISDA Letter, supra note 114, at 8-9. Until recently, the extent of defaults in the swaps
area had been relatively limited. See Weiner, Survey Shows Losses Are Low in Swap
Market, AM. BANKER, July 20, 1988, at 2.
Default statistics can change quickly as to new financial products. On November
1, 1989, Britain's High Court reportedly ruled that swaps entered into by
Hammersmith & Fulham (a local council in London) were ultra vires and
unenforceable. As of the time of judgment, Hammersmith & Fulham's swap
portfolio totalled almost three billion pounds. An appeal is being brought by 35
banks involved in swap transactions with that local council. As of early November,
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Maturity Interest Rate Exchange Rate
Contracts Contracts
Less than one year 0.5% 2.0%
One year or more but less than two 1.0% 5.0%
years
For each additional year 1.0% 3.0%
Table 2
This original exposure approach to calculating credit
equivalents will often generate numbers bearing only the most tenu-
ous relationghip to the true credit exposure on any individual swap.
At the commencement of a typical swap, for instance, the actual
credit exposure is almost negligible because the swap terms corre-
spond to the prevailing market conditions; yet the original exposure
approach assigns the same weight at commencement as at subse-
quent, "riskier" points in time. In addition, because interest rates
and exchange rates will always be fluctuating, the mark-to-market
value of the swap can vary considerably over the life of a swap.
Because a swap dealer's true economic exposure on a swap at any
given time depends on the mark-to-market value of the swap, the
exposure will vary as well from time to time. By way of contrast,
under this regulatory approach, movements in the actual mark-to-
market values of a given swap are totally ignored. As a result, only
through happenstance will the figure calculated under this regula-
tory approach equal the true exposure faced by the dealer.
This original exposure approach thus cannot not be accurate as
to any individual swap. The justification for this approach would
have to be grounded on the notion that, viewing a bank's swap port-
folio in the aggregate, the figures generated under this approach
should provide estimates of credit risk which are accurate enough for
regulatory purposes. Since currency swaps are generally riskier than
interest rate swaps of the same notional amount and duration, higher
capital requirements are imposed on currency swaps. Since the
credit risks of swaps generally increase with notional amount and
industry sources reported that 20 local authorities had officially suspended swap
transactions. See A Little Local Difficulty, ECONOMIST, Mar. 18, 1989, at 84; Britain's high-
court swap-shop, ECONOMIST, Nov. 4, 1989, at 93; Dumping Britain's Local-Council Swaps,
ECONOMIST, May 6, 1989, at 71; Evans, 35 Banks Prepare for Their Appeal in UK Swap
Case, AM. BANKER, Nov. 14, 1989, at 6; Swaps in the Town Hall, Bus. L. BRIEF, July
1989, at 6; N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1989, at 25, col. 3.
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duration, the capital required increases as well. Simplicity is the
chief virtue of this original exposure approach. 155
The United States and the United Kingdom went down a differ-
ent, more sophisticated path' 56 of calculating credit equivalents for
swaps and related products. The United States and the United King-
dom divide these products into two broad categories: "interest rate
contracts," like interest rate swaps and related interest rate hedging
instruments, and "exchange rate contracts," like currency swaps and
related currency hedging instruments. t5 7 Although designated the
"current exposure" method, this method in fact relies on measures
both of current and potential exposures.' 8 The credit exposure is
deemed to consist of both a "current exposure" element and a
"potential exposure" element. Specifically, the regulators assumed,
over the objections of some in the swaps industry,"' that the credit
155 There are a number of other problems associated with the original exposure
method's approach to estimating the credit risk of swaps. See, e.g., Ferron &
Handjinicolaou, supra note 41, at 145-46; 1988 ISDA Letter, supra note 154, at 4.
156 See BOE CAPITAL GUIDELINES, supra note 119, at 10; FDIC Capital
Guidelines, supra note 31, at 11,515; FRB Capital Guidelines, supra note 31, at 4,205
& 4,217; OCC Capital Guidelines, supra note 31, at 4,182.
157 Under the Federal Reserve Board rules implementing the BIS Accord,
applicable to banks and bank holding companies, the special rules applicable to
swaps and related products are applicable as well to the following instruments:
I. Interest Rate Contracts
A. Single currency interest rate swaps.
B. Basis swaps.
C. Forward rate agreements.
D. Interest rate options purchased (including caps, collars, and
floors purchased).
E. Any other instrument that gives rise to similar credit risks
(including when-issued securities and forward deposits
accepted).
II. Exchange Rate Contracts
A. Cross-currency interest rate swaps.
B. Forward foreign exchange contracts.
C. Currency options purchased.
D. Any other instrument that gives rise to similar credit risks.
See FRB Capital Guidelines, supra note 31, at 4,205 & 4,217; see also BOE CAPITAL
GUIDELINES, supra note 119, at 10 (Bank of England categorizations of "exchange
rate contracts" and "interest rate contracts"); FDIC Capital Guidelines, supra note
31, at 11,515 (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation definitions of "foreign
exchange rate related contracts" and "interest rate related contracts"); OCC Capital
Guidelines, supra note 31, at 4,178 (Office of the Comptroller definitions of
"exchange rate contracts" and "interest rate contracts").
158 See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
159 For some of these objections, see Ferron & Handjinicolaou, supra note 41, at
142-48; 1987 ISDA Letter, supra note 114, at 3-4.
This Article does not attempt to provide a full description of the true credit risks
SWAPS AND FINANCIAL INNOVATION
risk equals the sum of the "mark-to-market" valuation (representing
current exposure) and an "add-on" (representing potential expo-
sure). With the vast majority of swaps, a bank calculates the "credit
equivalent amount" by adding:
(a) the total replacement cost (obtained by doing mark-to-
market valuations) 160 of all of its contracts with positive value; and
(b) an amount (an "add-on") for potential future credit expo-
sure calculated on the basis of the total notional principal amount
of its book (including contracts with positive, zero, and negative
value), split by residual maturity as follows:
Residual Maturity Interest Rate Exchange Rate
Contracts Contracts
Less than one year nil 1.0%
One year and over 0.5% 5.0%
Table 3161
With the current exposure method, as with the original expo-
sure method, once the "credit equivalent" amount of a swap is calcu-
of swaps, but instead abstracts some of the factors which help determine credit risk in
the context of the financial innovation process. See supra note 57. Similarly, this
Article does not provide an overall critique of the BIS Accord's evaluation of swap
credit risk. The comment letters filed over the years in connection with the BIS
Accord, its antecedents and the implementing regulations provide the best analysis
with respect to these broader issues. See supra note 36.
160 Neither the Bank of England nor United States banking authorities
specifically mentioned how mark-to-market values would be calculated. It is the
understanding of the British Bankers' Association that the Bank of England intended
to have discussions with individual institutions to ensure consistency of approach,
instead of simply publishing a formula. See BRITISH BANKERS' ASSOCIATION,
MEMORANDUM TO THE BANK OF ENGLAND ON THE BANK'S EXPLANATORY PAPER ISSUED
IN JANUARY, 1988, at 7 (Apr. 1988).
161 Certain products thought to involve less credit risk are excluded from this
calculation, and as such either do not trigger capital requirements or trigger only less
stringent capital requirements. These products include interest rate swaps in which
the payments exchanged are based on floating rate indices; exchange rate contracts
which have an original maturity of no more than fourteen days; and instruments
subject to daily margining which are traded on exchanges. See, e.g., BIS ACCORD,
supra note 2, annex 3, at 22; BOE CAPITAL GUIDELINES, supra note 119, at 10 nn.1-2.
The Bank of England and federal banking regulators adopted the precise
percentages set forth in the BIS Accord rather than a higher percentage. This was
not surprising given the natural desire of regulators not to handicap their own
domestic financial institutions relative to those of other nations. See, e.g., BRITISH
BANKERS' ASSOCIATION, MEMORANDUM ON THE CONSULTATIVE PAPER ISSUED BY THE
BASLE COMMITTEE IN DECEMBER 1987, at 2 (Apr. 1988) (stating that it "will be
essential for national supervisory authorities to build on [the common system] in the
same way").
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lated, a risk weight is applied. In the United States and the United
Kingdom, this risk weight will be fifty percent in the usual case.
162
A simple example, using plain vanilla interest rate swaps, may be
helpful. 163 Assume that a swap dealer enters into two interest rate
swaps with two of its regular corporate customers. Each swap has a
term of three years and is in the notional amount of $10,000,000. In
a swap into which the bank enters with customer A on January 1,
1990, the swap dealer is the floating rate payor and customer A is the
fixed rate payor. In a swap into which the bank enters with customer
B on July 15, 1990, the roles are reversed: the swap dealer is the
fixed rate payor and customer B is the floating rate payor. During
the fall of 1990, if interest rates were to fall the swap dealer would
pay less money than it would receive from customer A and it would
162 See FDIC Capital Guidelines, supra note 31, at 11,517; FRB Capital
Guidelines, supra note 31, at 4,205 & 4,217-18; OCC Capital Guidelines, supra note
3 1, at 4,182; see also supra note 154 (describing the rationale for a 50% risk weight and
the subsequent Hammersmith & Fulham ruling).
163 This example is adapted from FRB Capital Guidelines, supra note 31, at
4,208 (Attachment V). In this example, the swap dealer has entered into only one
swap with each counterparty. In the real world, a swap dealer may well enter into two
or more swaps with a particular counterparty.
The impact of the American bankruptcy laws and the capital adequacy system in
the latter type of situation is particularly troublesome. If a counterparty subject to
the Bankruptcy Code becomes insolvent, the trustee in bankruptcy would likely try to
assume all swaps in which the swap dealer is the net payor and reject all swaps in
which the counterparty is the net payor. On the other hand, the swap dealer would,
at a minimum, prefer that all swaps be aggregated so that the trustee would have to
either assume or reject all of the swaps as a whole. The uncertainty under the
Bankruptcy Code with respect to whether swaps would be aggregated creates
uncertainty as to the true credit exposure of a swap dealer. This uncertainty in turn
affects the amount of capital regulators should require of banks involved in multiple
swaps with a single counterparty.
Swap dealers have been active on both the bankruptcy front and the bank capital
adequacy front. They have been helping promote the use of carefully drafted swap
documentation and statutory changes that would minimize this and other bankruptcy
risks and have been seeking to convince bank regulators to weigh the net rather than
the gross exposure arising out of swaps with the same counterparties. For
background on the bankruptcy aspects of swaps, see FIRREA, supra note 95, Pub. L.
No. 101-73 at § 212; Cunningham & Rogers, The Status of Swap Agreements in
Bankruptcy, in INTEREST RATE AND CURRENCY SWAPS 1988, at 187, 211-26; Henderson,
supra note 22, at 396-97; Pollard, Treatment of Swaps in Bankruptcy, BuTrERWORTH'S J.
INT'L BANKING & FIN. L., Dec. 1988, at 514; Senate Judiciary Panel Urged to Amend
Bankruptcy Code to Honor Swap Contracts, 52 Banking Rep. (BNA) 870 (1989). For
background on how bankruptcy issues can affect bank capital adequacy requirements,
see BIS ACCORD, supra note 2, annex 3, at 24; BOE CAPITAL GUIDELINES, supra note
119, at 3; FDIC Capital Guidelines, supra note 31, at 11,507; FRB Capital Guidelines,
supra note 31, at 4,192; OCC Capital Guidelines, supra note 31, at 4,174; 1988 ISDA
Letter, supra note 154, at 3. See generally S. HENDERSON &J. PRICE, supra note 36, at
163-64 (discussing netting).
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pay more money than it would receive from customer B. The swap
dealer would be "in the money" on the first swap, while customer B
would be "in the money" on the second swap. As a result of such
interest rate movements, assume that the mark-to-market value of
swap with customer A is (plus) $200,000. This is the amount of dam-
ages that the swap dealer would suffer if customer A breached. The
value of the swap with customer B is negative; assume that this is
(negative) $250,000. The capital required under the BIS Accord
would be calculated as follows:
Potential Exposure Current Exposure
Notional X Potential = Potential + Replacement Current Credit
principal exposure exposure cost exposure equivalent
amount conversion (dollars) (dollars) amount
(dollars) (dollars)
#1 10,000,000 .005 50,000 200,000 200,000 250,000
#2 10,000,000 .005 50,000 -250,000 - 50,000
The "credit equivalent amount" of the two swaps collectively would
be $300,000. We apply the risk weight of fifty percent to the
$300,000 and find that the swap would require as much capital as the
typical loan in the principal amount of $150,000.
The amount of capital required for currency swaps is an order of
magnitude higher than that required for interest rate swaps. As can
be surmised from the fact that the "add-on" for currency swaps is
ten times the "add-on" for interest rate swaps, regulators felt that
currency swaps were much riskier than interest rate swaps. By way of
example, assume that a currency swap was written for $10,000,000.
Fifteen months into the seven year swap, rates had moved against the
dealer so far that the mark-to-market value was eighty-five percent of
the notional amount." At that point in time, the "credit
equivalent" amount would be equal to the sum of $8,500,000 and
$500,000, or $9,000,000. The amount of capital which would be
required on that currency swap, only fifteen months in on a seven-
year obligation, would be equal to that for a $4,500,000 loan.
The sets of "conversion factors," "add-ons," and "risk weights"
embraced by the regulators are classification-based rules by which
regulators assign capital requirements. The conversion factors, to
164 See, e.g., Cooper, Image, Fiction and Fact About Swaps, EUROMONEY, Jan. 1987
(supplement), at 21 (swaps officer found to his horror that a movement of this
magnitude had occurred on a currency swap into which his bank had entered fifteen
months earlier).
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which the regulators following the original exposure method adhere,
reflect what regulators presume to be the overall credit risk associ-
ated with a swap. The add-ons, to which regulators following the
current exposure method adhere, reflect what regulators presume to
be the potential exposure component of the credit risk associated
with a swap. The risk weights reflect a general assessment on the
part of regulators in both camps as to the general credit quality of
the customers of swap dealers. For convenience, we will refer to
these three sets of figures as the "weights" in the BIS Accord.
These weights are not permanent. For instance, the Cooke
Committee warned that it "will keep a close eye on the credit quality
of participants in these markets and reserves the right to raise the
[risk] weights if average credit quality or if loss experience
increases."' 65 The "add-ons" and "conversion factors" are to be
"regarded as provisional" and "may be subject to amendment as a
result of changes in the volatility of exchange rates and interest
rates."' 66 Several months after the BIS Accord was signed, in his
parting remarks as he retired from the Cooke Committee, Peter
Cooke stressed that the capital formulas were still subject to
review. 167
III. THE FINANCIAL INNOVATION PROCESS AND THE BIS ACCORD
As we have seen, the swaps-related rules of the BIS Accord are
complex. There are two reasons for this. First, regulators recog-
nized that if a risk-based capital adequacy approach is going to be
effective, 168 the regulatory "pricing" of subject instruments must be
accurate. Capital requirements which are too high or too low in rela-
tion to the true credit risk of particular instruments can, in the aggre-
165 BIS ACCORD, supra note 2, annex 3, at 6; see also FRB Capital Guidelines,
supra note 31, at 4,192 (noting that "[t]he Federal Reserve intends to monitor the
quality of credits in [swap] markets and, in the future, might consider, if
circumstances so warrant, assigning a 100 percent risk weight to credit equivalent
amounts of rate contracts"). See supra note 154 (Hammersmith & Fulham litigation).
166 BIS ACCORD, supra note 2, annex 3, at 4.
167 See Huid Muller Takes Over at the Basel Committee, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR,
Nov. 1988, at 18. Cf. Hearing of the Senate Banking Committee, Federal News Serv.,
Oct. 25, 1989 (available Nov. 19, 1989, on LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file) ("The
international organization is now studying risk-based [standards] to add additional
standards .... [T]hey haven't even completed their work.") (testimony of L. William
Seidman, chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on Oct. 25, 1989).
168 This Article attempts to demonstrate that the process of innovation must be
considered if attempts to regulate swaps are to be successful. This Article does not
examine any of the purported defects of the BIS Accord apart from those directly
related to the financial innovation process. See supra notes 134 & 159.
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gate, create unacceptable economic results.169 These credit risks are
complex and so the pricing rules end up that way as well. Second,
these swaps-related rules served as the primary mechanism for solv-
ing difficult international collective action problems. Absent adher-
ence to such rules - or to the extent that regulators use their
judgment in individual cases to override these rules - the interna-
tional bank regulatory system will be back to the regulatory free-for-
all which had existed prior to the BIS Accord. Even if there were two
approaches to determining credit equivalents - the original exposure
method and the current exposure method - they were at least rules
which would constrain inappropriate regulatory behavior. Differ-
ences in the capital requirements which would be generated under
the alternative approaches were predictable and tolerable sacrifices
to avoiding regulatory chaos.'
70
Given the complexity of the existing capital adequacy rules, it
was not surprising that regulators did not attempt to address the
underlying process of financial innovation. The BIS Accord frame-
work, with its reliance on formal rules adopted and kept current by
regulators, is largely indifferent to this process. This Article argues
that this process undermines the basic integrity of the framework in
three related ways.
First, the compelling need for formal rules which regulators of
widely differing sophistication can administer will lead increasingly
to results that no regulator intends.' 71 The compelling need to
avoid complicated rules will generate increasingly heavy social costs.
As existing forms of hedging products evolve and new forms arise,
more and more products will be squeezed into a single classification.
The regulatory "prices" will bear little relation to the true credit
risks in a growing number of cases. Constraints on the subtlety of an
internationally agreed-upon classification system in the face of the
increasing heterogeneity of financial products will result in an
increasing difficulty in the "mapping" of any individual type of swap
to a correct regulatory price.'
72
169 See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
170 For criticism of the existence of two approaches to calculating capital
requirements, see Letter from John F. Kooken, Vice Chairman and Chief Financial
Officer, Security Pacific Corporation, to William R. Wiles, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, app. 2, at 3-4 (May 10, 1988); 1988 ISDA Letter, supra note
154, at 4; infra note 173 (discussing effect ofjudgmental supervision).
171 Cf M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15-63 (1987)
(explaining the distinction between use of formal rules and use of ad-hoc situation
sensitive decision making).
172 See Powers, Formalism and Nonformalism in Choice of Law Methodology, 52 WASH.
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Second, there is no formal mechanism for changing the capital
adequacy requirements on a timely basis. Even if the regulations
could mirror changes in volatilities and our theoretical understand-
ing of the ways such volatilities translate to credit risk, it would not
be enough. The regulations must also change with the character of
hedging products and the relative importance of these products.
The BIS Accord fails to establish a formal mechanism to facilitate
such revisions. The only way major changes can occur on a coordi-
nated basis is through time-consuming, open-ended negotiations
among the regulators of at least the twelve countries involved in the
BIS Accord. Absent an unprecedented degree of cooperation, the
rules will continually suffer from regulatory lag.
Third, there are subtle informational difficulties, related in some
ways to the previous problem. The BIS Accord does not require
financial institutions to obtain clearance from regulatory authorities
before introducing new products or changing the relative composi-
tion of the products they offer. This practice raises two informa-
tional difficulties. To begin with, products which arise or become
popular only after the BIS Accord will be assigned weights based on
a classification system which does not in any way reflect information
about their risk characteristics. Moreover, because financial institu-
tions will take the initiative in introducing products, regulators - like
competing financial institutions - will necessarily obtain or generate
information about the product with a lag. Because of the complexity
of these products, the lag could be intolerably long.
A. Formal Rules, Constraints on Subtlety, and the Mapping Problem
The BIS Accord establishes a formal decisionmaking process
under which regulators must, at least in the first instance,' 73 decide
L. REV. 27, 30-31 (1976) (defining the "mapping" problem); cf Simons, Overinclusion
and Underinclusion: A New Model, 36 UCLA L. REV. 447, 448-49 (1989) (examining the
constitutionality of governmental classifications and the "fit" between means and
ends, especially with respect to the overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of the
classification).
173 Regulators, of course, can avoid the mispricings generated by the blind
application of formal rules by making individual judgments as to the appropriate
amount of capital. Indeed, regulators have made clear that suchjudgments will be
made in applying the BIS Accord generally. See FRB Capital Guidelines, supra note
31, at 4,187; FDIC Capital Guidelines, supra note 31, at 11,501; OCC Capital
Guidelines, supra note 31, at 4,169.
This "solution" has a number of fundamental problems, stemming largely from
the kinds of international collective goods problems identified in Part II.B.2. If
regulators depart from the formal rules of the BIS Accord in a large number of
individual cases, it becomes very difficult to ensure that banks world-wide are
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mechanistically the capital required to be allocated to any given swap
by applying simple rules to a limited number of facts.' 74 The
amount of capital required on account of a swap is, in the usual case,
determined by whether it is an interest rate or a currency swap, its
maturity, and its notional amount. This classification system sub-
stantially screens from regulatory consideration all other information
pertaining to the swap.
Any such rule-bound decisionmaking can result in undesirable
results in individual cases because once adopted, the rule alone
becomes the source of decision, blind to the policies which gener-
ated it.' 75 For example, if we assume that the purpose of a voting
age requirement is to screen out immature voters, allowing only
those older than eighteen to vote will screen out some who are
mature while granting a vote to some who are immature.' 76 How-
ever, in deciding to set a voting age, as in other such decisions, the
benefits of predictability, ease of application by limiting the scope of
relevant information, freedom from arbitrary power and discretion
and similar factors' 77 can outweigh the costs of inequitable results in
individual cases.
With the BIS Accord, the need for simplicity in the rules was a
result of the fact that the rules had to be administrable by even the
least sophisticated of regulators and financial institutions in the
twelve countries. Since the financial innovation process is most
advanced in the United States and the United Kingdom, regulators
in other countries do not have the same degree of experience.1
7 8
Indeed, even the relatively simple classification system originally
proposed by the United States and the United Kingdom in 1987 had
contributing equally to the maintenance of a healthy international financial system.
Unlike the capital adequacy approach, with its heavy reliance on published and
objectively verifiable numbers, there is no easy way of comparing the individualized
judgments made by regulators. The incentives for regulators to "cheat" in an effort
to help their home institutions will serve as a centrifugal force tearing at the burden-
sharing concepts at the heart of the BIS Accord. Moreover, to the extent that
regulators are required to coordinate their departures from the rules in some fashion
so as to eliminate cheating, variations on the mapping, obsolescence, and
informational problems associated with the BIS Accord arise.
174 See M. KELMAN, supra note 171, at 15.
175 See Powers, supra note 172, at 28.
176 See M. KELMAN, supra note 171, at 15.
177 See id.; Powers, supra note 172, at 29-30.
178 See Sillem, supra note 81, at 12-13; see also Shreeve & McDougall, Quality, Not
Quantity, BANKER, Aug. 1987, at 12, 13 (noting that Bank of England "prides itself on
having outdistanced other regulatory authorities in providing a formula for assessing
the true credit risk" of swaps).
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to be further simplified upon objections of other regulators.' 79 In
the end, not even the final BIS Accord system was simple enough.
Some countries rejected the "current exposure" approach in favor of
the far simpler "original exposure" method, a method which is less
accurate from a standpoint of approximating credit risk.'
Regulators felt that a relatively simple system would have to suf-
fice,' 8 1 even though mapping problems with respect even to existing
swaps and related financial products were readily apparent. For
example, the BIS Accord ignores the type of currencies involved in
currency swaps. For example, the movements of the United States
Dollar and the Canadian Dollar are more highly correlated than the
movements of the United States Dollar and the Swiss franc. The
chances of a swap dealer becoming exposed to a large credit risk on
the United States Dollar/Canadian Dollar currency swap is, there-
fore, much lower than on the U.S. Dollar/Swiss franc currency swap.
Yet, under the BIS Accord, they are treated alike for purposes of the
capital adequacy requirements.1
8 2
The mapping problems can be especially serious as to more
complicated swaps. The notional amounts, specified cash flows, and
duration of such swaps could all vary in ways which are not fully cap-
tured by the simple categorizations adopted by the BIS Accord. For
179 See Bardos, supra note 11, at 34 (discussing objections).
180 See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
181 This point was emphasized by Andrew Pople, Banking Supervision Division,
Bank of England, in a discussion with the author in London on July 7, 1988. See also
THE 1987 LONDON SWAPS SEMINAR, supra note 26, at 110 (Carol Sergeant, Banking
Supervision Division, Bank of England, noting the need "to produce something that
people can understand - the people that operate it in the bank and the supervisors");
cf Staff Memorandum, Treatment of Interest Rate and Exchange Rate Contracts in the Risk
Asset Ratio, reprinted in INTEREST RATE AND CURRENCY SWAPS 1987, at 289, 297 (1987)
[hereinafter Staff Memorandum] (noting that "proposed conversion factors for
calculating potential exposure reflect an attempt to strike a reasonable balance
between precision and complexity").
182 See Staff Memorandum, supra note 181, at 297; letter from Michael P. Esposito,
Jr., Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, to William W. Wiles (June I,
1987).
Under the original exposure approach, the credit equivalent for these two swaps
will always be identical. This is so because the credit equivalent is dependent only on
the conversion factors, and these factors are the same for United States Dollar/
Canadian Dollar and United States Dollar/Swiss Franc swaps. The results under the
current exposure method are likely to be somewhat better. Under the current
exposure method, the credit equivalent is dependent on both add-ons and the mark-
to-market values. Although the add-ons for the two swaps are the same, the mark-to-
market value for the United States Dollar/Swiss franc swap will fluctuate more over
time. For this reason, under the current exposure approach, the more volatile swap
will typically generate a higher credit equivalent.
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example, with respect to the notional amount, there are "drawdown
swaps," in which the notional amount increases over the life of the
swap to match drawdowns on an extension of credit; "rollercoaster
swaps," in which the notional amount first increases and then
decreases over the life of the instrument; and "saw tooth swaps," in
which the notional amount varies according to a predetermined
schedule.' 3 As to specified cash flows, "superfloater swaps" allow
parties to exchange payments based in part on a multiple of a float-
ing rate index, while "arrears reset swaps" permit the floating rate
payor to pay on the basis of a floating rate index set at the end of
each interest period rather than at the beginning.
184
The durational characteristics of swaps are already quite diverse.
In its simplest form, a "puttable swap" allows one of the parties to
terminate the transaction before completion of the full term while a
"callable swap" gives the fixed rate payer the option of cancelling the
agreement, usually on a specified date. 185 More generally, bank
purchases and sales of "swaptions" (swaps with various option fea-
tures) have become important.186 With the exotic commencement
and termination features of these instruments, it is doubtful that the
general rules of the BIS Accord will lead to accurate regulatory
prices.
Moreover, the BIS Accord applies to more than just swaps.
Instruments which are closely related to swaps, such as interest rate
options and currency options are also subject to the BIS Accord's
classification system. Although the payment terms of these contracts
are substantially different from those of swaps and the risk character-
istics can differ as well,187 regulators apparently felt that these prod-
ucts were not important enough to consider separately.18 8 As these
183 See A. SARWAL, supra note 7, at 320-23; When the Swap Meets the Option,
EUROMONEY, Apr. 1989 (supplement), at 26, 32.
184 See Puleo, supra note 40, at 32-33.
185 See A. SARWAL, supra note 7, at 320.
186 See Cooper, Still Plenty of Room to Grow, EUROMONEY, Oct. 1988, at 35, 38;
When the Swap Meets the Option, supra note 183, at 32.
187 See, e.g., Shirreff, Caps and Options: The Dangerous New Protection Racket,
EUROMONEY, Mar. 1986, at 26, 33-34; Weiner, supra note 87, at 16 (noting that the
pricing of interest rate caps become better understood in 1988).
188 See Swap market regulation: Banks' response to proposed capital ratios must not be
overly negative, says Fed, INT'L FIN. REV., May 2, 1987, at 1497, 1499 (noting that the
Federal Reserve "did not devote much attention to options because they did not
think they loomed large in swaps activity, or large enough to influence risk-weighted
capital assessments"). It is unclear to what extent regulators considered the risk
characteristics of these other instruments. See, e.g., FRB/BOE Credit Exposure
Memorandum, supra note 57, at 325; Staff Memorandum, supra note 181, at 292.
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newer hedging products grow in relative importance, the overall
mapping problems associated with the BIS Accord may increase.
8 9
The regulators thus established a classification system which was
intended to be substantially correct when used to evaluate the sim-
plest and most common types of interest rate swap and currency
swaps. Although the evidence is sparse, it appears that the mathe-
matical models on which they relied were fundamentally premised
on the kind of "plain vanilla" swaps described in Part I, rather than
the more sophisticated types of swaps.
1 90
The mapping problem described will only get worse. Of course,
as with any rule-based system, there will be an incentive to "walk the
line," to try to use the rules to one's own advantage.19' But the
financial innovation process itself causes a far more fundamental
problem. Since current administrative and political realities may
prevent a more complex classification system and since the diversity
of financial products will grow as financial innovation continues,
192
189 For example, the market for "caps," "floors," and "collars" is no longer
insignificant. Fueled by leveraged buyouts and recapitalizations, these instruments
reached $290 billion in outstandings by the end of 1988. See Forde, LBOs Spur Rise in
Rate Protection Deals; Cap Agreements Surpassed $290 Billion Last Year: Study, AM. BANKER,
Mar. 13, 1989, at 2.
Under certain conditions, a bank does not incur any credit risk from entering
into these non-swap hedging transactions. For instance, if a bank simply sells an
option to a corporation, the corporation is taking a chance on the creditworthiness of
the bank, not the other way around.
190 See, e.g., FRB/BOE Credit Exposure Memorandum, supra note 57, at 325-26. In a
discussion with the author in London in July 1988, a swaps officer who preferred to
remain nameless contended that the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England only
looked at "uncomplicated structures."
191 See M. KELMAN, supra note 171, at 41-43 (noting "walking the line" behavior
in response to income tax rules); cf Fingleton, MutualAdmiration, EUROMONEY, Sept.
1989, at 27, 27 (author referring to certainJapanese practices in response to the BIS
Accord as "doing Trojan work hoovering up theJapanese banks' various BIS-related
capital issues").
192 While revolutionary financial products are increasingly less likely to emerge
as a general matter, innovation can be expected to continue in the area of swaps and
related products. Banks compete not only on the price but on the ability to provide
creative new products. Creativity in the swaps and related markets is rewarded by
recognition among peers and new business. See, e.g., Cooper, They're Teaching the Old
Swap New Tricks, EUROMONEY, Apr. 1989, at 43 (noting that "the swaps crowd
certainly knows how to repackage an old concept, dress it up with new technology,
give it ajazzy name, and find new applications all over the globe"); Shegog, Who's Top
in Swaps?, EUROMONEY, Jan. 1987, at 25, 29 (ranking swap houses as to who is the
"most innovative in problem-solving"); Strong Pru-Bache Drive Relies on Hi-Tech, Pru
Backing, INT'L FIN. REV., Sept. 21, 1985, at 2,315 (noting the preference for
sophisticated, "value-added" transactions); The Busy Folks at SecPac Hoare Govett, INT'L
FIN. REV., Jan. 3,1987, at 22 (stating that creativity is rewarded with new business);
Tholstrup, Recent Innovations in the Global Swap Markets, reprinted in THE 1987 LONDON
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the system will assign improper regulatory prices with increasing
frequency.
193
B. The BIS Accord and Obsolescence
Institutionalization of change, as well as the operation of a
highly dynamic marketplace, will cause serious problems of regula-
tory obsolescence. The emergence of new products, and changes in
the relative importance of both existing and new products as well as
changes in the real or understood riskiness of such instruments all
contribute to the need to revise continually the BIS Accord's classifi-
cation system and the associated weights.' 94 The BIS Accord does
not provide a clear mechanism for dealing with this issue.
Even in the purely domestic setting, it is difficult for regulators
to keep up with the changing financial scene.195 Despite tremendous
growth in the swaps market and substantial uncertainty in the law, no
Internal Revenue Code section, regulation, or revenue ruling
directly addressed the tax treatment of interest rate swaps until the
SWAPS SEMINAR, supra note 26, at 9 (referring to an "onus" on every swap department
to innovate and analogizing such departments to the research laboratories of
pharmaceutical companies); Weiner, supra note 87, at 16 (highlighting one bank
officer who noted the increasing importance of designing interest rate protection
products for specific corporate needs); When the Swap Meets the Option, supra note 183,
at 26 (quoting a swaps officer as saying that there are now "very few revolutionary
products in swaps"); infra note 231 (discussing diffusion of information pertaining to
swaps). But cf. Keller, supra note 50, at 52 (stating that much financial technology
"has become almost run-of-the-mill").
Observers generally believe that new financial products will continue to emerge,
although there is dispute over the rate at which this will occur. See CROSS REPORT,
supra note 3, at 184-86; Finnerty, supra note 3, at 31; Miller, supra note 1, at 471;
Muehring, Why Investors are Losing TheirAppetitefor Eurobonds, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR,
Oct. 1987, at 281, 285 (describing investor distaste for exotic financial products); cf
Rosenberg, The Impact of Technological Innovation: A Historical View, in THE PosrvE
SUM STRATEGY: HARNESSING TECHNOLOGY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH 17 (R. Landau &
N. Rosenberg eds. 1986) (quoting the Commissioner of the Patent and Trademark
Office as saying in 1899 that "[e]verything that can be invented has been invented").
193 Countries that follow the "original exposure" method for determining
capital adequacy will be especially susceptible to this problem. This susceptibility
will stem from the fact that under the "original exposure" method, the requisite
amount of capital is established entirely by the weights fixed by regulation. In
contrast, with the "current exposure" method adopted by the United States and the
United Kingdom, the amount of capital is determined by two components; one
component (the "add-on") is fixed by regulation and the other component (the
"mark-to-market") is established by market forces.
194 Cf Powers, supra note 172, at 32 n.23 (noting the costs of changing rules).
195 Cf W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 844-91 (1988) (analyzing statutory
obsolescence in domestic setting).
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end of 1986. This was nearly eighteen months after the New York
State Bar Association Tax Section asked the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice to rule that payments made pursuant to an interest rate swap are
not subject to a thirty percent withholding tax. 9 6 The Internal Rev-
enue Service has publicly complained about having to pigeon hole
the sophisticated hedging transactions of the 1980s to categories and
labels developed in the far less sophisticated financial world of the
1950s and 1960s.1
97
The problem is far worse in the international setting. There is
no world banking regulator 98 with the authority to keep standards
current, nor did the BIS Accord establish any mechanism for doing
so. By default, the only way the BIS Accord can be updated is
through formal or informal coordination among the twelve coun-
tries. This process, especially in view of the absence of any explicit
attempt to narrow the scope of such renegotiations to "technical"
issues of risk assessment, is certain to be cumbersome and untimely.
Further, the transaction costs are likely to be enormous in light of
the number of parties involved.199
The fragmentation of legal and political authority is daunting.
Fragmentation of authority in the United States alone has often
presented impediments to quick decision making in the area of finan-
cial innovations. Turf battles and policy disputes among federal reg-
ulatory bodies in the United States foreshadow even greater
difficulties within an international system. The experience of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") in its battles
with the Securities and Exchange Commission and others is illustra-
tive. Turf battles appeared early in the CFTC's existence: the dis-
196 See I.R.C. §§ 871, 881 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); Brown, Tax Consequences of
Interest Rate Swaps: Characterization by Function, Not Prjudice, 6 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW.
122, 123-24 (1988).
197 See IRS Official Cites Difficulty Fitting New Financial Products into Tax Code Labels,
Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 74, at G-l, G-2 (Apr. 19, 1989).
198 Establishing such an authority at this time would probably be politically
impractical. Moreover, if such a regulatory authority were estabished, the likelihood
of its behaving in an optimal fashion would have to be studied. Cf CENTRAL
BANKERS, BUREAUCRATIC INCENTIVES, AND MONETARY POLICY (E. Toma & M. Toma
eds. 1986) (analyzing central bank behavior in accordance with economic theory of
bureaucracy); Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REV. 207,
227-50 (1984) (discussing internal and external influences on administrative agency
decisionmaking); Macey & Garrett, supra note 93, at 215 (article discussing various
bureaucratic and political incentives which cause regulators not to seek optimal level
of safety).
199 See Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL
STUD. 257, 267 (1974) ("Transaction costs tend to increase rapidly with the number
of parties whose agreement is necessary for the transaction to occur.").
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pute over one product extended over a period of years and had to be
resolved by congressional action. 200 New turf battles continue to
break out, sometimes spilling over into litigation.20 '
Just as there is not a single regulator responsible for the safety
and soundness of United States financial institutions, the world does
not have a single regulator overseeing the soundness of global finan-
cial institutions.20 2 The closest thing to such an international
authority is the Cooke Committee itself.20 The Cooke Committee,
however, has no formal charter or other legal mandate, 20 4 no direct
authority over individual private financial institutions, no formal gov-
emance or dispute resolution mechanism, 20 5 and no direct power to
implement any changes in national laws or regulations.20 6 The
200 See Markham & Stephanz, The Stock Market Crash of 1987 - The United States
Looks at New Recommendations, 76 GEo. LJ. 1993, 2025-26 (1988).
201 See, e.g., Markham & Stephanz, supra note 200, at 2025 n.213 (describing
litigation arising from Securities and Exchange Commission's actions "[in apparent
retaliation" for a controversy over a financial product); see also Chicago Mercantile
Exch. v. S.E.C., 883 F.2d 537, 548-50 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that index
participations are futures contracts subject to the jurisdiction of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, rather than the jurisdiction of the Securities and
Exchange Commission); Freitag, Key Ruling on "Basket" Securities, N.Y. Times, Aug.
21, 1989, at DI, col. 5 (noting that the decision in Chicago Mercantile is expected to
"set off a turf battle that may not be resolved without legislation that sets forth
specific regulatory roles for each agency or that merges the two").
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the Securities and Exchange
Commission have had their disagreements over swaps as well. See SEC Criticizes CFTC
Draft Proposal to Extend Regulation to Hybrid Products, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1348
(Aug. 26, 1988); supra notes 87 & 88.
202 See, e.g., R. PECCHIOLI, PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION IN BANKING 32 (1987)
(discussing "the need for an adaptation of the supervisory framework" of
international financial institutions); Hackney & Shafer, The Regulation of International
Banking: An Assessment of International Institutions, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 475,
475 (1986) (noting that "various institutions address different aspects of
international banking regulation").
203 See supra note 104.
204 See Bench & Sable, International Lending Supervision, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 427, 431 (1986).
205 The Bank for International Settlements does provide the secretariat for the
Cooke Committee. See Flexible Mystique, supra note 28, at 94. As of mid-1989, the
institution employed only 360 staff members. See Bank for International Settlement
(Advertisement), ECONOMIST, July 1, 1989, at 79. For an example of an international
financial organization with the explicit governance arrangements absent from the
Cooke Committee, see generally J. GOLD, VOTING AND DECISIONS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (1972) (work discussing governance of the
International Monetary Fund).
206 See Note, The Proposed Risk-Based Capital Framework: A Model of International
Banking Cooperation?, 11 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 777, 783, 795-6 (1988); Cooke, supra note
104, at 151 ("The [Cooke] Committee does not undertake a formal supranational
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Committee derives whatever efficacy and power it has from its
stature.
Modifying the BIS Accord would be a lengthy process. First,
one or more national regulatory authorities must determine that
their problems are so serious that a formal revision is necessary.
Second, members of the Cooke Committee must agrele to any pro-
posed change. Third, an opportunity for notice and comment on the
proposed revision by the financial communities of each respective
member country presumably would be given. Fourth, the Cooke
Committee must determine the precise contours of the final regula-
tion in light of the respective comments. Finally, the individual
national banking authorities must implement the changes. Follow-
ing a similar process, the original BIS Accord took two years to
complete.
Of course, only the most serious changes to the BIS Accord
would be subject to this sort of revision process. Moreover, if this
sort of process occurs again, it should move at a faster pace because
regulators are now more familiar with the issues. Whether the rules
under the BIS Accord capital adequacy system are changed through
a formal process or more informal means, internationally agreed
upon changes are likely to occur slowly. As discussed previously,
bank regulators play a dual role. While they are concerned with
global financial stability, each regulator also has an interest in pro-
moting the competitive interests of local financial institutions. This
conflict of interest, as well as heterogeneity in political, legal and
administrative traditions, accounting practices,20 7 financial struc-
tures and sophistication among regulators, likely make negotiations
difficult.
20 8
supervisory role; its conclusions do not have, and were never intended to have, legal
force.").
207 The Governor of the Bank of England stated that "[elach of us had, at the
outset, a fairly clear view that our existing concept of capital adequacy was not only
the most appropriate to our individual national circumstances, but also the right
one." Leigh-Pemberton, Convergence of Capital Standards and the Lessons of the Market
Crash, BANK ENGLAND Q BULL., May 1988, at 220.
208 See R. PECCHIOLI, supra note 202, at 21 (discussing different approaches by
members of different countries to the supervision of financial institutions); see also
Banging heads together, BANKER, July 1989, at i76 (stating that subsequent to the BIS
Accord, arguments have "started to break out over the detailed rules governing what
should be allowed as capital").
For illustrative examples of problems which have occurred in international
coordination as to interpretation and modifications of the BIS Accord, see Keller,
Need Capital, Banks? Here's How, EUROMONEY, Apr. 1989, at 59, 62 (appointment of a
formal subcommittee to make a determination as to whether certain securities met
BIS Accord's definition of Tier 1 capital).
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The failure of the BIS Accord to make explicit some of the more
"political" judgments inherent in its classification system and
weights also makes such negotiations difficult. For instance, in estab-
lishing the "add-ons" or, in the case of the original exposure
method, the "conversion factors," the regulators had in mind some
notion of the probability thresholds which should be used to gauge
potential exposure as a matter of political judgment.2 "9 Had those
statistical levels been explicitly set out in the BIS Accord, subsequent
negotiations would not need to revisit this key issue. Subsequent
negotiations would then have been confined largely to the more
"technical" issues having to do with generating the new add-ons and
conversion factors consistent with those statistical levels. Because of
the failure to explicitly set out the relevant probabilistic thresh-
olds, 210 subsequent negotiations are much more likely to occur on a
far broader front.
The foregoing factors make the maintenance of up to date clas-
sifications and weights on either the domestic or international levels
difficult. Indeed, even though the BIS Accord was only entered into
in mid-1988 and the implementing regulations were not adopted in
the United States until early 1989, obsolescence appears to have
already appeared as to a previously obscure segment of the swaps
market. With "commodity swaps," the cash flow payments are tied
to fluctuations in the price of commodities rather than fluctuations in
the interest rates or exchange rates. An airline, for instance, may
wish to protect itself against a rise in the price ofjet fuel by using a
commodity swap where the cash flows are tied to the price of jet
fuel.2 1'
As with interest rate and currency swaps, banks may stand in the
middle and thus be exposed to credit risk. Despite this credit ]risk,
the BIS Accord and the United States implementing regulations
209 Staff Memorandum, supra note 181, at 289, 290.
210 Cf 1988 ISDA Letter, supra note 154, at 6 (swap dealers expressing
puzzlement over the theoretical justification for differences in the relative weights for
interest rate swaps and currency swaps under the original exposure method and the
relative weights under the current exposure method); Scott, Scholarship in Banking
Law: An Introduction to the Symposium, 49 OHIo ST. LJ. 1183, 1186 (1989) ("[T]he final
target capital figure (eight percent of risk-adjusted assets), in particular, apparently
floated down from Mt. Sinai (or Mont Blanc), for no theoretical or empirical
foundation was given.").
211 For descriptions of commodity swaps, see Brody, Commodity Financiers
Sharpen Up, EUROMONEY, Aug. 1989, at 38; Commodity Swaps: A Risky Business,
ECONOMIST, Sept. 2, 1989, at 76 [hereinafter Risky Business]; Ireland, Mexcobre Loan
Deal Repays Debt, CORP. FIN., Aug. 1989, at 11; Angrist, Big-Stakes Hedge Starts
Branching Out, Wall St. J., Sept. 26. 1989, at Cl, col. 2.
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appeared to have ignored commodity swaps for purposes of estab-
lishing the classification system and in generating the weights. The
BIS Accord applies to "interest rate contracts" and "exchange rate
contracts." These terms in turn are defined to include various iden-
tified hedging products pertaining to interest rate risk and exchange
rate risk as well as "similar instruments."2 2 The United States
implementing regulations use similar formulations. Absent an
expansive reading of the "similar instruments" language, commodity
swaps fall outside of the swaps-related capital adequacy provi-
sions.21 3 Similarly, there is no indication whatsoever that anything
but interest rate and exchange rate volatilities were used to generate
the weights adopted by the BIS Accord and the implementing regu-
lations. Only through happenstance would those volatilities corre-
spond to the volatilities associated with the price of jet fuel or other
commodities. Finally, recognizing that regulators are likely to deem
that the swap capital requirements are applicable to commodity
swaps, a prudent bank will have to determine whether to classify a
commodity swap as a currency swap or an interest rate swap and to
resolve other difficulties in calculating the amount of capital
required.
This omission was understandable. While regulators were
aware of the existence of commodity swaps even prior to the BIS
Accord, the market was relatively small and obscure. 214 Taking
these commodity swaps into account may have introduced unwar-
ranted complexity into the capital adequacy system. However, the
July 1989 decision on the part of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission ("CFTC") not to regulate these commodity swaps
(under specified conditions) gave impetus to an increase in the
212 BIS ACCORD, supra note 2, at annex 3.
213 See supra note 120 and accompanying text. Bank regulators are likely to read
the language expansively, especially in view of pre-BIS Accord suggestions that
commodity swaps would be subject to capital adequacy requirements. See National
Bank Acting as Principal in Commodity Price Index Swaps with Customer,
Comptroller of the Currency No-Action Letter, [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 84,034, at 76,641 (July 20, 1987) [hereinafter Chase Letter].
214 The Chase Manhattan Bank, for instance, requested and obtained a "no
objection" letter in mid-1987 from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
allowing Chase to engage in commodity swaps under certain specified circumstances.
See Chase Letter, supra note 213, at 76,638. For a sense of the size of the swaps market
prior to the July 1989 CFTC decision, see Cooper, They're Teaching the Old Swap New
Tricks, EUROMONEY, Apr. 1989, at 46 (describing the origins of commodity swaps);
Horowitz, Bankers and Brokers Gear Up for Action in Fledging Market for Commodity Swaps,
AM. BANKER, July 20, 1989, at 1 (estimating that only 130 commodity swaps had been
consummated in the previous two year period and noting that such numbers "pale in
comparison" to those of the interest rate and currency swaps market).
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number of participants in and the expected number of commodity
swaps. 215 The BIS Accord and implementing regulations had,
through their silence, become obsolete as to an important segment
of the swaps market. As of October 1, 1989, no domestic or interna-
tional rules had yet been generated as to precisely how much capital
should be allocated to these swaps.
C. Informational Hurdles
Ideally, regulators should assign regulatory prices to hedging
products on the basis of current and accurate information about such
instruments. Regulators "cannot ride a bicycle to reach their conclu-
sions while the market is driving a Porsche." 216 Daunting as the
informational problems are in formulating rational regulatory poli-
cies in general,21 7 the BIS Accord and the financial innovation pro-
cess combine to create extraordinary informational burdens.
1. Bank Initiative and Informational Lags
Generally speaking, banks may develop a swap or related prod-
uct without any clearance from or registration with banking authori-
ties.218 There is an inevitable informational lag built into the
system. 219 Banks typically invent and introduce the product first.
215 See Angrist, supra note 211 (quoting former counsel to the chairman of the
CFTC as saying that "[c]ommodity swaps have progressed faster and further in the
two months since the CFTC policy statement than did interest-rate swaps in two
years when they began"); Horowitz, supra note 214, at 1 (stating that several
commercial and investment banks are planning to "lunge into the emerging
commodity swaps market following the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's
decision"); Risky Business, supra note 211, at 76 (noting that more banks will act in a
principal capacity as commodity swaps after the CFTC action); CFTC Swaps Policy
Statement, supra note 87 (discussing the July 1989 CFTC action). But cf Brody, supra
note 211, at 42 (commodity swaps were flourishing even prior to July 1989 CFTC
action).
In contrast to the BIS Accord and the United States implementing regulations,
FIRREA explicitly recognizes commodity swaps. See FIRREA, supra note 95, Pub. L.
No. 101-73, § 212, 103 Stat. 125, 127 (1989) ("commodities contracts" and "swap
agreement" placed in the same category of financial contracts).
216 Cook, Risk Assessment and Disclosure: Discussion Summary, in NEW FINANCIAL
INSTRUMENTS: DISCLOSURE AND ACCOUNTING 209, 210 (1988).
217 See S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 109-12 (1982); McGarity,
Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1243, 1276-84 (1987);
Sappington & Stiglitz, Information and Regulation, in PUBLIC REGULATION: NEW
PERSPECTIVES OF INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES 3-13 (E. Bailey ed. 1987).
218 See Puleo, supra note 40, at 28; cf supra note 87 and accompanying text
(discussing minimal regulation of new bank swap products).
219 Cf Hiltzik, Banks Enter New World of High Risk, L.A. Times, Oct. 27, 1985,
Part V, at 1, col. 6 (quoting a regulator from the Office of the Comptroller of the
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The regulators must become aware of the existence of the product
and then obtain or generate information on the risk characteristics of
the new product so as to determine whether the existing classifica-
tion and weighting system assigns a proper capital price.
If history is any guide, this lag can be lengthy. For instance, one
Japanese regulator conceded in late 1986 that it was "only recently"
that he and his colleagues had become aware of the implications of
swaps. 2 20 Internal Revenue Service officials were "alarmed, even
infuriated" by certain tax-driven swaps whose use had been wide-
spread but kept "under wraps" for months. 22 ' Regulators' informa-
tion about risks also lagged. As late as April 1986, the associate
director of Economic and Policy Analysis at the Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency stated that he "definitely [did not] have suffi-
cient data to evaluate the risk" posed by interest rate swaps.
22 2
Information lags have also been pervasive as to financial innova-
tions in general. An officer at the Internal Revenue Service has con-
ceded that financial markets have been inventing new products faster
than the Internal Revenue Service can keep up with.2 2 ' The general
counsel of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission learned
about one form of instrument arguably within his jurisdiction when
he read about it in the Wall Street Journal.2 2 4
Even among private financial institutions themselves there have
been serious information lags. Toward the end of 1986, the most
sophisticated of the swap houses realized that the fundamental theo-
Currency as stating that "if you believe in a free-market system, you'll always have
regulators catching up with the market").
220 See Fingleton, Worrying About a Crash, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1986, at 110, 117; see
also Shegog, Riding Cross-currents in Swaps, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1987, at 222, 226
(noting that "regulators have only just got up to speed with the first couple of
generations of swaps"); Shirreff, The Fearsome Growth of Swaps, EUROMONEY, Oct. 1985,
at 247, 253 (discussing the invitation of swaps officers to the Federal Reserve Board
in 1984 to explain the swap market).
221 See Belton, Troubled Waters Ahead for Tax-Driven Swaps, INVESTMENT DEALERS'
DIGEST, Nov. 14, 1988, at 17, 19; cf Winkler, IRS Acts to Plug Big Loophole on Interest-
Rate Swaps, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1989, at C1, col. 3 (reporting the new IRS ruling
closing the loophole). This IRS ruling is set out in I.R.S. Notice 89-21, 1989-8 I.R.B.
23 (Feb. 21, 1989).
222 See Regulators Expected to Require More Disclosure, Regulation of Swap Market, 46
Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) 531, 532 (Apr. 7, 1986); cf Mayer, supra note 121, at 15
(suggesting that "bank examiners are at the mercy of the banks in determining the
value of options and swaps"); Miller, When Swaps Unwind, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR,
Nov. 1986, at 165, 166 ("Of course, when we talk to central banks, we always say
there isn't any [risk]. .. ").
223 See Evans, Legislative Solutions Neededfor New Financial Products Problems, 40 TAX
NOTES 332, 332 (1988).
224 See Roberts, supra note 22, at 16.
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ries used to analyze the cash flows generated during the life of a swap
were wrong.225 They quickly began using more advanced theories
which gave them a strong competitive advantage for quite some
time.226 Such knowledge apparently gave the big houses a pricing
edge of three to ten basis points over the houses which were unaware
of the newer thinking,227 a remarkable advantage relative to the mar-
gins then prevailing.228 Similarly, some dealers came to understand
more quickly than others the subtle bankruptcy problems associated
with swaps229 and the credit risks of swaps generally.2
Although the maturation of the swap and related markets and
the continuing diffusion of pertinent information 23 1 ameliorate the
informational lag problem, the complexities can still overwhelm. For
example, in July 1988 the Federal Reserve Bank of New York forced
Bankers Trust Company to slash $80 million from its foreign
exchange trading income recognized in a regulatory financial report
for the fourth quarter of 1987.232. Although the New York Federal
Reserve would not comment on why the bank was asked to make the
225 This, of course, did come as a surprise. In June 1985, for instance, a major
swap dealer had claimed that the swaps area no longer required people who were
"financial wizards," and that now "all you need is a solid command of arithmetic."
See Weiner, Banks' Swap Business Booms, AM. BANKER, June 10, 1985, at 1.
226 See Cooper, Swap Houses Switch to New Values, EUROMONEY, Jan. 1987, at 32
(new zero-coupon method of valuing swaps "gives the big houses a pricing edge of
anywhere from 3 to 10 basis points").
227 See id.
228 See id.
229 For instance, in the early years of the swap market, many people did not fully
understand the impact of the automatic stay and executory contract provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Henderson, Termination of Swaps Under US Insolvency Laws,
INT'L FiN. L. REv., Dec. 1984, at 17, 21; cf. supra note 163 (describing certain other
bankruptcy issues in the swaps context).
230 See Kreca, Pricing versus Credit. An Art or a Science?, INTERMARKET, May 1986, at
41 ("In the early days, a few [swap] participants understood the credit issue; the rest
didn't." (quotingJonathan Berg, deputy head of capital markets for Bankers Trust));
Weiner, '89 Will Bring Closer Scrutiny of Swap Product, AM. BANKER, Jan. 3, 1989, at 3
(reporting that "some institutions didn't recognize swaps as having risk" (quoting
Donald Layton, managing director of Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.)).
231 See supra note 192 and infra 279-91 and accompanying text. Information on
the economics of swaps and related financial products is now much more widely
diffused. Software for swap analysis and risk management of varying degrees of
sophistication and accuracy is now commercially available from a dozen developers.
See Anti, All kinds of bells and whistles, EUROMONEY, Aug. 1989, at 80-87; cf Investment
Support Systems Inc., Futrak Risk Management Software from Investment Support
Systems, Inc. (undated) (sales brochure describing trading and risk management
software available from one leading vendor).
232 See Fed Orders Bankers Trust to Slash 1987 Foreign Exchange Trading Income,
Banking Rep. (BNA),July 25, 1988, at 117; Horowitz, Regulators Force Bankers Trust to
Cut Earnings by $80 Million, AM. BANKER, July 21, 1988, at 1; cf Stem, (Dangerous) Fun
1989]
408 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 138:333
restatement, a bank spokesman attributed the $80 million discrep-
ancy to the over-the-counter currency options market and implied
that some of the bank's options may have been mispriced.233
2. Diffusion and Informational Lags
While information does diffuse and the swap and related mar-
kets have been maturing, there are several factors which make it
likely that regulators will have a more difficult time than private
financial institutions in keeping up. Regulators will, to a degree,
need to resort to direct or indirect pressure or outright compulsion.
To the extent that information diffuses because of personnel
movement, regulatory authorities are generally out of the loop. In
the swaps area, there have been continual personnel moves from one
institution to another.234 The impact on financial institutions from
these departures in certain circumstances is so extreme that regula-
tors have expressed concern.23 5 Yet, as a result of these moves,
information spreads. Referring to one new technique, one observer
noted that "[a]s personnel have moved from one team to another,
taking bright ideas with them, so the number of players who can
wield those tools has grown from a handful a year ago to eight or
10." '236 Some moves have inspired litigation.23 7 In one notable
case, Citibank sued a leading investment bank in connection with the
defection of a swap team. As part of the settlement, the investment
bank agreed to return all the documents that the swappers had taken
with them when they left Citibank; however, the settlement appar-
ently did not prevent the team from either participating in the swaps
and Games in the Foreign Exchange Market, FORBES, Aug. 22, 1988, at 69, 70 (discussing
dangers in banks allowing options traders to price their portfolios).
233 See Mayer, supra note 121, at 15.
234 See, e.g., The Way to Any Market, EUROMONEY, Nov. 1983, at 64, 67
("Continental has been a breeding-ground of swap expertise. The early team
included John Price, who moved to Bankers Trust and this year set up a private swap
consultancy; Peter Ogden, who pioneered swaps at Merrill Lynch and was head-
hunted by Morgan Stanley; Amir Eilon, now at Samuel Montagu; Allan Wilson who
had a spectacular 15 months at Credit Suisse First Boston . . .before returning to
Continental."); Sterngold, Raiding of the Rate Swappers, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1986, at
DI, col. 3 (discussing Citibank's loss of three teams of swappers to other financial
institutions).
235 The Bank of England has publicly made clear its displeasure over the
practice of banks which enter a new area after poaching whole teams of people from
competitors, leaving the competitors without key talent. See Fingleton, supra note
220, at 117.
236 Shegog, Riding Cross-Currents in Swaps, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1987, at 222, 224.
237 See, e.g., Mayer v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 703 F. Supp. 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(litigation involving the departure of a Morgan Stanley vice president).
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business or from using the allegedly proprietary materials it had
taken.
238
Although personnel movement can result in diffusion of infor-
mation, the government is unlikely to solve its informational lag
problem by hiring swaps personnel from private industry, at least in
the United States. One reason is that salary differentials between the
private sector and the public sector can be enormous in the financial
innovations area. In early 1989, the Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board had a salary of $89,500 and most federal banking reg-
ulators were making even less.239 In 1985, top people in the swaps
area were averaging at least $300,000 to $500,000; their most senior
underlings were making between $150,000 and $300,000.24 0 At one
investment bank, a finance expert starts at $80,000.241  Although
important legislative and administrative steps were taken in late 1989
to improve the pay scale of government bureaucrats, 242 gaps in pub-
lic and private pay at the top levels in the financial industry probably
will persist.
243
238 See Sterngold, supra note 234, at D4, col. 6.
239 See Bartlett, A Stronger Savings Regulator, N.Y. Times,Jan. 24, 1989, at D 1, col.
3; id. at D7, col. 4 (showing salaries of top-level staff at Federal Home Loan Bank
Board, Federal Reserve, Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation); cf Adequacy of Examination Levels and Compensation: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the
House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 113-21
(1989) [hereinafter Bank Supervision Hearings] (discussing staff salaries at the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency relative to those of other federal banking regulators
and salaries received by departing executives); infra note 242 (discussing pay
increases for federal banking officials).
240 See Kolman, The Sultans of Swap, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Oct. 1985, at 258;
see also Mayer, 703 F. Supp. at 251-52 (finding that expected compensation for vice
president in a swap group in Tokyo office of investment bank was $500,000 to
$600,000 in 1987).
241 See Uchitelle, supra note 9, at D4, col. 3.
242 See, e.g., FIRREA, Pub.L.No. 101-73, § 1202, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (statutory
provision authorizing Office of the Comptroller of the Currency to provide
compensation comparable to that provided by any other federal bank regulatory
agency); Fed Hikes Salaries to Keep Top Employees Competitive, BANK LETTER, Oct. 9, 1989,
at 7 (available Nov. 12, 1989, on LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file) (describing
substantial across-the-board pay increase for officials at Federal Reserve Board, with
the top salary being raised to $130,900 from $82,500); N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1989, at
18, col. 1 (describing pending legislation as to the salaries of lawmakers, federal
judges, and top government officials).
243 Alas, the availability of work on Wall Street is cyclical. Many leading Wall
Street executives are considering two options: "lopping off large portions of their
firms which just a few short years ago would have been considered essential to their
business, or reducing salaries and bonuses drastically." Bartlett, Why Wall Street's So
Topsy-Turvy, N.Y. Times, May 7, 1989, § 3, at 1, col. 3. Actual or threatened layoffs in
the private sector could result in new government personnel.
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Another reason to doubt that the government will benefit from
significant personnel migration is that some of the non-pecuniary
benefits which motivate people to government service in the United
States do not exist in the financial innovations area. 24 4 The dream of
inter-planetary voyages which may motivate a scientist to work for
NASA has no obvious parallels in the financial innovations area.
Since mass migration of personnel from industry to government
is unlikely, regulators must, absent government compulsion, depend
upon cooperation from the financial institutions or generate the
information themselves. But as for genuinely new information,
cooperation is unlikely to be sufficient because the nature of the
information needed by bank regulators is extremely sensitive. The
regulator needs not only the blueprints for new financial products
but the equally proprietary and expensive test results as to risk and
other characteristics.
If competitors discovered this information, it would deprive the
innovator of lead time and impose on it a material cost disadvan-
tage. 24 5 Risk information is so central that the mechanisms used by
financial institutions to simply monitor their own overall risk expo-
sure can be used to enter into appropriate hedging transactions.
246
A financial institution, if it is to cooperate with regulators, must
be certain that any information it volunteers will not be available to
competitors. No such assurance can be made. Any information
given by an institution to the regulatory authority of one country
may be considered by the regulatory authorities of eleven other
countries during the course of international negotiations and rule-
making. Inadvertent leaks of information aside, regulators might be
required by law to provide the public access to such information.
In the United States, for example,2 47 the Freedom of Informa-
244 This discussion concerns only the large-scale migration of researchers from
the private sector to the public sector. It is not meant to suggest by any means that
the quality of research or researchers is lower in government than in the private
sector. Indeed, the extraordinary quality of the economists at the Federal Reserve, to
take just one example, is widely recognized.
245 Cf McGarity & Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety Testing
Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REV. 837, 849 (1980)
(discussing disclosure of health and safety testing data of, among other things, new
chemicals).
246 See Shale, The Great Risk-Management Systems Failure, EUROMONEY, Feb. 1989,
at 66, 70 (discussing Merrill Lynch's use of its investment analysis system to hedge
various option positions).
247 For a comparison of policies of various nations pertaining to the rights of
access to government information, see Relyea, Business, Trade Secrets, and Information
Access Policy Developments in Other Countries: An Overview, 34 ADMIN. L. REV. 315 (1982).
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tion Act248 and related access statutes249 may give competitors the
legal right to access to the information.25 ' Under the Freedom of
Information Act, federal agencies are under a general obligation to
make their records available to the public without any consideration
of the motives of the person requesting the information.
2 5 1
Although the principal purpose of the statute is to inform citizens
about the operations of government, it is being used increasingly as
a tool for industrial espionage. 25 2 Such laws may result in federal
agencies becoming conduits for the passage of confidential informa-
tion.25 3 Existing exemptions from the Freedom of Information Act,
construed in light of applicable Supreme Court precedent and cur-
rent Federal Reserve Board regulations, would provide scant com-
fort to a financial institution.254
248 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982 & Supp.V 1987).
249 See 2 J. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE: PROCEDURES, FORMS
AND THE LAW § 23.01 (1988) (discussing government openness statutes); see also 2 B.
BRAVERMAN & F. CHETWYND, INFORMATION LAW: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION, PRIVACY,
OPEN MEETINGS, OTHER ACCESS LAWS §§ 22-1 to 22-6.4 (1985) (discussing
government openness provisions).
250 This Article focuses on the impact of the Freedom of Information Act and
similar access laws on the willingness of financial institutions to share information
with regulators. Such laws could also have the effect of discouraging financial
innovation by decreasing the ability of financial institutions to fully capture the
benefits of their work in financial research and development. The ability to capture
the benefits - the "appropriability" of such benefits - is an important factor in
influencing the amount of technological research and development. See, e.g., Isaac &
Reynolds, Appropriability and Market Structure in a Stochastic Invention Model, 103 QJ.
ECON. 647, 647 (1988) (stating that appropriability is one of two factors that
supposedly serve as incentives for investment); see also W. CASEY, J. MARTHINSEN & L.
Moss, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, PRODUCTIVITY, AND THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 5
(1983) (arguing that the Freedom of Information Act is an independent cause of the
technological innovation slump troubling the United States economy because of
failure to protect from disclosure "circumstantially relevant business information").
251 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
252 See Note, Protecting Confidential Business Information from Federal Agency Disclosure
After Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 109, 113 (1980).
253 See, e.g., O'Reilly, Free Business Secrets: With love, from Uncle Sam, ACROSS THE
BOARD,June 1983, at 8 (noting that federal information law has forced firms to share
confidential information with competitors). But see McGarity & Shapiro, supra note
245, at 837-88 (noting that private firms have successfully forestalled efforts by
agencies and interested citizens to have the contents of products disclosed, by
claiming that such data are protected trade secrets). There have already been efforts
to gain information through the Freedom of Information Act in the financial
innovations area. See Epstein, Researching for New Contracts, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1986,
at 357, 359.
254 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) ("exemption 4" to the
Freedom of Information Act); 12 C.F.R. § 261.1 - .8 (1987) (Federal Reserve Board's
Freedom of Information Act regulations); W. CASEY, J. MATHINSEN & L. Moss, supra
note 250, at 19 (noting the ambiguity of exemption 4's language); McGarity &
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Of course, regulators could independently develop information
about new financial instruments rather than relying on information
from the private sector. Unfortunately, the actual behavior of new
financial instruments often departs quite markedly from that pre-
dicted by theory. 255 To understand the price and risk characteristics
of these instruments one must also have a keen sense what the mar-
ket will pay, regardless of the computer predictions of some abstract
model. 25 6 Although the transactional expertise of the traders in the
capital markets at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York25 7 and their
counterparts abroad is enormously helpful, the lack of direct transac-
tional experience in developing, pricing, and hedging new financial
products will nevertheless hinder the ability of bank regulators to
accurately forecast the precise risk characteristics of particular
products.25 8
Shapiro, supra note 245, at 858 (explaining the various laws relating to the release by
federal agencies of proprietary information); O'Reilly, Regaining a Confidence:
Protection of Business Confidential Data Through Reform of the Freedom of Information Act, 34
ADMIN. L. REV. 263 (1982) (advocating Congressional action as to exemption 4
cases); cf 15 U.S.C. § 4305 (Supp. V 1987) (exemption from Freedom of
Information Act for certain information provided pursuant to the National
Cooperative Research Act of 1984).
255 See French, The Comeback of the Number-Crunchers, EUROMONEY, Oct. 1988, at
69, 72 (explaining how theoretical bond valuations can be wrong); cf. Hansell, Risk
busters, INsTrruTioNAL INVESTOR, Aug. 1988, at 134, 136 (discussing reliance on
experiments); Shirreff, Caps and Options: The Dangerous New Protection Racket,
EUROMONEY, Mar. 1986, at 26, 32 (market prices for options departing from theory);
Bartlett, Why Wall Street's So Topsy-Turvy, N.Y. Times, May 7, 1989, § 3, at 1, col. 2
(describing the belief of investment banks that having a corporate bond underwriting
unit helps them price deals in the merger context).
256 See Hansell, supra note 255, at 136 (quoting Daniel Napoli, chairman of
Merrill Lynch Government Securities, as saying that "[c]omputers don't buy
bonds").
257 In 1984, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York traded currency and
securities valued at approximately $600 billion for the accounts of the Treasury, the
Federal Reserve System and foreign central banks. See Williams, The Inaction That
Makes Things Happen, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1984, § 3, at 8, col. 3.
258 Cf Oversight of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Securities Industry:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1987) (testimony of Donald B. Marron,
Chairman and CEO of Paine Webber Group, Inc.). Marron stated that:
In order to deal with the proliferation of new products being offered by
the securities industry, we believe that the SEC must accelerate its efforts
to acquire expertise in those products. Since the Commission's staff
generally has no "hands on" experience in the operational side of the
financial services industry, it is desirable for them to obtain second-hand
experience and guidance through the assistance of industry
representatives.
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IV. DEALING WITH DYNAMISM: POINTS OF STRESS
AND INCREMENTAL CHANGES
A. The Need for Incrementalism and the Scope and Type of Change
Milton Friedman once said that the safest place of all is jail: not
much happens there. 5 9 To their credit, the regulators who formu-
lated the BIS Accord did not try to keep the world's financial institu-
tions fully protected from the perils of the dynamic new financial
world outside the big house.2 60 Instead, through a plan which is
remarkable in its very implementation and admirable for its analyti-
cal sophistication, the behavior of banks in the outside world is care-
fully channeled to take into account known dangers.
Unfortunately, the BIS Accord is incomplete in a conceptually
important way. As discussed previously,2 61 the BIS Accord deals
with certain known financial instruments, not with the underlying
process by which they emerged. However, the massive amount of
public and private energy invested in generating the provisions, the
costs of any new swaps regulatory system and the historical back-
ground to the swap-related provisions make wholesale rejection of
the BIS Accord inconceivable in the short run.
An overview of the massive public and private investment in the
development of the BIS Accord and the investment now going into
its implementation provides an insight into some of the forces which
militate against wholesale change. Economists, lawyers, and others
in the government sector have devoted years to developing and
revising the capital adequacy provisions which ultimately led to the
BIS Accord, especially those pertaining to swaps and related prod-
ucts. Regulators have not only reached hard-fought compromises in
the BIS Accord, but have had to determine how to implement the
BIS Accord in their own countries as well.2 62 Moreover, efforts have
been underway to encourage implementation of standards consistent
259 See Securities Futures Market Credit Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 3597 Before the
Subcomm. on Domestic Monetary Policy of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1988) (Statement of Professor Merton Miller
quoting Friedman).
260 As a practical matter, this would be nearly impossible. See, e.g., Pitman,
Swooping on Swaps, EUROMONEY, Jan. 1988, at 80 (Mark Ferron, Vice President of
Security Pacific Hoare Govett, quoted as saying that "[a]nyone who thinks he can put
swaps back into the bottle is someone who spends most of his life with one").
261 See supra notes 194-215 and accompanying text.
262 See supra notes 149-167 and accompanying text. Regulators have had to deal
with a number of ancillary issues as well. See, e.g., Fed Lets Japanese BHC's Act as Interest
Rate Swap Broker, Offer Financial Advice, 53 Banking Rep. (BNA), July 3, 1989, at 7
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with the BIS Accord on the part of countries not party to the BIS
Accord.263
Participants in the private sector have also devoted significant
resources to the BIS Accord. They have not only spent time analyz-
ing and seeking to influence each of a series of proposals but are
engaged in extensive long-term planning in order to comply with
interim and final BIS Accord requirements.264
Another obstacle to outright rejection of the BIS Accord is the
fact that such an action would trigger a whole new set of direct public
and private costs in the formulation, revision, international negotia-
tion and domestic implementation of new regulations. These direct
costs, along with the indirect costs of delay and uncertainty may well
outweigh the benefits of the alternative to the capital adequacy
approach. Approaches radically different from the capital adequacy
approach are, in view of the complexity of the subject matter, partic-
ularly likely to involve high costs of these sorts.
Finally, the effort to regulate swaps and related products on a
coordinated basis proved possible, in large part, because it took
advantage of and contributed to a longstanding international
momentum to establish common capital adequacy standards with
respect to bank activities generally. Absent such a driving force, it is
not clear whether the international collective action issues inherent
in dealing with these issues can be overcome.
In view of these concerns, any move away from the BIS Accord's
capital adequacy approach should be incremental in both scope and
method.265 The BIS Accord's capital adequacy approach should be
used in as many circumstances as possible. In circumstances where a
new method is necessary to deal with the problems raised by the
(adjusting for Japanese banking and accounting practices in determining capital
adequacy for United States purposes).
263 See Jones, Pillars of the Community, BANKER, July 1989, at 38, 39; Banging Heads
Together, BANKER, July 1989, at 176; cf. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, 59TH
ANNUAL REPORT: IST APRIL 1988-31ST MARCH 1989 at 194-95 (describing how "many
other countries with major international banks have already indicated a desire to
ensure that their own supervisory arrangements are in line with the new standards").
264 See, e.g., Keller, Need Capital, Banks? Here's How, EUROMONEY, Apr. 1989, at 59
(discussing banks' efforts to raise the requisite amount of capital); Rehm, Money
Centers Prepare for Capital Rules; Cost of Backing Higher-Risk Products Will Affect Pricing, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 28, 1988, at I (describing banks' reexamination of all business lines in
light of capital adequacy rules); supra notes 141 & 145.
265 Cf R. DAHL & C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND WELFARE: PLANNING
AND POLrIco-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS RESOLVED INTO BASIC SOCIAL PROCESSES 82-85
(1953) (describing and analyzing incrementalism as a method of social action).
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financial innovation process, the new method should not present too
radical a departure from the old.
The BIS Accord works best in regulating those plain vanilla
swaps which were most popular at the time of the BIS Accord. It is
the risk characteristics of those financial products which the regula-
tors had in mind in designing the classifications and setting the
weights. The BIS Accord's scope should be limited to those
products.
The more a hedging product departs from such plain vanilla
swaps, the more likely mapping, obsolescence or informational
problems will lead to inaccurate regulatory pricing. Products most
likely to fall outside the competence of the BIS Accord regime are
products which did not exist at the time of the BIS Accord. The
characteristics of the new financial products, when slotted into rules
designed for other products, could trigger capital requirements
which are inconsistent with their actual risk characteristics. As dis-
cussed earlier, only through a combination of luck and foresight
would such regulatory pricing be correct in this context. The kinds
of factors creating regulatory lag and informational problems in the
financial innovation context will conspire to hinder efforts on the
part of regulators to continually modify the BIS Accord in step with
the emergence of important new financial products.
Another category of financial products which poses problems is
the class of products which existed prior to the BIS Accord's adop-
tion, but become popular subsequently. At the time of the BIS
Accord, the products may have been so unimportant that they did
not influence the categories or weights established; errors in the reg-
ulatory pricing of these products could be safely ignored. If these
products have become prevalent in the market overall or become
prominent in the portfolio of any single bank, the pricing inaccuracy
may reach unacceptable levels.
A final category of financial products which poses problems is
the class of products which simply are not and never will be popular.
Whether they existed at the time of the BIS Accord or arose subse-
quently, these products are a only small part of the market on an
individual basis. In view of the limitations oA the subtlety of any clas-
sification-based system, the kind of system created by the BIS Accord
can never adequately deal with these products.
These are three of the categories of financial products which do
not fit neatly within the framework of the capital adequacy system
established by the BIS Accord. The scope of any change to this sys-
tem should be limited to these categories of financial products. The
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BIS Accord should be revised to set out explicitly the kinds of instru-
ments for which it was designed. All other hedging products creat-
ing credit risks for banks would be subject to some alternative
approach; the coverage of the existing swaps-related rules must be
broadened. The broad set of hedging products should thus be bro-
ken into two subsets: the "designated" products and "non-desig-
nated" products. "Designated" products would be handled by the
capital adequacy system created by the BIS Accord; as regulators
periodically modify the classifications and weights to take into
account financial products which have been introduced or become
more popular, the products covered will change from time to time.
"Non-designated" products would be handled by the alternative
approach.
B. The Complexity of Evaluating An Incremental Solution
Having identified the scope of the most urgently needed change,
this Article concludes by briefly analyzing one prospective mecha-
nism for dealing with the credit risk posed by non-designated prod-
ucts in a manner which avoids international public goods problems.
The mechanism is swap insurance.
26 6
266 There are many other ways of dealing with the non-designated products at
the international level. Cf supra notes 110 and 173 (concerning application of
judgment in determining capital adequacy of individual banks). A few of the possible
categories of solutions are listed below:
(1) Prohibition. Regulators can simply prohibit commercial banks and
their affiliates from dealing with non-designated products in any way
which would way create credit risks for those banks or bank affiliates.
While this approach would solve the mispricing problem, it does so in a
Procrustean fashion. The primary evaluative issue with this approach, as
with any regulatory system which prohibits new innovations until
approved by a regulatory agency, is balancing the benefits of the
regulation against the curtailment of innovation. Cf H. GRABOWSKI, DRUG
REGULATION AND INNOVATION: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND POLICY OPTIONS
75 (1976) (concluding that prohibitory regulation of the drug industry in
the United States by the FDA has had adverse effects on innovation);
Whittaker, supra note 57, at 11 (describing disadvantages to prohibiting
bank participation in swap market); supra note 146 (difficulties in
estimating benefits of product innovation).
(2) Minimization of Credit Exposure. Regulators could limit the amount
of credit exposure that banks have on non-designated products. They
could, for instance, set out the maximum relative amount of risk exposure
a bank can have on these products at any one time. Alternatively, they
could require that there be a mark-to-market mechanism which operates
at regular intervals during the life of the non-designated product; under
this scheme, the parties would regularly exchange payments reflecting
changes in the nondesignated product's value arising from fluctuations in
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Although a system of swap insurance seems to avoid many of the
interest rates, exchange rates, commodity prices, or other market prices.
Cf. When the Swap Meets the Option, EUROMONEY, Apr. 1989 (supplement), at
26, 32 (describing Manufacturers Hanover's periodic mark-to-market
system).
(3) Risk-sensitive Deposit Insurance. If banks worldwide were required
to pay deposit insurance premiums corresponding to the risks they
assumed (including those as to their non-designated products), the banks
themselves would be forced to "internalize" the social costs of failure.
Banks would in effect pay for costs they inflict on society. Despite its
appeal, a deposit insurance scheme with risk-sensitive premiums has not
yet proven possible to implement in the United States; moreover, losses in
a variety of federal insurance programs outside of the savings and loan
context suggest the difficulties in operating such a system. See, e.g.,
Hershey & Labaton, U.S. Fund Insuring Home Mortages Hit by Big Losses, N.Y.
Times, June 21, 1989, at 1, col. 6 (reporting large losses by the main
Federal Housing Administration fund which insures American home
mortgages); Ingersoll, Farm Fiasco: Crop-Insurance Fraud and Bungling Cost
U.S. Taxpayers Billions, Wall St. J., May 15, 1989, at A1, col. 6 (reporting
losses by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation which insures farmers
against natural disasters); cf supra note 95 (concerning FIRREA
requirement that the Secretary of the Treasury study variable rate deposit
insurance). Any sort of risk-sensitive international deposit insurance
scheme is likely to be even more difficult to implement and operate. See,
e.g., Dean, Conservative Versus Liberal Regulation of International Banking, J.
WORLD TRADE, Feb. 1989, at 5, 11 (stating that international deposit
insurance proposals "have never got off the ground").
(4) Credit Enhancement Mechanisms. Regulators could require that
banks eliminate the credit risks of their non-designated products through
collateral or third party arrangements. One way of doing so is the
insurance proposal set out in the text. A variety of other ways are
possible. For instance, regulators could require banks to obtain
appropriate collateral from its customers as to all non-designated
products. The costs of operating such a mechanism can be high and there
are a number of bankruptcy and other legal obstacles which limit the
usefulness of this approach. See Henderson, supra note 22, at 388-89;
Note, Legal Doctrines Restricting the Secondary Market in Interest Rate Swaps, 26
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 313, 323-24 (1988); Willoughby, Swap Flop,
FORBES, Oct. 7, 1985, at 65. Instead of requiring banks to obtain
collateral, bank regulators could require that swaps be traded on an
exchange so that the exchange's clearinghouse arrangements would,
unless they were to also fail, provide the bank some protection against
credit risks. This sort of scheme would be likely to dampen financial
innovation. See, e.g., Zusy, Swaps Tradability, in THE 1987 LONDON SwAPs
SEMINAR, supra note 26, at 3441 (transcript of address and copy of
document entitled "Swaps Clearing House") (discussing advantages and
disadvantages of various swaps clearing arrangements); cf. CFTC Swaps
Policy Statement, supra note 87, at 30, 696 (stating that the safe harbor from
Commodity Futures Trading Commission regulation is limited to swap
transactions which are, among other things, "not supported by the credit
of a clearing organization and that are not primarily or routinely
supported by a mark-to-market margin and variation settlement system
designed to eliminate individualized credit risk").
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pitfalls inherent in the BIS Accord's approach, the suggestion here is
not that swap insurance is necessarily a feasible or desirable mecha-
nism for regulating non-designated products. Instead, we analyze
this highly incremental mechanism - a mechanism involving no new
governmental or private institutions, no governmental expenditures
or guarantees, and little international coordination - to illustrate the
complexities of any solution. The difficulties involved in evaluating a
mechanism as incremental as this suggests that a systematic review of
how the capital adequacy system could be modified to accommodate
the process of financial innovation must begin immediately.
1. Specification and Swap Insurance: Surrogate Regulation as a
Safety Valve
Under a swap insurance program, the swap dealer would be
required to obtain insurance which would fully protect it against loss
on non-designated products by reason of its customer's default. A
dealer would not be permitted to enter into a non-designated swap
without such insurance; no capital (or minimal capital) would be
required as to such swaps. Dealers would be permitted to obtain
such insurance from any insurer or combination of insurers as long
as each such insurer is not an affiliate of the dealer and the insurer
meets certain objective standards of creditworthiness. To minimize
disruption, existing non-designated products would be exempt from
this system. Thus, the swap insurance requirement could be limited
in its applicability to transactions involving non-designated products
which are entered into subsequent to adoption of the mechanism.
As a result of the natural aging process, all non-designated products
will eventually be subject to the swap insurance scheme.
The nature of the coverage and the creditworthiness of the eligi-
ble insurers aside, each bank and insurer would have the freedom to
negotiate the terms of its insurance arrangements. They could agree
on whatever premium levels and whatever procedures for insuring
particular swaps they wanted. Being self-sustaining entities, insurers
would seek to match their premiums to the probabilistic estimates of
loss. 2 67 The premiums would presumably reflect, among other
Cf., e.g., OCC Capital Guidelines, supra note 31, at 4172 (concerning decision not to
give preferential risk weights to municipal revenue bonds supported by financial
guaranty insurance); id. at 4183 (excluding from capital adequacy requirements those
swaps traded on exchanges and subject to daily margin requirements).
267 See, e.g., S. D'ARcY & N. DOHERTY, THE FINANCIAL THEORY OF PRICING
PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE CONTRACTS 86 (1988) (although advocating a more
sophisticated method of determining insurance premiums, acknowledging that the
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things, the inherent credit risk characteristics of a particular type of
swap as well as the creditworthiness of the counterparty. If a bank
were to enter into a particularly risky swap, an insurer would pre-
sumably insist on a higher fee. Banks will have the incentive not to
engage in too many risky swaps.
At first glance, the swap insurance proposal fulfills the basic
objective of the BIS Accord of minimizing the destabilizing effects of
credit risk assumed by banks in a manner which does not give rise to
international collective action difficulties. Under the swap insurance
proposal the BIS Accord's capital adequacy approach would con-
tinue to operate in the usual fashion with designated products, prod-
ucts which still will account for the bulk of the swap and related
markets. However, with respect to non-designated products, banks
must take out swap insurance. Having taken out swap insurance, the
bank would be assured that upon any default it would receive an
amount from the insurance company which would make it whole.
The insurance scheme would directly prevent a default by a
bank customer from threatening the bank's stability, a goal capital
adequacy requirements accomplish only indirectly. The swap insur-
ance requirement would apply to banks in all countries; absent gov-
ernment intervention as to such insurance, the insurance premiums
paid by banks would correspond to the risks taken on the designated
products. Regulators would not be able to "cheat." Overall, the sys-
tem of dealing with the credit risks posed by swaps and related prod-
ucts is one of government regulation supplemented by surrogate
regulation.
In order for the insurance scheme to actually insulate the bank
from credit risks of its hedging products, two conditions must hold.
First, the insurance policy must provide compensation to the dealer
in an amount which is roughly equal to the amount of damages suf-
fered as a result of the default. Second, the insurer itself must not
default on its obligation to the bank.
To fulfill the first condition, the bank must be insured as to the
mark-to-market value of the swap. If its customer were to default on
its swap obligations at a time when the interest rate, exchange rate,
commodity price, or other fluctuations had moved against the
counterparty, the bank would avoid any loss if it received an amount
equal to the mark-to-market value.
268
traditional insurance pricing approach projects expected losses and expense, and
charges a premium that allows a certain profit margin).
268 See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. In the event that reliable
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The more difficult condition to satisfy is that of making sure that
the insurer itself will not default on its obligations on the insurance
policy. To simply rely on government regulation of insurers to
accomplish this would make little sense. The net result would be
simply to shift the regulatory focus from banks to insurers. The
kinds of problems which prevent effective regulation of banks would
also prevent effective regulation of insurers. The frame of reference
would change but many of the problems would remain. After all,
financial guarantors and other insurance companies can also become
insolvent and their failure would have troubling social effects as
well.
2 6 9
The circularity can be broken by introducing market factors into
the analysis. By requiring that the financial guarantors carry credit
ratings of the requisite grade, the risk of default can be reduced.
Bank regulators can choose how much of a risk of default on the
insurance obligation they are willing to accept. For instance, by
insisting that all eligible insurers receive the highest credit rating
from an internationally recognized and officially approved rating
agency, 27° regulators would assure a high probability that the insur-
mark-to-market values are unavailable, appropriate formulas for estimating damages
could be agreed upon by the parties.
269 See, e.g., Deposit Insurance Reform and Related Supervisory Issues: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Pt. II, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 16
(1986); Lappen, Guarantees with Nothing Behind Them, FORBES, July 24, 1989, at 41;
Schifrin, What's a Guarantee Worth?, FORBES, July 24, 1989, at 88; see also infra note 312
(concerning new New York statute pertaining to financial guaranty insurers).
270 Ratings agencies typically rate not only the issuer itself but also each
separate debt instrument. See Keslar, The Power of Ratings in the Marketplace, CORP.
FIN., July 1985, at 45. For convenience, this Article will ignore this distinction.
In the United States, obtaining ratings from the two most prominent ratings
agencies is a matter of course. These ratings agencies, Moody's Investor Services
and Standard & Poor's, dominate both the United States and European capital
markets. See Dickins, The Rating Game, CORP. FIN., Feb. 1989, at 44. For a description
of these as well as two other United States ratings agencies, see D. HAWKINS, B.
BROWN, & W. CAMPBELL, RATING INDUSTRIAL BONDS 17-19 (1983) [hereinafter
HAWKINS STUDY].
Market recognition of the ratings is significant. As Standard & Poor's has noted:
Credit ratings are of value only if they are credible. Credibility arises
from the objectivity of the rater and his independence of the issuer's
business. The investor is willing to accept the rater's judgment only
where such credibility exists. When enough investors are willing to accept
the judgment of a particular rater, that rater gains recognition as a rating
agency.
Credibility is fragile. [Standard & Poor's] operates with no
governmental mandate, subpoena powers, or any other official authority.
It simply has a right, as part of the media, to express its opinions in the
form of letter symbols.
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ance company will be able to pay off on a claim. Even within the
triple-A category there are gradations of risk. To guard against the
possibility that the credit agency is wrong, regulators could insist on
a "double triple," or triple-A ratings from two such agencies.
271
Both United States Treasury securities (with debt backed by the "full
faith and credit" of the United States) and various governmental
agency securities (with debt which do not carry such an explicit gov-
ernmental assurance) carry triple-A ratings. United States Treasury
securities are generally considered somewhat less risky from a credit
standpoint and thus trade at somewhat lower yields. 272 Regulators
could, therefore, insist that implicit market valuations of default risk
of instruments insured by eligible insurers not exceed prescribed
levels.
As a working model, assume that an insurer would be eligible if
two conditions were met. First, insurers must carry a "double
triple." Second, if an insurer insures not only swaps but also publicly
traded bonds, those bonds must trade at yields which are consistent
with prescribed levels of market confidence in the creditworthiness
of the insurer.273 In the event that the insurer on a swap declines in
creditworthiness subsequent to commencement of the swap, the
bank would be required to replace the insurer with an eligible
insurer.
STANDARD & POOR'S, DEBT RATINGS CRITERIA: FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 3 (1988)
[hereinafter S & P RATING CRITERIA].
271 Ratings by different agencies may be markedly different. See Comparing the
Comparers, EUROMONEY, July 1989, at 15 (comparing the credit ratings given to the
world's top banks by Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and IBCA, a London based bank
rating agency); infra note 293. Requiring the highest rating from two agencies would,
therefore, serve to further limit the number of eligible insurers. Cf. Hsueh & Kidwell,
Bond Ratings: Are Two Better Than One?, FIN. MNGT., Spring 1988, at 46 (discussing
effect of "split ratings" and why borrowers obtain more than one credit rating for
their debt).
272 See Zigas, There Are More Ways Than Ever to Get Uncle Sam Behind You, Bus. WK.,
Dec. 26, 1988/Jan. 2, 1989, at 160.
273 Specification of the prescribed level would have to go beyond simply stating
that the yield on bonds insured by a particular company cannot exceed a certain
amount higher than the yield on bonds of comparable maturity issued by the U.S.
Treasury. See F. FABOZZI & T. FABOZZI, BOND MARKETS, ANALYSIS AND STRATEGIES
124-25 (1989) (discussing how the quality yield spread between bonds of different
credit ratings varies over the interest rate cycle); Paschal, Insurers Urge SEC to Clarify or
Delete Credit Enhancement in Disclosure Rules, BOND BUYER,Jan. 12, 1989, at 1 (discussing
the importance of issuer's creditworthiness).
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2. Identifying Some Questions and Moving Toward
Some Answers
The feasibility and desirability of the swap insurance mechanism
depends on satisfaction of a number of conditions. 274 Three of these
are particularly important. First, there must be insurers willing to
insure against default on such complex instruments. Second, the
likelihood of insurer default must be acceptably low. Third, the
direct and indirect costs of the insurance must bear a reasonable
relationship to the risks assumed by the financial guarantors.
a. Existence of Insurers
First introduced in the early 1970s for municipal bonds, finan-
cial guaranty insurance has moved beyond its municipal bond origins
to include corporate bonds, commercial paper, unit investment
trusts, and a host of other financial instruments. 275 As of the end of
1987, the total amount of principal and interest insured by the four
largest United States financial guaranty insurers exceeded $215 bil-
lion.2 76 Under these arrangements, insurers typically undertake to
guarantee "irrevocably and unconditionally" the payment of princi-
pal and interest on a timely basis. 277 Established ratings agencies
have given virtually all of these insurers the highest possible credit
ratings. 278 Because of the creditworthiness of the insurers and the
274 Cf. Abraham, supra note 35, at 945-49 (describing how most types of
insurance can perform their functions effectively only under very special conditions
of uncertainty).
275 See Miegs, Financial Guaranty Insurance and Investor Confidence, CREDIT
DECISIONS, June 29, 1987, at 1; Milligan, The Pioneer of Corporate Debt Guarantees,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Apr. 1988, at 197.
276 See Ratings and Statistical Guide, STANDARD & POOR'S CREDITWEEK, Oct. 17,
1988 (Bond Insurance CreditReview supplement), at 24 [hereinafter S&P Ratings
Guide].
277 See WESTERN FINANCIAL AUTO LOANS 2, INC., PROSPECTUS (Oct. 18, 1988);
Meigs, supra note 275, at 1.
Although financial guaranty insurance is the best analogy to the proposed swap
insurance system, there are other types of insurance to which an analogy could be
drawn. See, e.g., Gorman, New Credibility for the Corporate Bill Collector, N.Y. Times, May
7, 1989, at C15, col. 1 (noting the availability of insurance to protect against losses on
accounts receivable); infra note 307 (concerning Delta Government Options).
278 See Credit Analyses, STANDARD & POOR'S CREDrrWEEK, Oct. 17, 1988 (Bond
Insurance CreditReview Supplement), at 11-23 (reporting triple-A ratings for all
municipal bond insurers considered); see also AMBAC INDEMNITY CORPORTION, 1987
ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1988) (noting that the four major municipal bond insurance
companies all have triple-A rated claims-paying ability, a fact which illustrates the
"fundamental soundness and strength of the industry as a whole"). But see
Subcommittee on Financial Guarantee Instrumentation of the Committee on
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unconditional and irrevocable nature of the guarantee, the investor
is significantly insulated from the credit risk associated with the
issuer.
In a swap insurance scheme, the complexity of the individual
instruments themselves - a factor making effective government regu-
lation difficult - is unlikely to be a problem for private insurers. The
personnel of these financial guaranty insurers are highly qualified
and have experience in the structuring of complex financial prod-
ucts. 2 79 One financial guaranty insurer had a president who was
responsible for global management of swaps, a senior vice president
who had specialized in swaps, caps, and options, and a third senior
vice president who was responsible for making interest rate swaps
accessible to the real estate market. 2 0 To the extent that a financial
guaranty insurer is held by a bank or group of banks, the owners can
be a source of financial expertise and management support.
281
Furthermore, financial guaranty insurers have already insured
the showpiece examples of the technical prowess of rocket scien-
tists. 28 2 For example, in the course of a single year, one company
Developments in Business Financing, NAIG Model Act on Financial Guaranty Insurance:
A Commentary, 43 Bus. LAw. 717, 717 (1988) (expressing concern about the
inadequate regulation of financial guarantors); Peers, Municipal Bond Insurance Gets
Cheaper, Wall St.J., March 1, 1989, at CI, col. 2 (noting that municipal bond insurance
is largely untested).
Financial guaranty insurance is provided by both "monoline" insurance
companies, which insure only third-party debt, and "multiline" insurance companies
which also offer more traditional commercial and property/casualty insurance
products in addition t6 debt insurance. See, e.g., Rating Methodology, STANDARD &
POOR'S CREDrrWEEK, Oct. 17, 1988 (Bond Insurance CreditReview Supplement), at
6.
279 See, e.g., Singer, Bond Insurer Cited for High Productivity, N.Y. Times, June 18,
1989, § 22, at 12, col. 3 (reporting that three out of every four employees of the
leading municipal bond insurer in the United States hold an advanced degree and
that all have had years of experience in business, government, and finance).
280 See Capital Markets Assurance Corporation, Management (undated
advertisement) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
281 See FINANCIAL GUARANTY INSURANCE COMPANY, PROFILE AND PROGRAMS:
FGIC 3 (1988). This is a mixed blessing from a regulatory standpoint; the bank
ownership can complicate analysis of the swap insurance scheme considerably. Cf
e.g., Wall St. J., June 12, 1989, § 2, at 5, col. I (stating that a financial guaranty
insurer was expected to complain to the Federal Reserve Board that a municipal
bond insurer owned by a bank holding company double counts the unit's capital for
banking purposes); cf. also R. LITAN, WHAT SHOULD BANKS Do? 99-143 (1987)
(describing risks of removing financial product-line restrictions on banks); infra note
312 (discussing U.S. West acquisition of corporate bond insurer).
282 See FINANCIAL SECURITY ASSURANCE INC., A GUARANTEE OF QUALITY IN
CORPORATE DEBT SECURITIES 6-11 (1989) [hereinafter FSA REPORT] (discussing
Financial Security Assurance's involvement in a public issue in which financial assets
were sold to reduce leveraged buyout debt); MooDY's INVESTORS SERVICE, SPECIAL
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insured bonds secured by a pool of retail installment sales contracts
secured by new and used automobiles, 283 as well as bonds secured by
over 74,000 home mortgages averaging about $23,000 each.284 In
order to evaluate properly the risks involved in these kinds of securi-
ties, complex computer modeling of cash flows, sophisticated "worst
case" simulations and careful statistical sampling techniques have all
been used.285
Even more convincing than the characteristics of the financial
guaranty insurance market is the fact that swap insurance of sorts
already exists. 286 The World Bank and the Deutsche Bank have in
place a program whereby the Deutsche Bank would insure up to $1
billion of the World Bank's currency swaps with European
counterparties with maturities of up to ten years. 287 Pursuant to this
arrangement, in the event of a default, Deutsche Bank would have
the option either to enter into a financially equivalent replacement
swap directly with the World Bank or to pay the World Bank the
market value of the swap. Because of this arrangement, the World
Bank can enter into swaps with counterparties whose credit stand-
REPORT: FSA - FINANCIAL SECURITY ASSURANCE INC. 5-10 (1987); cf. S&P Ratings
Guide, supra note 276, at 21 (noting insurer's "emphasis on unique and innovative
structures"); US Mortgage-Backed Securities: The True Home of the Rocket Scientist, INT'L
FIN. REV., Aug. 8, 1987, at 2600 (discussing complexity of mortgage-backed
instruments).
283 See WESTERN FINANCIAL AUTO LOANS 2, INC., supra note 277.
284 See MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, supra note 282, at 6.
285 Cf Monroe, Moody's, S&P are Thrust Into New Role, Wall St.J., Sept. 16, 1986,
§ 1, at 6, col. 1 (stating that the complexity of structured financings makes the rating
process crucial and that professional investors often cannot do their own analysis, as
they do customarily with traditional debt offerings).
286 Under the former program between the World Bank and Aetna, Aetna in
effect insured five swaps. See International Capital Markets: The World Bank Decides on Das
Deutsche-Swap, INT'L FIN. REV., July 23, 1988, at 2383; see also THE WORLD BANK, SWAP
INSURANCE PROGRAM - GENERAL INFORMATION, reprinted in INTEREST RATE AND
CURRENCY SWAPS 1987, at 47-52 (1987) (discussing the general aspects of the World
Bank's swap insurance program); Brenner, Aetna Pioneers Insurer Role in Swap
Guarantees, AM. BANKER, Mar. 17, 1986, at 1 (discussing Aetna's approval of "about
100 corporations for swaps" with the World Bank).
Protection against the default of the bank's customer is also possible through the
purchase of a standby letter of credit. See Adams & Peck, The Federal Home Loan Banks
and the Home Finance System, 43 Bus. LAW. 833, 851 (May 1988).
287 See When the Swap Meets the Option, EUROMONEY, Apr. 1989 (supplement), at
26, 27; World Bank, Press Release No. 89/F9 (July 28, 1988); cf., e.g., Cooper, Swaps -
An Even Bigger Black Box, EUROMONEY, June 1989 (supplement), at 75 (describing how
one investment house is "currently working on a number of potential [swap] deals
with investors involving credit enhancement via mechanisms including insurance
company guarantees").
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ings would otherwise disqualify them due to the World Bank's strin-
gent policies.
2 88
Deutsche Bank is not alone in offering swap insurance. For
instance, Capital Markets Assurance Corporation ("CapMac"), a
financial guarantor with a triple-A rating from Standard & Poor's,
has also begun offering swap insurance. Under its plan, a party can
purchase a surety bond from CapMac which covers all or a specified
part of the losses on default of the other party to the swap. 28 9 Under
the CapMac plan, swap dealers can purchase surety bonds covering
swaps and related instruments with counterparties who have a triple-
B rating.
2 90
If the proposed swap insurance requirement as to non-desig-
nated products is adopted, the demand for swap insurance will
increase dramatically. The existence of a nascent swaps insurance
industry even in the absence of such a regulatory requirement and
the existence of a large and sophisticated financial guaranty industry
strongly suggest that there would be some swap insurers of the req-
uisite creditworthiness and sophistication.
The fact there might be some qualifying swap insurers, however,
only suggests that some swap insurance would be available. Before a
swap insurance requirement can be adopted, there must be some
assurance that the contemplated swap insurance market will be deep
enough to handle all of the credit risks to be assumed. 9' After all,
the use of extremely stringent creditworthiness standards and the
complexity involved in assessing the risks of non-plain-vanilla hedg-
ing instruments mean that the number of potential swap insurers
may be quite low. If regulators elect to adopt the swap insurance
supplement to the capital adequacy system despite a capacity prob-
288 See World Bank, supra note 287 (stating that without the new swap
arrangements, the World Bank could only swap with corporations or public entities
rated triple-A); see also Simonian, Deutsche Bank Agrees on Swap Deal, FIN. TIMES, July
29, 1988, at 23, col. 1 (stating that "[u]nder its existing rules, the World Bank can
only enter deals with triple A rated counterparties").
289 See CAPITAL MARKETS ASSURANCE CORP., SWAP INSURANCE (undated); see also'
Swap Default Insurance Cost Revealed, SWAPS MONITOR, May 29, 1989, at 4 (describing
CapMac's system of pricing swap insurance).
290 See Swap Default Insurance Cost Revealed, supra note 289, at 4 (discussing the
cost of insuring an interest rate swap against default by a triple-B party). As of May
1989, CapMac had not yet written any swap default insurance. See id.
291 For a discussion of the problems of availability in other insurance areas, see
Abraham, supra note 35, at 943-44 (discussing the difficulty of obtaining
environmental liability insurance); Clarke, Warren-Boulton, Smith & Simon, Sources of
the Crisis in Liability Insurance: An Economic Analysis, 5 YALEJ. ON REG. 367, 367 (1988)
(discussing the "unaffordability and unavailability" of property-casualty insurance).
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lem, the regulators would be able to ameliorate the capacity problem
by increasing the number of "designated products." Since the swap
insurance scheme is only applicable as to non-designated products,
less pressure would be put on the capacity of the swaps industry. By
carefully modulating the mix of designated and non-designated
products, regulators can ensure that the safety valve of swap insur-
ance be used only for the most egregious cases of regulatory
mispricing.
In sum, it is highly likely that there will be swap insurers of the
requisite creditworthiness and sophistication. However, absent
empirical analyses of both potential entrants and the relative impor-
tance of products in the designated and non-designated product
classes, it is impossible to determine whether there would be suffi-
cient capacity to handle all of the non-designated product credit risk.
To the extent that there is a capacity problem, regulators can amelio-
rate the problem by increasing the number of products in the desig-
nated products category.
b. Insurer Default
The proposed system depends on each financial guaranty
insurer being able and willing to meet its obligations to its bank cus-
tomer upon default by the swap counterparty. 92 As discussed ear-
lier, under the working model, a qualifying insurer would have to
292 A financial guarantor, even if solvent, may of course seek to avoid paying a
claim with respect to a swap default on various technical grounds. This "weaseling
out" problem has been analyzed in the context of the financial guaranty insurance
generally. Given the ratings assigned to insured bonds, ratings agencies have
apparently deemed this to be unlikely. The market, however, is not quite as
confident; some believe that this doubt contributes to triple-A insured bonds
typically trading at "double-A" yields. See infra note 302.
Close analysis of possible defenses in the posited swap insurance system will be
necessary. A bank which has actively participated in the procurement of swap
insurance for its own benefit may not necessarily stand on the same footing relative
to a defending insurance company as the beneficiary of bond insurance which had
been arranged by the issuer itself. For discussion of these issues in the general
financial guaranty context, see UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL GUARANTEE MARKET: THE USE OF THE
EXEMPTION IN SECTION 3(A)(2) OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 FOR SECURITIES
GUARANTEED BY BANKS AND THE USE OF INSURANCE POLICIES TO GUARANTEE DEBT
SECURITIES 37-38 (1987) [hereinafter SEC REPORT]; Letter from Robert A. Meyer,
Bond Investors Guaranty, to Lynette Carter, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, William H. Wiles, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and
Hoyle L. Robinson, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (May 13, 1988)
(describing limitations on defenses available to such insurers); Letter from David H.
Elliott, Association of Financial Guarantor Insurors, to Lynette Carter, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, William H. Wiles, Board of Governors of the Federal
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meet a "double triple" 293 credit rating standard as well as carry mar-
ket risk premia which do not exceed specified levels. A "double
triple" institution presumably has a default risk that is equal to or
lower than that of comparable institutions with a split rating. The
market risk premia requirement may help screen out entities that
have suffered deteriorations in creditworthiness not yet reflected by
downgradings in their credit ratings.294 This standard is more strin-
gent than a simple triple-A standard. Evidence that even a simple
triple-A standard is stringent would thus be quite comforting.
A simple triple-A standard is quite stringent. Ratings agencies
do not assign triple-A ratings lightly. As of February 1988, less than
two percent of the senior debt of United States industrial companies
was rated triple-A by Standard & Poor's.295 As of November 1988,
only twelve American industrial companies were assigned a triple-A
rating by Standard & Poor's.
296
The creditworthiness of an insurer could of course decline.
Luckily, one of the leading sources of rapid declines in creditworthi-
ness in recent years - the financial restructuring which has created so-
called "event risk" 297 - is less likely to cause such problems for finan-
Reserve System, and Hoyle L. Robinson, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(May 10, 1988) (same).
293 Ratings agencies can differ on their ratings. See supra note 271. The
differences can be accentuated when complicated financial instruments are involved.
Cf Dickins, The Rating Game, CORP. FIN., Feb. 1989, at 46 (stating that "as corporate
structures become more complex, agencies are more likely to rank borrowers
differently"); Mortgage Funding Corp gets the Moody's blues, CORP. FIN., Sept. 1988, at 5
(discussing how two rating agencies gave different ratings to a company that issued
more than $300 million of floating rate notes).
294 Some observers believe that ratings agencies lag behind events in
downgrading issuers. See, e.g., American Money-Centre Banks: A Pile ofJunk, ECONOMIST,
Feb. 6, 1988, at 82 ("When Standard & Poor's ... downgraded the debts of some of
America's largest banks on February 1st, it was stating the obvious. Investors had
been downgrading those securities themselves for months."); Herman, Downgrading
the Credit Rating Services, Wall St. J., June 23, 1989, at C1, col. 2 (quoting an officer at
an investment counselling firm as saying that credit ratings "lag behind current
events in many instances").
295 STANDARD & POOR'S CORPORATION, COMMENTS ON THE NATURE OF THE
MARKET FOR HIGH YIELD BONDS, reprinted in UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, HIGH YIELD BONDS: NATURE OF THE MARKET AND EFFECT ON FEDERALLY
INSURED INSTITUTIONS 181 (1988). Similarly, Moody's gave its triple-A rating to only
$7.90 billion of the $113.09 billion new U.S. corporate debt it rated. See Market
Statistics 1988: United States, MOODY'S BOND SuRv., Jan. 23, 1988, § 2, at 7697.
296 See Sheeline, The Straight-A Club, FORTUNE, Nov. 21, 1988, at 9.
297 Standard & Poor's defines "event risk" as "the potential for a sudden and
dramatic decline in credit quality resulting from a large stock repurchase or dividend
payment by the obligor, the obligor's acquisition by another entity, or other
restructurings that remove assets from or add liabilities to the obligor." Hessol &
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cial guarantors. This is because the nature of the creditworthiness
issue in the typical corporation is distinguishable from that of a
financed guaranty insurer. With the typical corporation,
creditworthiness is not a goal in itself, but is instead one of the tools
to maximize shareholder value. Thus a triple-A credit rating, far
from being a goal of management, might even be a sign that the capi-
tal structure of the firm is not optimal.298 The situation is quite dif-
ferent with a financial guaranty insurer because "[a]ll a financial
guarantor sells is [its] triple-A." '299 Because the loss of a triple-A
rating would ravage the value of the financial guaranty insurer itself,
both current and would-be management will have unusually strong
incentives to avoid engaging in any restructuring which would could
result in the loss of the triple-A rating.
3 0 0
Finally, as an empirical matter, obligations bearing high credit
ratings tend to have low default rates. Of 52 corporate issuers which
defaulted from 1972 to 1984, only one was rated as high as triple-B,
the lowest category within the "investment grade" class. 301 An anal-
ysis of all corporate straight debt in the period 1970 through 1986
found that not a single issue carried either a triple-A rating or a
double-A rating from Standard & Poor's one year before default.
30 2
Samson, Event Risk Covenant Rankings, STANDARD & POOR'S CREDITWEEK, July 24,
1989, at 1. For a discussion of the "event risk" issue, see European bond markets: Main
events, ECONOMIST,July 22, 1989, at 71; Global Outlook 1989: Overview, MOODY'S BOND
SURV., Jan. 23, 1989, § 2, at 7660, 7661.
In July 1989, Standard & Poor's began explicitly ranking the protection of
corporate debt obligations against event risk. See Hessol & Samson, supra, at 1.
298 See, e.g., STANDARD & POOR'S CORPORATION, supra note 295, at 181, 182 &
187; Stillit, The Perfect Capital Structure, CORP. FIN., Nov. 1988, at 54, 59.
299 See Farrell, The Risky Business of Insuring Muni Debt, Bus. WK., Apr. 27, 1987,
at 96, 97 (quoting the executive vice president of a financial guarantor firm after its
ratings had dropped); cf. MBIA INC., ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K, at 14 (1989)
(noting that an insurer's "ability to compete with other financial guarantors would be
materially adversely affected by any reduction in its ratings").
300 Cf Mebus & Levin, Property/casualty insurers' low event risk, STANDARD & POOR'S
CREDITWEEK, Apr. 24, 1989, at 20 (discussing the low event risk of property and
casualty insurance companies).
301 See Keslar, supra note 270, at 46; cf STANDARD & POOR'S CORPORATION, supra
note 295, at 185 (for the period 1977 through 1987, with one exception, all defaults
on rated public debt were confined to the speculative grade sector).
302 See Altman, Measuring Corporate Bond Mortality and Performance (Feb. 1988),
reprinted in U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HIGH YIELD BONDS: NATURE OF THE
MARKET AND EFFECT ON FEDERALLY INSURED INSTITUTIONS 155, 158 (1988); cf.
MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICES, HISTORICAL DEFAULT RATES OF CORPORATE BOND
ISSUERS 1970-1988, at 7 (July 1989) (stating that from 1970 to 1988, every defaulting
issuer with a Moody's rating carried a simple A or lower rating).
Double-A bond data is relevant because insured bonds typically trade at double-
A interest levels. See Farrell, supra note 299, at 96- 97 ("Issues backed by an AAA
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Only one to two percent of bonds originally issued in 1970 with rat-
ings of double-A or triple-A from Moody's ended up defaulting in
the nineteen subsequent years. 3
In sum, under normal economic conditions, it is highly unlikely
that a qualifying swap insurer will default on its obligations. The
more difficult issue is posed by concerns over whether such insurers
would in fact be able and willing to protect their customers in the
event of a world-wide financial cataclysm.3 4 In evaluating this
insurer usually sell at the higher yields of an AA bond.") Market investors do not
quite believe that insured bonds really deliver triple-A quality. Part of this skepticism
stems from a concern that bond insurers might somehow weasel out of their
obligations. See Celarier, Are the Risks Covered, U.S. BANKER, Nov. 1987, at 72 (quoting
the officer of a financial guarantor as saying that investors suspect "someplace there's
some fine print" that will allow the financial guarantor to "weasel out"); Rudnitsky,
What's in a Rating?, FORBES, Sept. 12, 1983, at 41 ("Even MBIA's Miralia admits that
'most insured are selling as double-A and sometimes as cheap double-A.' The market
is telling you that turning triple-B insured into a triple-A may not be the bargain it
seems to be."); supra note 292.
303 See MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICES, supra note 302, at 22.
Only "anecdotal" statistics are used here to illustrate the low default risk as to
high quality bonds; more sophisticated statistics are nonetheless consistent with the
anecdotal evidence. See, e.g., Altman, Measuring Corporate Bond Mortality and
Performance, 44 J. FIN. 909, 913 (1989) (noting that, based on data for the period
1971-1987, "AAA-rated debt had a zero mortality rate for the first five years after
issuance and then only 0.13 percent from six to ten years (due to Texaco's 1987 bond
default)"). The current dispute in the junk bond market over the proper
methodology for evaluating historical bond default rates have not undermined the
general notion that bonds with Triple-A ratings are relatively unlikely to end up in
default. Cf SEC REPORT, supra note 292, at 54 ("The apparent accuracy of the
ratings agencies in designating a AAA or "prime" rating has made the AAA rating an
attractive and generally reliable indicator of credit risk for the investor."). For a
sense of the current controversy over the proper methodology for analyzing bond
defaults, see Altman, supra; Asquith, Mullins, & Wolff, Original Issue High Yield Bonds:
Aging Analyses of Defaults, Exchanges, and Calls, 44 J. FIN. 923 (1989); Junk Bond Defaults
at 11.27, N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1989, at D12, col. 5; Ricks, Even 'Soft Landing'May Jolt
1 of 8 Junk Bonds, Wall St. J., July 12, 1989, at C1, col. 3.
The 1983 default on bonds to finance plants 4 and 5 of the Washington Public
Power System was the largest in the history of the tax-exempt muncipal bond market.
Standard & Poor's rated the bonds "A" at the time of their issuance. For background
on this fascinating story, see The Bonneville Power Administration [BPA] and Washington
Public Power Supply System [WPPSS: Oversight Hearing before the Subcomm. on Mining,
Forest Management, and Bonneville Power Administration of the House Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, Pt. I, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); Bernstein, A Nuclear Fiasco Shakes the
Bond Market, FORTUNE, Feb. 22, 1982, at 100; Datta, Analysts Group May Examine
Members' Roles in WPPSS Case, BOND BUYER, Oct. 28, 1988, at 1; Settlement on Default is
Approved, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1989, at D5, col. 3.
304 For analysis of default rates during the Great Depression, see W. HICKMAN,
CORPORATE BOND QUALITY AND INVESTOR EXPERIEN4CE (1958); Fitzpatrick &
Severiens, Hickman Revisited: The Case for Junk Bonds, J. PORTFOLIO MGmT. 53 (1978).
Michael Milken, ofjunk bond fame, first encountered Hickman's work in college. See
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aspect of the swap insurance scheme, the same kind of political judg-
ment which went into determining how much capital was "adequate"
will need to be made as to whether these risks are tolerable.
c. Cost
The costs associated with entering into appropriate insurance
arrangements raise subtle issues. If the transaction costs in
obtaining insurance coverage or the insurance premiums themselves
are too high relative to the credit risks involved, the swap insurance
scheme would serve to chill the market for non-designated products.
A bank may decide not to bother offering the product and any pri-
vate and social benefits associated with the new financial product 30 5
would be lost. Instead of simply ensuring that banks engage in non-
designated products activity in a manner which does not create unac-
ceptable risks for society, the insurance scheme would instead
deprive society of the instruments themselves. If the insurance pre-
miums are too low relative to the credit risks involved, the long-run
viability of individual swap insurers would be threatened.
While the transaction costs involved in obtaining insurance cov-
erage cannot be estimated with any certainty without empirical
research, the likely circumstances in which such transactions costs
will arise can be outlined. A swap dealer who anticipates doing a
material amount of non-designated product business would likely
want to first enter into a master agreement with each of the major
swap insurers. This type of master agreement could cover the basic
kinds of rights and obligations which would govern the relationship
between the swap dealer and the swap insurer. Having established a
network of master agreements, a swap dealer could limit negotia-
tions with swap insurers as to the insurance coverage for a specific
C. BRUCK, THE PREDATORS' BALL: THE JUNK-BOND RAIDERS AND THE MAN WHO
STAKED THEM 27-28 (1988).
One can argue that, by concentrating huge bank swap risks onto a relatively few
number of insurers, the swap insurance scheme itself has the potential for increasing
the chances of financial cataclysm. Several factors serve to mitigate this concern.
First, swap insurance may represent only a small part of the business of the insurer;
indeed, the credit rating and risk premium mechanism contemplated in the working
model will tend to prevent insurers from becoming too dependent on any one sector.
Second, the swap insurance scheme is supplementary to the capital adequacy
approach established under the BIS Accord. Swap insurers only absorb the credit
risk of non-designated products; the credit risks associated with designated
products-the kinds of plain vanilla swaps which are predominant in the
marketplace-are still absorbed by the banks themselves.
305 See supra note 146.
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swap transaction to the particulars of the counterparty and kind of
swap involved. If a swap dealer accepts the quote given by a particu-
lar swap insurer, the two could then document that fact through an
exchange of simple confirmations; the specific swap transaction
would then be covered by the master agreement, modified by the
pricing terms set out in the confirmation."0 6
While this master agreement system would involve far lower
transactions costs than separate, fully-negotiated agreements for
each particular swap transaction, the transactions costs may never-
theless still be too high in the judgment of a swap dealer. A swap
dealer may not have the luxury of providing information as to spe-
cific counterparties and swaps to a series of swap insurers and then
waiting for quotes before being able to make a commitment to the
swap dealer's customer. A swap dealer would want to establish an
arrangement which functions much like a credit card in the wallet of
a consumer. A swap dealer would like to be able to simply place a
swap on its account with the swap insurer of his choosing without
having to obtain the prior consent of the swap insurer; under this
arrangement, the types, amounts, and counterparties for whom this
system would operate would be specified in the master agreement.
While there is some precedent for this type of arrangement in the
financial guaranty industry,30 7 the question of whether this type of
arrangement will be widely available under the swaps industry
scheme or permitted by ratings agencies or state insurance regula-
tors will be an important one in determining the overall feasibility of
such a scheme.
The level of insurance pricing will also play a critical role in
determining the feasibility of the swaps insurance scheme. Two of
the major obstacles to proper regulatory pricing under the BIS
306 Because of the relatively small size of most swaps, this master agreement
approach would reduce transactions costs significantly. The average notional
amount of interest rate swaps entered into in the first half of 1988 was $20 million
and that of currency swaps was $33 million. AM. BANKER, Dec. 8, 1988, at 3, col. 4.
This system would be analogous to the master agreement system in wide use for the
documentation of swaps. See supra note 82.
307 See, e.g., VANGUARD MONEY MARKET RESERVES, PROSPECTUS 10 (Mar. 31,
1988) (discussing procedures which were used by the former "Insured Portfolio"
mutual fund in obtaining insurance against credit risk of money market instruments);
DELTA GOVERNMENT OPTIONS CORP., PROSPECTUS 7-8, 14-15 & 29 (Jan. 12, 1989)
(discussing system for the trading of put and call options wherein the issuer is
protected from default on the part of participants in the system by financial guaranty
insurance); cf. Board of Trade v. SEC, 883 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1989) (vacating the
SEC's temporary approval of clearing agency registration for Delta Government
Options Corporation).
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Accord do not operate as to the swap insurance scheme. The map-
ping problem endemic to the classification-based BIS Accord's sys-
tem should not occur; under the swap insurance scheme, pricing is
agreed upon with a particular transaction in mind. Similarly, the
kinds of regulatory lags arising from the necessity of renegotiating
across countries under the BIS Accord's system should not occur;
under the swap insurance scheme, only two parties are directly
involved and they only need to decide the price as to the particular
transaction.
The question of whether the insurance premium will bear a rea-
sonable relationship to the credit risks of non-designated products
will turn on whether the insurers would be able to evaluate those
risks correctly and, if they do, whether they will elect to charge a
reasonable premium. Although it is always possible that a swap
insurer will misjudge the risks on a new financial product, the likely
background of the relevant personnel suggests that this would not
happen very often.3 0 8 As discussed earlier, financial guarantors have
had extensive experience in dealing with complicated instru-
ments.3 0 9 Furthermore, to the extent that risk information as to a
particular non-designated product has not yet diffused into the mar-
ketplace, swap dealers may be somewhat more forthcoming with
swap insurers than with government regulators. With swap insurers,
there is no possibility that they will have to divulge sensitive informa-
tion because of the Freedom of Information Act or similar laws.
Moreover, to the extent that confidentiality is needed, financial insti-
tutions could ask for an appropriate non-disclosure agreement.
Available evidence in analogous contexts suggests that confidential-
ity can be maintained.3 10 The primary concern here would be the
willingness of banks to share information with insurers who may be
affiliated with competitor institutions .
3 1 1
The continuing ability of insurers to evaluate these complex
308 Moreover, the stringent creditworthiness requirements help assure that
mistakes in one or more transactions would have to be disastrous before the ability of
the financial guaranty insurer to meet its obligations is threatened.
309 See supra notes 280-86 and accompanying text.
310 Cf Liu & Moore, The Impact of Split Bond Ratings on Risk Premia, 22 FIN. REV.
71, 74 & 83-84 (1987) (providing statistical evidence consistent with the notion that
confidential information collected by ratings agencies is kept out of the public
domain).
311 Financial guaranty insurers need not be owned by or affiliated with banks or
insurance companies. For instance, U.S. West Inc., the regional Bell telephone
company serving the Rocky Mountain states, announced plans recently to acquire
Financial Security Assurance Holdings Ltd., the largest insurer of corporate bonds.
See Quint, Bond Insurer to be Bought by U.S. West, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1989, at DI, col. 6.
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products can be monitored by the presence of the ratings agen-
cies.3 12 Ratings agencies will not assign a triple-A rating to an
insurer which they believe lacks the basic capacity to evaluate risk.313
Ratings agencies are well-positioned to undertake this evaluative
role. Ratings agencies have developed specific expertise with respect
to complex new financial products and with respect to financial guar-
anty insurers. Indeed, rating agencies are familiar with both the
legal and economic complexities of innovative securities (including
swaps and over-the-counter options), and have themselves engaged
in original empirical and legal analyses pertaining to new securities
of the utmost complexity in an effort to determine their risk charac-
teristics.3 14 Ratings criteria have, in fact, become blueprints for
312 One municipal bond analyst referred to state regulation of the municipal
bond industry as a "joke" and said that "there's nothing wrong with the rating
agencies having a strong influence on the business" and that he was "glad to see
they're keeping them honest." Greenwald, Triple-A Ratings Expensive, Insurers Say,
Bus. INS., Oct. 10, 1988, at 38 (quoting Jeffrey Noss, a Vice-President and Bond
Analyst with the Bank of New York). This situation may be changing; in April 1989,
New York State adopted statutory provisions pertaining specifically to financial
guaranty insurers. See Laws of New York Ch. 48 (adding Article 69 to New York
Insurance Law).
The ratings agencies charge for this regulation. "Observers conservatively
estimate that the municipal bond insurance industry now spends about $20 million
annually for its ratings." Greenwald, supra. at 38.
313 See, e.g., PUBLIC FINANCE DEPARTMENT, MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, INC.,
FINANCIAL GUARANTY INSURANCE COMPANY: UPDATE 3 (1988) ("Confidence in a bond
insurer's underwriting standards and procedures is key to Moody's evaluation of the
insurer's potential claims under economic stress."); Taub, Monoline Bond Reinsurers'
Rising Entiy Barriers, STANDARD & POOR'S CREDITWEEK, Feb. 15, 1988, at 19, 20
(management would "offer key skills and experience in the insurance and
reinsurance industries, credit analysis, and capital markets" and have to
"demonstrate ability to establish strong operating and monitoring controls."). But
see Elliott, Rating the Debt Raters, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Dec. 1988, at 109, 112
("[M]ost industrial companies feel that they receive perfunctory treatment when their
debt is reviewed."); supra note 303 (concerning Washington Public Power System
bonds).
314 For instance, in connection with the emergence of "defeasance-type"
mortgage-backed bonds in 1988, Standard & Poor's undertook a massive, multi-
faceted empirical analysis of such bonds' risk profile. See Raiti, The Defeasance
Innovation, STANDARD & POOR'S CREDrrWEEK, July 25, 1988, at 21; see also CMO
Residuals, STANDARD & POOR'S CREDrrWEEK, August 29, 1988, at 3 (describing the
rating of collateralized mortgage obligation residuals as "among the most complex
mortgage securities currently available"); Citeria Update: Two Years of Evolution,
STANDARD & POOR'S CREDrrWEEK, Nov.24, 1986, at 1 (Nov. 24, 1986) (describing the
methodology used for rating commercial mortgage-backed securities).
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designers of new securities,3" and the rating of financial guarantors
is now so routine that published guidelines are available.3 16
The same rating agency which helps assure that the insurers
understand new financial products would also serve to discipline the
insurers from charging premiums which are too low. If the pricing is
too low relative to the true risks of the swaps, not only will the
insurer not earn a competitive rate of return, but it will also jeopard-
ize its triple-A rating.
31 7
Of greater concern are premiums which are too high. Over-
pricing could occur in two ways. First, if there are relatively few swap
insurers, there is potential for collusion or other non-competitive
pricing. This is of particular concern in the United States where the
McCarran-Ferguson Act might severely limit the use of federal anti-
trust statutes to combat such overpricing.318 While anecdotal evi-
dence suggesting that the pricing policies of financial guarantors
have been on the low rather than on the high side is reassuring,
31 9
the dangers of overpricing cannot be ignored. Second, the financial
guaranty insurance industry in the United States has tended to be
fairly conservative as to the bond issues it is willing to insure.
3 20 If
this manifests itself among swap insurers under the model scheme,
the premiums charged may be too high.
315 See Monroe, S&PAre Thrust Into New Role, Wall St.J., Sept. 16, 1986, at 6, col.
1.
316 See, e.g., Rating Methodology, STANDARD & POOR'S CREDITWEEK, Oct. 17,
1988, at 6.
317 See, e.g., Greenwald, Rates Fallingfor Municipal Bond Cover, Bus. INS., Oct. 10,
1988, at 33, 36 (noting that price competition among municipal bond insurers
limited by the need to keep triple-A ratings).
318 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012 & 1013(b) (1982) (limited federal antitrust immunity
for the business of insurance); In re Insurance Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 767
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file) (lawsuit filed by 19
state attorneys general against numerous insurance companies dismissed on
McCarran-Ferguson Act grounds); Note, Financial Guaranty Insurance: Is it "The
Business of Insurance" Under the McCarran Act, 1988 COLUM. Bus. REv. 855, 858
(discussing applicability of McCarran-Ferguson Act to financial guaranty insurance).
319 See Walters, Premium Battle Among Top Bond Insurers May Result in Coverage for
Fewer Issues, BOND BUYER, Oct. 3, 1988, at 4 (available on NEXIS) ; Luxenberg, Buyer's
Market for Insured Municipals, N.Y. Times, May 7, 1989, § 3, at 12, col. 3.
320 See, e.g., Milligan, supra note 275, at 197-98 (stating that a corporate bond
insurer "strives for a no-loss underwriting result and will insure only obligations that
already qualify as investment grade"); Singer, supra note 279, § 2, at 12, col. 3 (bond
insurer stating that it furnishes bond insurance for "investment-grade offerings only,
not for marginal credits"). But cf Imperial Uses FSA to Set Overcollateralization Debt Deal,
CORP. FIN. WK., Mar. 7, 1988, at 2 (available on NEXIS) (describing a transaction in
which the insured debt was collateralized with privately placed junk bonds).
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The arcane new financial products of this past decade have
started to command attention. Apocalyptic visions of world-wide
financial disaster caused by these products and images of panic-
stricken traders on the stock exchanges in New York and in the trad-
ing pits of Chicago reach mythical proportions and touch a primor-
dial nerve. Bank regulators, with the BIS Accord, have seized the
regulatory initiative. We are witnessing the creation of a new gener-
ation of financial regulation, a regime to deal with complicated prod-
ucts which now constitute pivotal elements of a globalized financial
system. The BIS Accord is a supreme achievement, fashioning a reg-
ulatory structure based on remarkably sophisticated analyses and
overcoming daunting international collective action problems.
However, the BIS Accord's reliance on legalistic solutions -
rigid, classification-based rules administered and maintained by gov-
ernment regulators - is reflective of a simpler, more static financial
era. The process of financial innovation is now far too institutional-
ized and complex to be so confined. The science which started to
drive finance this past decade has, in this paradigmatic case, outrun
the art of financial regulation.
Financial regulators must develop a mechanism to deal explicitly
with this underlying process. The difficulties involved in devising
such a mechanism are daunting. A brief overview of one of the sim-
plest, most incremental of possible mechanisms suggests the dimen-
sions of the task. Unless we begin now to intensify our efforts,
incremental changes may ultimately prove insufficient to ensure the
continued stability of the world financial system.
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